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The theory of the moral agent is the normative theory which prescribes actions 
following the higher authority. In this thesis, I conduct a comparative analysis 
of Plato and the Laozi to uncover what they say about the moral agent. My 
findings will show that the same theory is used, in relation to the formation of 
the moral agent, the final moral ends and moral motivations, in ancient Chines 
and Greek philosophies, in particular the Laozi and Plato.  
With regard to the evidence of the notion of moral agent in the Laozi and Plato, 
I find that both encourage people in a socio-political context to follow the role 
model set by an exemplary figure in each, which is the sage in the Laozi and 
the philosopher-king in Plato. With regard to the process of the 
education/cultivation of people to the stage of the role model, each related 
aspect of the exemplary figure has been presented, such as the final moral 
ends, moral psychology and their actions.  
I argue that we can find that the moral agent can be cultivated/educated by 
following a higher authority in the Laozi and Plato, the dao and the cosmic god 
respectively, whereas the relation between the moral agent and human society 
are presented differently in each philosophy. Both the dao and the cosmic god 
represent the highest good for humans, because they contain the principles of 
the order for humans to emulate. We can find that the final moral ends for the 
Laozi is to live in accordance with the dao, whereas for Plato it is to become 
godlike as much as possible. On the basis of the relation between the moral 
agent and the final moral ends, I argue that although both the Laozi and Plato 
draw attention to the connection between desires and motivation of action for 
moral agents, the treatment of knowledge is different between, which leads to 
a difference in the treatment of desires. Both think that desires are necessary 
for the motivations of the moral agent to act. Moral agents can be cultivated 
(the Laozi) and educated (in Plato) and controlled in a certain way so as to 
regulate the desires that would motivate them to act. The moral motivation for 
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the Laozi would for the moral agent to have no desires, whereas the best life 
for the moral agent in Plato would be that the rational soul rules the whole 
human body and soul. For the Laozi acting wuwei and being in the status of 
having no desires is to live in accordance with the dao, whereas for Plato, 
letting the rational part of the soul rule the life of human beings is the final moral 
end that leads the human life to become as godlike as possible. 
The finding of this thesis is that we can identify, interpret and evaluate the 
notion of the moral agent including the relation to the formation of moral agent, 
the final moral ends and moral psychology in both the Laozi and Plato. By 
identifying the notion of the moral agent in the Laozi and Plato, I demonstrate 
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The theory of moral agent is the normative theory which prescribes actions 
following the higher authority. In this thesis, I conduct a comparative analysis 
of Plato and the Laozi to uncover what they have say about the moral agent. I 
shall specifically relate my analysis to their discussions on the education and 
cultivation, and related aspects of the moral agent. My research will, hopefully, 
inform further discussion on this topic in contemporary moral philosophy. Over 
recent decades, a sharp distinction has been drawn by Christopher Gill 
between action-centred and agent-centred moral normative theories in order 
to differentiate the focal points of ancient ethics and contemporary morality1 
This distinction is based on the general questions these theories explore, 
examine and discuss, e.g. action-centred theories decode what action is right 
and what action is wrong and provide decision procedures to guide moral 
agents to perform right actions; whereas agent-centred theories focus on 
issues moral agents adopt, such as vision, beliefs, motives and communal 
values. In contemporary moral theories, action-centred moral normative 
theories are known commonly as consequentialism and deontology, whereas 
agent-centred moral normative theories are known as virtue ethics. However, 
care needs to be taken since consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics 
take a variety of forms, and in some cases bridge the distinction of being agent-
centred or action-centred. For example, the most common Western form of 
consequentialism is utilitarianism, which avows that moral agents should 
perform actions that can maximise the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number of people. This is also known as ‘act-consequentialism’, which 
becomes a decision-making procedure advocating that an action is right if, and 
only if, the action maximises happiness. Rule-consequentialism, as a 
subdivision of consequentialism, intends to reconcile deontology and 
 
1 Gill, Christopher (ed.) (2005). Virtue, Norms, and Objectivity: Issues in Ancient and Modern Ethics. 
Oxford University Press, p.1. 
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consequentialism. As it notes that “an act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden 
by the code of rules whose internalisation by the overwhelming majority of 
everyone everywhere in each new generation has maximum expected value 
in terms of well-being (with some priority for the worst off)”, the rule-
consequentialist takes over deontologist moral rules as their prerequisite 
internalised social rules, and then conducts consequentialist calculating 
principles. On the one hand, rule-consequentialism reconciles the certain 
tension between consequentialism and deontology; on the other, it also blurs 
the distinction between consequentialism and deontology. Besides the 
common distinctions of either following moral rules or aiming for maximum 
happiness, or justifying that an action is good, there is another distinction 
between consequentialism and deontology, which is the contrast between 
agent-neutral and agent-relative ethical considerations.2  
While my thesis is not tasked to research contemporary moral ethics in order 
to make fine-grained distinctions between different fields and disciplines or to 
reconcile disputes between them, these disputes frequently concern the nature 
of the moral agent. In addition virtue ethics has roots in ancient Greek 
philosophy and argues that the moral agent is the criterion to measure if the 
 
2 Agent-neutral moral theory indicates that it offers moral agents an identical set of substantive 
aims, whereas agent-relative moral theories indicate that an act is right if it maximises the 
agent’s utility. It is commonly held that consequentialism is considered as agent-neural and 
deontology is considered as agent-relative. Agent-neutral moral theory has the moral value 
from an objective perspective, so for example, for any moral agent from an act-consequential 
perspective, an action is right if and only if the action maximises happiness. The reasoning for 
the performance of the action does not change according to different moral agents. Deontology 
is always considered as agent-relative moral theory, because this kind of theory gives each 
moral agent a particular concern for what reason or motive the moral agent intends to act in 
a certain way, rather than the general action or reasoning for all moral agents. Dougherty 
argues that a moral rule can be agent-neutral and deontological, because he suggests an 
alternative to deontic constraints. See papers: Dougherty, T. (2013). Agent-neutral deontology. 
Philosophical Studies, 163(2), 527-537. Hammerton, Matthew. (2017). Is agent-neutral 
deontology possible? Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 12(3), p.319. 
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action per se is moral.3 Thus the aim of my research is to revisit texts of ancient 
Chinese and Greek philosophy and examine the extent to which they discuss 
the moral agent, particularly focusing on the formation of the moral agent, the 
final moral ends and moral psychology, and to understand the relevance of 
these discussions in contemporary moral theories. Specifically, my research 
has two aims; first to use a comparative philosophy approach to identify what 
the texts of the Laozi and Plato articulate about the nature of the moral agent, 
and second to reveal how this comparative analysis can add to the many 
discussions on the nature of the moral agent in contemporary moral theories 
in the future.  
1.1 Comparative Grounds --- Moral Agent  
Contemporary philosophy is comprised of a wide field of theories and 
approaches and it is beyond the scope and purpose of this work to research 
them in detail. Therefore, for the purpose of my research moral agent will 
hereafter be understood in the specific sense that it encompasses any person 
who is able to make moral judgements based on the notion of right and wrong 
and taking responsibility for their actions.4 I recognise this definition of moral 
agent is not used by all strands of contemporary philosophy but, as long as my 
 
3 Williams, B. (1993). Shame and necessity (Sather classical lectures; v. 57). Berkeley; London: 
University of California Press; Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) “Modern Moral Philosophy.” 
Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 124, pp.1-6; Frankena, W. (1973). Ethics (Second ed., Prentice-Hall 
foundations of philosophy series). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.; Hursthouse, R., 
(1999). On virtue ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
4 Boostrom, R. (1998). The student as moral agent. Journal of Moral Education, 27/ (2), 179-190, 
p. 180. Robert Boostrom claims that “In a general sense, a moral agent is rational and 
deliberative. A moral agent acts and judges in accordance with her own understanding of the 
good. A moral agent is a subject, not an object, and thus cannot be a receptacle.” Mayo, B. 
(1968). The Moral Agent. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1, 47-63. In Bernard’s paper, he 
focuses on the notion of moral agent in the respect of the social role, I think that is also 
important to consider, and the Laozi and Plato also consider the importance of the social role 
for the moral agent.  
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perspective is clear I believe that the findings from my comparative analysis of 
the ancient texts will be understood by all.  
Another aspect of my research that must be clarified is a recognition of the 
significant differences between the ancient texts and contemporary 
philosophy. The exact terminologies of some concepts may be missing in the 
ancient texts, but notions can be detected and represented through detailed 
exploration and analysis of them. For example, the term ‘moral agent’ appears 
nowhere in the Laozi or Platonic dialogues. “Progressivist thinking” 5 , a term 
coined by Williams, argues that there was no moral agency in antiquity (in the 
ancient Greek world) as “there were not even agents in Homeric literature. 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s people are allowed to have been agents, but they 
perhaps still fell short of moral agency, because – on some of these accounts 
at least – they lacked a proper concept of the will”. However, the understanding 
of moral agency should be refuted, according to Williams, because 
progressivists are mistaken about the degree of shift in underlying conceptions 
from antiquity to contemporary thinking. Thus, although there are no such 
terms as morality, moral agent or moral agency etc. in antiquity, the notions 
are nevertheless present. Williams notes that the moral agent in antiquity is a 
person who has the capacity to deliberate, to conclude, to act, to exert oneself, 
to make oneself do things and to maintain human life. 6  On the basis of 
Williams’ understanding of moral agent, the ‘will’ that motivates the moral 
agent to become an autonomous person interacting with the external world is 
not, as the progressivists supposed, absent from the ancient world, but rather 
the nature of the moral agent in antiquity is similar to the contemporary 
understanding of the moral agent. In my thesis, by adopting the definition of 
 
5  The progressivist idea is that the notions and ethical conceptions in antiquity world is 
primitive and less developed than the contemporary ethical theories, undergoing the specific 
process of history, those primitive ethical notions, conceptions, actions etc. have been replaced 
by more finely defined and the well-argued set of ethical conceptions that construes better form 
of ethical experience. (Williams, B. (1993).) 
6 Williams, B. (1993), chapter 2. 
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moral agent from Williams, I mean that the term ‘moral agent’ refers to human 
moral agents, not agency, because in both Plato and the Laozi it is not only 
human beings that have the capacity for moral agency. For example, in the 
Laozi, the dao and the de can be moral agencies, as can the soul in Plato, 
nevertheless I will not use the term moral agent to refer to the dao, the de or 
the soul in my thesis. A moral agent in my thesis is an autonomous person or 
entity which can deliberate and take decisions; they are also accountable for 
their actions and the consequences of their actions.  
Applying Williams’ definition of moral agent to my thesis, is likely to be 
challenged because the capability of rational choice of the individual moral 
agent is missing in the Laozi.7 However, I believe that many of those scholars 
likely to challenge the notion that individuals are not autonomous in the Laozi 
are motivated by the ‘political principle’ and focus on the well-being of their 
country and people. Notwithstanding that it is sensible to be wary of harbouring 
a specific preconceived notion of moral agent when examining the Laozi and 
Plato, which might lead to misinterpreting the texts, the potential understanding 
that could be realised by comparing them is worthy of serious study. A further 
question on the feasibility and benefit of a comparative philosophy approach 
in my research is; if research can only be done from the perspective of one 
culture or timescale why make the effort to compare them? I acknowledge that 
it is difficult to justify any result that could only be achieved by means of 
comparative philosophy, and that the comparative approach brings extra 
complexities encompassing the subtlety of different languages, cultural 
differences and historical impacts to name but a few. Nevertheless, 
comparative philosophy is one of many approaches to study this issue and one 
which my research demonstrates facilitates some intellectual findings that 
have been overlooked with unilateral deliberation.  
 
7 Gentz, J. (2011). Rational choice and the Chinese discourse on the Unity of the Three 
Religions (sanjiao heyi 三教合一). Religion, 41(4), 535-546, p.544, as Gentz argues, the political 
cannot be subsumed under the autonomous principle in Bourdieux’ field theory. 
The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
6  Introduction 
There are two further reasons why comparative philosophy is important in my 
research. Firstly, the study of sinology in the context of western cultures has 
been undertaken in a haphazard manner. Keeping the western cultural 
background in mind, sinologists consciously or subconsciously compare exotic 
cultures with their own throughout the process of learning.8 As Chad Hansen 
indicated, comparison is “inherently” required for a philosophical text 
composed in one language, which is interpreted or understood in another 
language.9 Whether undertaking cross-cultural comparison or considering only 
within one culture, comparison per se as a method of acquiring knowledge is 
not superficial or unfamiliar. For example, a philosophy undergraduate learns 
consequentialism as a general moral theory, but further study and research 
would lead them to encounter act-consequentialism, rule-consequentialism 
and deontology etc. Comparison of these moral theories provides clarity and 
enables the student to learn the knowledge of similarities and differences from 
the same perspective, such as on the question “what is right to do?” or “how 
should moral agents live?”. If we zoom out from the lens of comparison, the 
scope becomes wider and wider until the comparison is between eastern and 
western philosophy. The plethora of texts available for us to compare and 
contrast lead us to establish fruitful outcomes of similarities and differences 
between these texts. Nevertheless, this raises the questions “and then? And 
so what?” As Ralph Weber argues “if we compare ancient China and ancient 
Greece for their ‘ethics’, we minimally must claim that both comparata are 
relatable to some same concept of ‘ethics’. The aspect of ancient Chinese 
ethics is of necessity substitutable with the corresponding aspect of ancient 
Greek ethics, because it is the same aspect.”10 Weber terms this kind of 
 
8  Li, X.A., 2017. Comparative encounters between Artaud, Michaux and the Zhuangzi : rationality, 
cosmology and ethics First., London: Taylor and Francis, p. 9. 
9 Hansen, C., 1983. Language and logic in ancient China, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
pp. 8-9. 
10  Weber, R (2015). “On Comparing Ancient Chinese and Greek Ethics: The tertium 
comparationis as Tool of Analysis and Evaluation,” in King, R. A. H. (ed.), The Good Life and 
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comparison “tertium comparationis” and argues that everything that can be 
compared with something else does not always justify them being compared. 
It is only meaningful to compare two things from a related or designated 
perspective.11 Richard King summed it up as “likeness is a triadic relation: a is 
like b, in respect of c – is the form any result of comparison should have, 
correctly”.12  
In terms of comparative philosophy methodology, I agree with Weber that it is 
meaningful that comparing a with b in respect of c makes scholars think and 
choose the comparative notions carefully so as not to fall into what Weber 
called ‘illegitimate comparison’. 13  In my thesis, in terms of comparative 
philosophy methodology, I will adopt Weber’s methodology with c being a 
scheme to which both comparative notions a and b should be initially capable 
of fitting in, and then the comparison between a and b should be conducted 
and analysed. That is to say, “the respect of c” is a question such as “what is 
a right action?”, and both consequentialism and deontology are capable of 
providing and developing a systematic answer, and thus can conduct a 
meaningful comparison.  
The second reason to defend the use of comparative philosophy of the Laozi 
and Plato through the lens of the moral agent is to observe overlooked 
perspectives of these texts. As Li noted, the perspectives of the viewer will 
change the reality of perception.14 Comparing the Laozi and Plato via the lens 
of the moral agent facilitates new interpretations and discussions of each on 
their own or both together. By ‘through the lens of the moral agent’ I mean that 
 
Conceptions of Life in Early China and Graeco-Roman Antiquity, Berlin: De Gruyter (Chinese-Western 
discourse), pp. 29-56, p. 31. 
11 Ibid. 
12 King, R. A. H (2015). “Introduction,” in King, R. A. H. (ed.), The Good Life and Conceptions of 
Life in Early China and Graeco-Roman Antiquity, Berlin: De Gruyter (Chinese-Western discourse), 
p. 7. 
13 Ibid, p. 52. 
14 Li, 2015, p. 12. 
The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
8  Introduction 
there is a notion of moral agent that can be found and read about in the texts, 
not that Plato and the Laozi have held certain viewpoints regarding the moral 
agent. In order to defend the position that the comparison will observe 
overlooked perspectives, I shall present it from the viewpoint we could detect 
the notion of the moral agent in the Laozi and Plato, and in what way that I 
mean something is neglected. First, I suggest that some central socio-political 
figures and their relationships with the sage and the philosopher-king 
respectively in the Laozi and Plato are insufficiently examined and discussed. 
While scholars of the Laozi focus mostly on the discussion of sage, sage-hood 
and sage-rulers, the relationships of  kings and dukes 王公 wanggong (chapter 
42), nobles and kings 侯王 houwang (chapter 39), officers and heads 官长 
guanzhang (chapter 28), generals and armies 将军  jiangjun (chapter 31), 
generic rulers人主 renzhu (chapter 30) and the masses 民/百姓 min/baixing 
(chapter 3、17) with the sage are entitled to be examined philosophically in 
the way they model themselves on the principles of the sage-hood.15 On the 
other hand, we find that Plato focuses on the notions of philosopher, 
philosopher-king and non-philosophers in the Republic, the Theaetetus, the 
Phaedo and the Timaeus etc. However, the discussion of the citizens in the 
first city and the second city in the Republic being moral agents who potentially 
can become philosophers is missing. By examining the texts of the Laozi and 
Plato through the lens of the moral agent, people/roles who make decisions 
and act on them in both the socio-political and philosophical senses jump out 
in front of us. And that is the importance of my research on the comparison of 
the moral agent in the Laozi and Plato.  
In the following section, I will sketch the notion of the moral agent in both the 
Laozi and Plato to reveal my rection to the two notions. In the Laozi, moral 
 
15 The literatures and related topic on sage, sage-hood and sage-rulers are numerous. For 
example, Liu, Xiaogan, 2014. Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer 
Netherlands. Ames, R.T. & Huainanzi, 1983. The art of rulership : a study in ancient Chinese political 
thought, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 
 The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
Introduction  9 
agents who are rulers or officers, such as dukes (王公 wanggong), nobles and 
kings (侯王 houwang) appear mostly in the sense of the socio-political class. 
Due to the essential and peculiar characteristics of literary form and content16, 
the Laozi guides each reader to become an individual moral agent who could 
take advice from the text, while at the same time offering universal 
principles/suggestions demonstrated by the ideal figure – the sage 聖人 
shengren – as the moral agent in the philosophical sense. Some scholars 
consider the Laozi more as a toolkit of governing for rulers than a philosophical 
and metaphysical textbook containing some systematic notions to contemplate 
like the dao. For example, Creel argues that “the Lao-tzu has much of the 
‘contemplative’, but more of the ‘purposive’ aspect”, because he feels the Laozi 
offers abundant advice to “kings and feudal lords and ministers on how to get 
and hold power. It is less concerned with the vision of the Tao, as the great 
whole, and more with the Tao as a technique of control”.17 The text of the Laozi 
presents some guidelines of governing for the socio-political roles such as 
emperors, officers and individuals by means of advising them to embody the 
dao and live in accordance with it. It would be difficult, and rather unnecessary, 
to make such a statement that the Laozi is more “purposive”, because being 
either “purposive” or “contemplative”18  depends on the perspectives when 
interpreting the text. Regardless from which perspective, one of the most 
important aspects in the text is the connection between the sage, who is the 
exemplar moral figure, and the individual moral agents, the socio-political 
roles. This connection shows the sage demonstrating a set of universal 
principles, including their way of thinking, their way of ruling, their behaviours 
and reactions expected when facing given contexts etc., as advice to emperors 
 
16 The language of the Laozi is mysterious and obscure. The sense of the many terms (can be 
symbols or metaphors) – such as the spirit of valley 谷神 gushen (chapter 6) or dark and 
profound female 玄牝 xuanpin remains unclear. 
17 Creel, H. G (1970). What is Taoism?: And other studies in Chinese cultural history. Chicago, [Ill.] ; 
London: University of Chicago Press, p. 6. 
18 Ibid. 
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and officers; whereas an individual reader draws the connection between 
themselves and the sage, imposing the set of universal principles to the 
specific situations they are facing in human society. In this way, the sage is the 
ideal moral agent to guide both the socio-political roles in the Laozi and its 
readers, who can be considered as the empirical moral agents.  
Unlike the Laozi, which does not have a clear notion of the moral agent, the 
notion of the moral agent can be easily spotted in various Platonic dialogues. 
While written from a different socio-political context, Plato wrote in a similar 
fashion to the Laozi, with two levels of the notion of moral agents, the empirical 
level and the philosophical level. Many noted scholars have explored the 
notion of the moral agent in Plato’s works. Nails reveals the historical 
backgrounds and relationships among protagonists of Plato’s dialogues in 
ancient Greek history in a complex series of connections among their social, 
political and philosophical stances in The People of Plato. 19  As 
aforementioned, Williams also examined moral agency in detail in ancient 
Greek literature. Furthermore, the fundamental notion of philosopher and 
philosopher-king has been thoroughly examined and reinforced. Bobonich 
notes that there is a consensus that philosophers in Plato are capable of living 
truly happy and flourishing lives, whereas non-philosophers live an incomplete 
life because they fail to attain the right virtues.20 However, the predominant 
discussions of philosopher, including the notion of philosophical (the Republic 
book V, VI and VII etc.), of their education (in the Republic III and IV), of 
philosophical king etc. are so complicated and tempting that the notion of moral 
agent in the sense of functioning in the socio-political and philosophical 
systems are unintentionally overlooked.  
 
19 Nails, D., 2002. The people of Plato: a prosopography of Plato and other Socratics, Indianapolis, Ind.: 
Hackett. 
20 Bobonich, C., 2002. Plato's Utopia recast : his later ethics and politics, Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 3-
4. 
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In the Republic Books 2 and 4, Plato depicts two cities, the first city – is named 
by Glaucon as the city of pigs (the Republic 372d), and the second city – the 
ideal city (the Republic 412b-427d). Plato intends to show that the virtue of 
justice can be attained through cooperation among citizens in the city of pigs,21 
whereas justice in the ideal city is attained by the education of the moral agent 
who to become a philosopher, works in a socio-political system as a ruler. In 
the city of pigs, “the essential minimum amount of people would be four or five 
for a city, including farmer, builder, weaver and cobbler … let’s see what sort 
of life our citizens will lead when they’ve been provided for in the way we have 
been describing.” (the Republic 369d-372d), In the city of pigs, citizens as 
moral agents have implicit rankings demonstrated by the sequence of the 
presentation of each professional, however individuals alone would be unable 
to survive, and it would be impossible to conduct the notion of justice. The 
virtue of justice is conveyed by cooperation among citizens and can only be 
achieved if each citizen complements the others by doing their own deeds and 
doing them well.22 Socrates moves back to the depiction of the ideal city, and 
because Glaucon does not want to live in the city of pigs, Socrates agrees to 
expand the ideal city to a “luxurious” city (the Republic 372e). In this city, the 
class of soldier emerges to act as guardians of the state and Plato presents 
them, along with (the Republic 376d), rulers, non-philosophers and 
philosophers, (the Republic 486a) as moral agents in the socio-political 
system. However, as Williams points out, some scholars accept that Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s people are allowed to have been agents but perhaps fell short 
of moral agency, because – in some accounts at least – they lacked a proper 
concept of the “will”.23 I argue that is not true however, because Plato’s writings 
contain the notion of the psyche soul as motives for moral agents to act. The 
 
21 Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
pp. 74. 
22 Pappas, N. (1995). /Plato and the Republic (Routledge philosophy guidebooks). London: 
Routledge, p. 67.) 
23 Williams, B. (1993). Shame and necessity (Sather classical lectures ; v. 57). Berkeley ; London: 
University of California Press. 
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embodied human soul consists of three parts, the rational, the spirited and the 
appetitive, each of which has its own desires that trigger the moral agent to 
act, an argument I will fully develop in chapter 3. By comparing Plato to the 
Laozi, I can mirror the two philosophical systems with each other, that will allow 
me to identify and explore neglected areas of research. 
In contemporary moral theory, agent-centred theories have been a subject of 
discussion in recent decades. Michael Slote proposes a position of agent-
based moral theory that is distinct from agent-focused moral theories.24 While 
I do not wish to engage in detailed discussion regarding specific fine-grained 
distinctions between agent-centred and agent-based, it is important I take 
them into account in my thesis. On the basis of the analysis of the Laozi and 
Plato, there are some findings to inform the discussions of the moral agent as 
well as its cardinal features, such as the formation, the final moral ends, and 
moral psychology. 
As John Cooper points out, contemporary ethics is action-centred, whereas 
ancient ethics are more concerned with the traits of the characters of moral 
agents, or how to make a person virtuous.25 It seems commonplace that for 
 
24 Slote, M. (1995). Agent‐Based Virtue Ethics. Midwest Studies In Philosophy, 20(1), 83-101. 
25 Cooper, John M., (2013). Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to 
Plotinus. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton UP, pp. 3-4. I agree with Annas that action centred and 
agent centred is not the main difference between modern and ancient moral theory, but rather 
self and others. (Annas, J., [1999]. Platonic ethics, old and new (Ithaca, N.Y.; London: Cornell 
University Press.) G. E. M. Anscombe's arguments that there are distinctively moral motives 
and actions, and advocate a return to ancient eudemonia, because contemporary ethicists have 
paid too much attention to those abstract terms such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’ and so 
forth but have ignored terms like ‘sensitive’, ‘compassionate’ and ‘courageous’ which mostly 
refer to virtue-like aspects of human character. William Frankena argues that the theory of 
virtue may not be able to construct an ethical theory, but if an ethical theory does not include 
the account of virtues, then this ethical theory is incomplete. Rosalind Hursthouse actually 
takes a stronger position than Anscombe and Frankena. She argues that as normative ethics, 
virtue ethics has a constructed principle that formulates what virtues and human dispositions 
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contemporary ethicists the focus of consequentialism and deontology differ 
from the focus of virtue ethics. The principal question of consequentialists and 
deontologists, generally speaking, is “what is the right thing to do?”; whereas 
virtue ethics begins with the question of “what is the best life to live? Or how 
should one live?” However, it is unjust to say that consequentialism and 
deontology neglect the perspective of moral agents, including virtues and 
motives, which would affect their decision making. Deontologists consider, as 
Kant argued, it is not the consequences that make an action right or wrong, 
but the motives that endow an action with moral value. The motive he argues 
arises from universal principles discovered by reason.26 On the other hand, 
consequentialists also consider the perspective of moral agents. John Mill 
argues “it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive 
it as implying the people should fix their minds upon so wide a generality as 
world, or society at large. … the multiplication of the happiness is, according 
to utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on which any person 
(except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on an extended scale, 
in other words, to be a public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on these 
occasions alone is he called on to consider public utility; in every other case, 
private utility in the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all he has to 
attend to.”27  
Both the Laozi and Plato take a stance which differs from John Mill’s idea of 
moral agent in respect of moral motivation and from the understanding of the 
 
are, and also provides and explains the decision procedure that an action is good if, and only 
if, it is what a virtuous person would do. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958) “Modern Moral 
Philosophy.” Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 124, pp.1-6. Frankena, W. (1973). Ethics (Second ed., 
Prentice-Hall foundations of philosophy series). Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, p. 63. 
Hursthouse, R., (1999). On virtue ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 28. 
26 Kant, I., Gregor, M., & Timmermann, J., (2013). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (Rev. 
edition / translation rev. by Jens Timmermann ed., Cambridge texts in the history of 
philosophy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 67. 
27 Mill, J., (2009). Utilitarianism. Auckland, New Zealand: The Floating Press, pp.33-4. G. E. 
Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903 [rev. edn. 1993]) 
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nature of happiness. It is necessary to elucidate that Mill’s idea of moral agent 
is at the empirical level, who merely considers or thinks that happiness 
(pleasure) at both private and public levels is only desirable in itself.28 Henry 
Sidgwick argues that on the basis of Mill’s understanding of the nature of 
happiness, Mill was a psychological egoist if he believes people only covet 
their own pleasure because it is the only thing that is desirable.29 However, the 
Laozi and Plato do not consider pleasure as the only desirable thing, on the 
contrary, to a degree both consider abandoning bodily pleasure in order to 
achieve the highest good (as discussed in chapter 3).  
For the notion of the good, I find that in both the Laozi and Plato, not only do 
they distinguish different kinds of the good including the intrinsic good and the 
best consequences of actions, but they further their arguments that the best 
consequences of actions are considered as the desirable good.30 If moral 
agents are developed to have intrinsic good, then the moral agent can have 
both intrinsic good and the best consequences. Thus, pleasure and the best 
consequences are the good for both the Laozi and Plato, but they cannot be 
categorised as the highest good which are intrinsic goodness and best 
consequences (I discuss this further in chapter 1). In the Republic Book II, in 
order to establish the definition of justice, Glaucon and Socrates define and 
discuss three kinds of good, one of which is an unmodified version of 
consequentialism in which good is considered only for its consequences. Plato 
argues that justice/virtue should be good in itself as well as for its 
consequences (the Republic 357d-358a). This means that with virtue, not only 
 
28  G.E. Moore also argues that only pleasure/ happiness is good in itself. G. E. Moore, 
Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1903 [rev. edn. 1993]). 
29 Sidgwick, H., & Singer, M. (2000). Essays on ethics and method. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, chapter 1. 
30 Korsgaard, C. (1983). Two Distinctions in Goodness. The Philosophical Review, 92(2), 169-195, 
pp. 169-170. Korsgaard argues that there are two distinctions in goodness, they are intrinsic 
goodness and the instrumental goodness. The intrinsic goodness means that if a thing that is 
intrinsically good, then it is valued for its own sake; whereas the instrumental goodness means 
that if a thing that is instrumentally good, then it is valued for something else.  
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do moral agents have intrinsic good, but they can also reason and choose the 
proper actions in a given situation to gain the best consequences. In similar 
fashion, we can find that there are two kinds of good in the Laozi, which are 
implicitly manifested by a dense and vague concept -- wuwei 無為 translated 
as ‘non-desires triggered action’.31 The action of wuwei 無為 is conducted by 
different agencies leading to different outcomes in the Laozi.32 The crisis of the 
consequences of conducting  wuwei 無為 by different agencies is depicted in 
the Laozi, where human beings, heaven and earth, the de and the dao are all 
considered as agencies able to conduct wuwei 無為.33 Human beings act 
wuwei for the purpose of attaining the benefit of wuwei (chapter 47). Benefits 
are assessed by a calculation of pros and cons, or gains and losses. Once 
human beings consider benefits, their reasoning on acting wuwei is initiated 
not from the good of wuwei, but rather the benefits generated from acting 
wuwei compared with other sorts of actions. However, contrasted with wuwei 
performed by the dao and the de, benefits (有益 youyi) are incomparable with 
“that nothing cannot be done” (wu bu wei 無不爲, chapter 37) and it is entirely 
done by and of itself and not by means of anything else (wu yi wei 無以為, 
chapter 38). Both of these are the outcome of the dao and the de operating in 
the mode of wuwei as the intrinsic good. Not only do they possess the intrinsic 
 
31 I will have a detailed discussion about the notion of wuwei 無為 in Chapters 37 and 43 non-
desires triggered action in the Laozi in chapter 1,2,3 in different aspects. For now, I summarise 
my arguments in the main chapters, I argue that wuwei is a kind of action that is performed by 
the moral agent who is in the status of having no desires 無欲 wuyu, (The detailed discussion 
on having no desires 無欲 wuyu will be displayed in chapter 3.), with the status of wuyu, actions 
are triggered purely based on the reactions that the moral agent situated in the context 
perceives the context and provides the proper actions. 
32 I use agency because dao and de cannot be human agents, and both always operate in the 
mode of wuwei, which I will argue in detail in the first chapter. I use mode instead of action for 
dao and de because initially they do not act or are not acted upon, but operate themselves 
consistently [常 chang] through activities with the internalised and spontaneous cause.  
33 Chapter 3, 25, 37, 38 etc. 
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good itself but would also achieve the best consequences. Thus, we can see 
that for both Laozi and Plato not only do the virtues of justice and wuwei 
contain an intrinsic value, but they also have an instrumental value that can 
achieve the best consequences.  
Through the comparison of the Laozi and Plato, not only do I discover new 
viewpoints to interpret the texts, it also allows me to bridge the ancient with the 
modern, and west with east in terms of discussing moral theory. The same 
approach can be employed to consider moral motivation. Both the Laozi and 
Plato discuss the notion of happiness in the sense of a thriving human life, with 
pleasure and desires, except in the text of the Laozi, there is no such term or 
concept as “duty”. Both believe that desires are a necessary condition for a 
moral agent to act, however, there is a difference between desires that 
motivate a moral agent to act for the sake of gaining pleasure and those that 
motivate a moral agent to act for the sake of being good per se. By the action 
for the sake of being good, I mean the action that is the most appropriate out 
of the available choices for the moral agent to make. 
Kant distinguishes three kinds of motivations, “you may perform an action from 
duty that is, do it because you think it is right thing to do, you may perform it 
from immediate inclination, because you want to do it for its own sake, or 
because you enjoy doing action of that kind. Or, finally, you may perform an 
action because you are impelled to do so by another inclination, that is as a 
means to some further end.”34 Korsgaard interprets this passage as Kant 
contrasting the right action that is motivated by duty with the right action that 
is motivated in some other way.35 It seems to me that what Korsgaard means 
by “in some other way” is that the action motivated by “the inclinations” of the 
moral agent performing an action is different from the action that is performed 
 
34 Kant, I., Gregor, M., & Timmermann, J., 2013. Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (Rev. 
edition / translation rev. by Jens Timmermann ed., Cambridge texts in the history of 
philosophy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
35 Ibid.  
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on the basis of the motivation from duty. In the former context, even if the 
action is the same in both cases, if the moral agent allows the action to be 
purely driven by their desires then the action does not possess any moral 
worth, because the action is not guided by the moral rules defined by moral 
considerations. 36  On the other hand, consequentialism deems that moral 
motivation should be the nature of happiness, which means the moral agent 
should be driven by the consideration of happiness, in Mill’s words “the desire, 
therefore, of that power which is necessary to render the persons and 
properties of human beings subservient to our pleasures, is the grand 
governing law of human nature”.37 Consequentialism understands happiness 
in a hedonistic way, as consisting in human pleasures.  
In his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant writes that “instead of the concept of 
the good as an object determining and making possible the moral law, it is on 
the contrary the moral law that first determines and makes possible the 
concept of the good.”38 He also argues that an action does not have any moral 
worth if the action is triggered by motivation without any moral considerations, 
because this kind of action is driven by a human’s inclinations.39 However, 
from the perspective of the Laozi and Plato, Kant’s argument is not convincing 
because Kant does not elucidate the reasons why the moral agent is willing to 
act correctly or to fulfil his/her duty, or to act in accordance with moral laws. 
Kant argues that action motivated by inclination does not have moral value 
because the motive to act has not gone through moral consideration. 
According to Kant, the morally right way to act ought to follow moral rules that 
have been captured by pure reason and abstracted into a universal principle, 
which derives the concept of good. However, in order to justify his argument 
 
36 Ibid. 
37 Mill, J., Macaulay, T., Lively, J., & Rees, J. (1984). Utilitarian logic and politics : James Mill's 
'Essay on government', Macaulay's critique and the ensuing debate. Oxford: Clarendon. 
38 Kant, I., Guyer, P., & Wood, A. (1998). Critique of pure reason (Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 
Works. English. 1992). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 64. 
39 Kant, I., Gregor, M., & Timmermann, J., 2013. 
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Kant presumes a premise that each moral agent is willing to follow their pure 
reasons and be principled. If there is no such thing as a higher authority to 
guide the moral agent, then how could it be possible that the moral agent 
possesses the will that motivates them to be principled? 
The way that the Laozi inculcates a motivation to be moral in moral agents is 
to inform the final moral ends as a teleological motive for the moral agent.40 
That is to say, the final moral ends for the moral agent is to live in accordance 
with the dao, and in order to achieve this the moral agent needs to arrive in a 
mental state of having no desire 無欲 wuyu, because in this state the moral 
agent is capable of acting wuwei as I mentioned above, an argument I will fully 
develop in chapter 3. In brief, on the one hand, we can find that desires in the 
Laozi are necessary to motivate the moral agent to act; on the other, the moral 
motivation for moral agents should be perception and reflection possessed and 
processed by the said moral agent from the given context, because in this 
situation, the action is triggered not by innate desires, i.e. emotional and bodily 
desires, but rather by recognition of the given context and the evaluation and 
judgement of the appropriate reaction. 41 Similar to the Laozi, Plato indicates 
that moral motivations need to be distinguished and justified by the moral agent 
in the way of recognising the final moral ends. The final moral ends should be 
getting the soul of the moral agent well-ordered, and the rational soul should 
rule over the whole embodied human soul because the rational part of the 
embodied human soul cares for the benefit of the whole soul (the Republic 
 
40 Vasiliou, I. (2011). Aristotle, agents, and actions. In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical 
Guide(pp. 170-190). Cambridge University Press. Vasiliou has distinguished between the 
efficient casual motive and the teleological motive in Aristotle.  
41 With regard to the distinction between emotional desires and bodily desires in the Laozi, and 
the relation between desires and wuwei 無為 I will give a fully argument in chapter 3. In brief, 
I argue that in the Laozi, there are two kinds of desires, emotional and bodily desires, the bodily 
desire pertains to the body that is merely associated with those desires for eating, drinking etc; 
whereas the emotional desire pertains to the heart 心 xin in the Laozi, that is associated with 
the sensual desires, or the desires for the exceeding goods.   
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441c).42 Vasiliou argues that in the Republic Book 4, although reason makes 
the best decision for the whole human soul, sometimes the spirited and 
appetitive parts of the soul overrule reason’s judgement.43 It is true that all 
three parts of the embodied human soul can be the motivator of actions 
respectively, but the consideration of the action to be moral should be based, 
in my view of reading Plato, on the consideration of the final moral ends of the 
moral agent, which is to let the rational soul rule the whole embodied human 
soul so as to act virtuously for the benefit of the whole soul (see Chapter 3). 
1.2 The Summary of Chapters 
The first chapter serves the function of the preparation of the comparative 
ground. Not only will it reveal the double-sided mirror – the moral agent — for 
both the Laozi and Plato, but also will place the formation of the moral agent 
in the centre to be examined and compared. By ‘the double-sided mirror as the 
morel agent’, I mean that via scrutinising and comparing the notion of the moral 
agent between the Laozi and Plato, the following issues will be reflected and 
projected. First, the distinction of different kinds of good in the Laozi and Plato. 
The distinction sets out the criterion to determine whether or not these two 
systems can be paralleled for the comparison of the formation of the moral 
agent. It furthers the argument on the understanding of the highest good as 
the prerequisite for both to foster moral agents. Second, the process of the 
formation of the moral agent on each side will be explored and presented, 
which will establish the major differences on how these two philosophical 
systems treat knowledge. To wit, the sage and the philosopher in the Laozi 
and Plato respectively act as the role models for moral agents to emulate. 
However, given that the understanding of the highest good is the prerequisite 
for both to foster moral agents, the Laozi prescribes the moral agent to 
 
42 Vasiliou, I. (2016). Moral motivation : A history (Oxford philosophical concepts). New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, p. 20. Vasiliou argues draws a distinction of the moral motivation in 
Plato that is “the acting virtuously is the motive in the teleological sense, while the well-being 
of my soul is the motive in the efficient causal sense.” 
43 Ibid, p. 21. 
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abandon knowledge (知 zhi) and to live in accordance with the dao; whilst Plato 
advocates attainment of knowledge is the necessity for the moral agent to 
become philosopher. This difference denotes, despite the similarity of the 
macro philosophical approach – the understanding of the highest good – a 
radical difference in how it is achieved. The way of fostering moral agents in 
the respective systems are achieved in contrary ways.  
The topic of the second chapter will be on the final moral ends. I suggest that 
we can find the paralleled understanding of the final ends and its related core 
notions, i.e. the dao and the soul in both the Laozi and Plato. Also, in this 
chapter, I will argue that there is a similarity in the linkage between the higher 
authorities, i.e. the dao and the cosmic soul, and the human reality between 
the Laozi and Plato, which I coin as “as if method”. Based on this method, we 
can find that both of the two philosophies reveal an approach to enrich the 
moral agent’s life, which is to achieve their final moral ends. Although the final 
moral ends in each philosophy appears different, i.e. in the Laozi the final moral 
end is to live in accordance with the dao and in Plato it is to become as godlike 
as possible, the objective to emulate the higher authorities which possess the 
highest good for the moral agent to attain is the same. In this chapter, I propose 
a new way of interpreting the Laozi. I suggest that the notion of the dao should 
be interpreted as a central notion for three layers of Weltanschauungen, i.e. 
the ideal level, the ideal-like level and the level of human reality. Each level 
corresponds and correlates to its own way of dao.  
In the third chapter I will further the argument that the different approaches are 
associated with the treatment of knowledge, with Plato advocating a pursuit of 
knowledge and the Laozi advocating the opposite as the means to reach 
philosopher-king and sage-like status respectively. Despite the pursuit of 
knowledge being key in Plato and the absence of knowledge being key in the 
Laozi, the two both advocate the absence of desire as being key to reaching 
truly moral status. In Plato, the function of rationality is central to the moral 
agent becoming truly moral, whereas the absence of rationality and desires is 
central to the moral agent becoming truly moral in the Laozi. In the following 
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sections, I will present different kinds of desires in Plato and the Laozi to 
illustrate the different approaches of each; for Plato it is educating the moral 
agent to be rational, whereas for the Laozi it is the cultivation of the moral agent 
to minimise desires to only those that fulfil basic needs. 
1.3 The Textual Issue of the Laozi  
It is important to discuss the textual issues due to the variation of the 
characters and content appearing in the multiple transmitted and excavated 
versions of the Laozi. The Laozi was not transmitted in a unified version during 
the Warring States period, and accordingly different versions circulated in the 
Han dynasty as witnessed by the three excavated versions from the Western 
Han period, the Mawangdui jia, the Mawangdui yi and the Beida version, all of 
which are different. This complex situation makes authorship of the Laozi 
problematic and I therefore need to explain why I use the Wang Bi recension 
of the Laozi, recognized as the transmitted version, for my research instead of 
the Guodian version, the Mawangdui jia or Mawangdui yi versions or the Beida 
version.44 It is first necessary to discuss the many versions of the Laozi and its 
commentaries starting from the Hanfeizi chapters “Jie Lao” 解老 and “Yu Lao” 
喻老 in the pre-Qin period to modern day commentaries. It is supposed there 
are 27 versions of the Laozi and more than 3000 commentaries.45 Nowadays, 
the transmitted version of the Laozi is divided into two books – the book of the 
dao and the book of the de – containing in total 81 chapters. Liu Xiaogan has 
compared and contrasted six versions of the Laozi, i.e. the Guodian version, 
 
44 Two silk manuscript versions of the Laozi were discovered in a tomb at Mawangdui in 1973. 
One of them has been dated back to 194—188 B.C. and the other to 195 B.C. They are not 
the oldest versions of the Laozi so far (as the bamboo strips version of Laozi that has been 
discovered in another tomb at Guodian in 1993 dated to ca 300 BCE is for now the oldest 
version of the text). Nevertheless, the core arguments of this thesis will not touch on the 
philological differences. Furthermore, for the sake of convenience of the reference, the chapter 
numbering and organisation of the received version of Laozi will be used in my thesis. 
45 Gao Ming 高明, (2015). Boshu Laozi jiaozhu 帛书老子校注, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華书局, 
p. 1.  
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the two Mawangdui versions, the Fuyi version, the Heshang Gong version and 
the Wang Bi version.46 From his book, it can be observed that apart from some 
characters having been amended due to the taboo of using the emperor’s 
name, there are very few discrepancies among the versions of Fuyi, Heshang 
Gong, Wang Bi and the Beida version. However, there is considerable 
discrepancy among the versions of Guodian, Mawangdui jia and Mawangdui 
yi and the transmitted version. Firstly, the Guodian version is radically different 
from the transmitted version and the Mawangdui versions because it merely 
contains three bundles of bamboo strips that contain only 32 of the transmitted 
81 chapters.47 The silk manuscript versions of Mawangdui jia and Mawangdui 
yi versions and the transmitted version contain 81 chapters, but the 
Mawangdui versions reverse the sequence of the book of dao (chapters 1-37) 
and the book of de (chapters 38-81), while the transmitted version begins with 
the book of de followed by the book of dao. The different versions reveal 
distinctive treatment of the philosophy of the Laozi. For example, in the 
Guodian version, the Laozi more systematically accepts inevitable warfare 
than in the Mawangdui versions.48 Thus, how in my research should I deal with 
the discrepancies among the different versions?  
My solution is to mainly consider the transmitted version in my thesis, because 
my research is regarding the philosophy, and not the philology, of the Laozi. I 
 
46 Liu Xiaogan, (2006). Laozi Gujin 老子古今, Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 中国社会
科学出版社. 
47 Peng Hao, (2000) “Post Excavation” Work on the Guodian Bamboo Slip Laozi: A Few 
Points of Explanation." Ed. in Allan, S., Williams, C., Laozi, & Society for the Study of Early 
China. (2000). The Guodian Laozi: Proceedings of the international conference, Dartmouth College, May 
1998 (Early China special monograph series; no.5). Berkeley: Society for the Study of Early 
China and Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 33-38. Within these 
chapters, some of them are, compared with the transmitted version, merely part of transmitted 
chapter units, one chapters is repeated in different bundles, for example, chapter 64 appears 
in both bundle A and C.  
48 Dan Murphy, (2006) “A comparison of the Guodian and Mawangdui Laozi texts”, University 
of Massachusetts Amherst, p. 56. 
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agree that the discrepancies among different versions of the Laozi might 
impact the interpretation of each version, which will possibly reveal different 
philosophical ideas, such as the example of the warfare between the Guodian 
and Mawangdui versions. However, I believe that the transmitted version 
contains a coherent and consistent conception and philosophy, because the 
historical commentaries, such as Heshang Gong and Wang Bi, treated the text 
of the Laozi as a coherent whole when they were constructed as my thesis will 
demonstrate. For example, I will argue that there are three layers of the notion 
of the dao and other concepts related to the dao in the second and third 
chapters. Thirdly, it is not the task of this thesis to distinguish the philological 
issues in the various interpretations of the Laozi. The issue of the identity of 
the Laozi is complex; for example the Guodian version has a number of issues: 
A. scholars like Peng Hao and Qiu Xigui claim that the writing styles are 
different among the three bundles of bamboo strips.49 B. there is another text 
Taiyishengshui 太一生水 50  grouped together with the Laozi that derives 
questions regarding the text of the Guodian version. What is the unity of the 
Guodian version of the Laozi and how should we read or treat the Guodian 
version with the transmitted version? What is the relationship between the 
Taiyishengshui 太一生水 and the Laozi, and was Taiyishengshui 太一生水 part 
of the Laozi? We can see that some content in the Guodian version is closer 
to the Mawangdui versions, and some is closer to the transmitted version, 
however, it is difficult to conclude there are certain corresponding relationships 
 
49 Xing Wen 邢文, (2005), Guodian Laozi yu Taiyishengshui 郭店老子与太一生水, Xueyuan 
Chubanshe 学苑出版社, P. 201. 
50 Sarah Allan argues that the Taiyishengshui 太一生水 has a strong connection with the text of 
the Laozi in terms of the semantics, and also she argues the Taiyishengshui 太一生水 can provide 
some help for the interpretation of some philosophic conceptions in the text of the Laozi. (Xing 
Wen 邢文, (2005), Guodian Laozi yu Taiyishengshui 郭店老子与太一生水, Xueyuan Chubanshe 学
苑出版社, p. 203) 
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between the Guodian version and the transmitted version, although it is certain 
that the Guodian version is one of the sources for the transmitted version.  
For similar reasons I do not use the Mawangdui Jia and Manwangdui Yi 
versions. Firstly we have to distinguish between the two versions, because: A. 
analysis of the writing styles and content (for example, the loaning words to 
change邦 bang translated as states being taboo in any text, because it is the 
same character as that of the emperor’s name Liu Bang 刘邦 [206 –194 
B.C.E.]), suggest they were produced in a different time period.51 B. more 
importantly, according to Gao Ming, the grammar is different in each, and he 
argues that they are derived from two different primary sources.52 Secondly, 
the original excavated versions of the Mawangdui manuscripts are missing 
considerable amounts of content, the Mawangdui jia version is missing 1306 
characters and the Mawangdui yi version is missing 645 characters.53  It is also 
important to note the accessibility of the English translations of the Laozi, most 
of which are from the transmitted version, which is the reason why using the 
transmitted version of the Laozi for my thesis will make my analysis easier to 
follow compared to the Beida version.  
Based on these textual issues, I will focus on the transmitted version of the 
Laozi, because it is the most complete and most widely used by scholars. If it 
is felt that the philological study of the different versions will impact the 
philosophic interpretations then a study of other versions should be 
undertaken, particularly the variants and lacunae of the Guodian version. 
 
51 Gao Ming 高明, (2015). Boshu Laozi jiaozhu 帛书老子校注, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 中華书局
,5-6; Henricks, R. (1989). Lao-tzu : Te-tao ching [sic] : A new translation based on the recently discovered 
Ma-wang-tui texts (1st ed.). London: Rider, introduction. Henricks mentions that Mawangdui 
Jia uses the “small seal” form writing and Yi version uses more modern “clerical” form to copy 
these two versions. 
52 Gao Ming 高明, (2015)., Introduction. 
53 Ibid, introduction and pp. 429-465. 
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However, I do not believe the existing variants undermine my findings that 
have been built upon the interpretation of the transmitted version of the Laozi. 
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Chapter 1 Formation of the Moral Agent in 
Plato and the Laozi   
 
1.1 Introduction  
This chapter compares how Plato and the Laozi treat the concept of the moral 
agent and will show the discrepancy of their approaches with that of 
consequentialism. In consequentialism the morality of an action is based on 
the outcome, which is contrary to the teachings of Plato and the Laozi. This 
chapter investigates how Plato and the Laozi derive the moral value of an 
action from the intention of the moral agent, rather than solely the outcome. 
Since the Enlightenment, moral theories have changed from agent-centred 
theory to act-centred theory, focusing on the dissection of the morality of action 
and duty rather than on the morality of the agent and character.54 This change 
along with the use of homonymous terms, such as ‘virtuous’ complicate 
discussions regarding the moral agent. As Everson notes, ‘an agent is virtuous’ 
and ‘an action is virtuous’ require clarification because they do not have the 
same meaning, 55 which is to say that the criteria of an agent being virtuous is 
distinct that of an action being virtuous. An agent being virtuous requires a 
lifelong commitment to living virtuously, whereas a virtuous action can be 
achieved by any individual regardless of whether they are a virtuous agent or 
not. Furthermore, whilst there is certainly a connection between the concept of 
moral agent and that of moral actions, it is debatable whether act-centered 
theories or agent-centered theories, should hold the predominant position.  
As I noted in the introduction, virtue ethics has roots in ancient philosophy and 
holds the viewpoint that the formation of the moral agent should prevail over 
 
54 Harris, G. (1999). Agent-centered morality: An Aristotelian alternative to Kantian internalism. Berkeley 
; London: University of California Press, p. 2. 
55  Everson, S. (2011). Justice and just action in Plato’s Republic. In /Episteme, etc./ (p. 
Episteme, etc., Chapter 12). Oxford University Press, p. 249. 
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the judgement of actions. Thus, it is necessary to consider how a comparison 
of the Laozi and Plato through the lens of the moral agent can offer insight into 
why ‘good’ character prevails over ‘right’ action in determining whether or not 
an action is moral. In this chapter, I will explore, examine and compare the 
formation of the moral agent, i.e. the philosopher in Plato, and the sage as the 
exemplary moral agent in the Laozi. In so doing I aim to defend the argument 
that the character of the moral agent is key in guaranteeing the good of an 
action, since the deliberation is derived from the disposition of the moral agent. 
Furthermore, by scrutinising the formation of moral agents in Plato and the 
Laozi I will demonstrate why agent-centred theory prevails over 
consequentialism.56  
1.2 The Distinction of Goodness in Plato and the 
Laozi  
In this section, I will clarify the distinction of goodness in Plato and the Laozi 
for two reasons. Firstly, the distinction of goodness provides the normative 
standards for the formation of the moral agent in both Plato and the Laozi. 
Understanding this will facilitate the discussion on how each undertake forming 
the moral agent, which is the main point of this chapter. Secondly, Plato and 
the Laozi both contemplate and examine consequentialist viewpoints, with the 
conclusion that goodness should prevail over consequentialist viewpoints. 
While scholars, such as Annas and Pappas,57 discuss Plato’s consequentialist 
viewpoints, there has been no similar discussion relating to the Laozi. By 
method of comparison, I open up a new horizon to interpret the Laozi. 
 
56 Agent-centred theory is concerned with who I should be rather than what I should do. It 
takes account of the notion of good characters rather than the notion of right actions. 
(Hursthouse, R. (1998). Normative Virtue Ethics. In How Should One Live?: Essays on the 
Virtues. : Oxford University Press, p.20.) 
57 I will discuss their ideas in the following section at length.  
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1.2.1 The Distinction of Goodness in Plato 
Plato explicitly elaborates on three kinds of goodness in the Republic 357 b-d, 
in order to establish which kind of justice is applicable. By demonstrating and 
discriminating between these three kinds of goodness, Plato establishes a 
hierarchy of normative orientations for the moral agent to pursue. Since I will 
discuss the passage in detail, I will quote it at length: 
“Tell me, do you think there is a kind of good we welcome, not because we 
desire what comes from it, but because we welcome it for its own sake – joy, 
for example, and all the harmless pleasures that have no results beyond the 
joy of having them?... and is there a kind of good we like for its own sake and 
also for the sake of what comes from it – knowing, for example, and seeing 
and being healthy? We welcome such things, I suppose, on both counts. … 
and do you also see a third kind of good, such as physical training, medical 
treatment when sick, medicine itself, and the other ways of making money? 
We’d say that these are onerous but beneficial to us, and we wouldn’t choose 
them for their own sake, but for the sake of the rewards and other things that 
come from them.”58 
The first kind of goodness is goodness in itself; The second kind is goodness 
in itself and for its consequences; and the third kind is goodness for its 
consequences only.59 Socrates believed that the second kind of goodness, 
which is considered as justice, was the most important, as he notes “I myself 
put (the justice) among the finest goodness, as something to be valued by 
anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness, both because of itself and 
because of what comes from it” 60  (the Republic 357d-358a). However, 
Glaucon argues against Socrates, considering that “justice belongs to onerous 
 
58  Cooper, J., & Hutchinson, D. (1997). Complete works. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing, p.998-9. 
59 Pappas, N. (1995). /Plato and the Republic/ (Routledge philosophy guidebooks). London: 
Routledge pp. 52-53. Pappas lists them as discusses how these three kinds of good relates to 
the cotemporary moral theories.  
60  Cooper, J., & Hutchinson, D. (1997). Complete works. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing, p.999. 
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kind, and is to be practiced for the sake of the rewards and popularity that 
come from a reputation for justice, but is to be avoided because of itself as 
something burdensome”61 (Republic 358a). Furthermore, Glaucon offers three 
arguments to articulate that justice is the least desirable of the three kinds of 
goodness. His first argument on the nature and origin of justice is much akin 
to Hobbes’ theory of the social contract,62 where the rules of justice correspond 
to the moral agent’s interests in society, in which the moral agent neither does 
unjust action nor is harmed by unjust action (Republic 359 a-b). His second 
argument is that the moral agent acts justly for fear of the consequences of 
acting unjustly although, if they could act unjustly without punishment, as in 
the story of Gyges’ ring, they would (Republic 359c-360d). His third argument 
is that a life of injustice is better than a life of justice (Republic 350d-362a). 
In the passage, having evaluated three kinds of goodness and established a 
normative hierarchy, Plato, as Annas notes, attempts to offer an alternative to 
moral theories that has some similarities to virtue ethics. 63 He endeavours to 
show that a right action can be derived from good – virtues like embracing 
good for its own sake, and the right action resulting in good consequences. 
Nevertheless, virtue ethics indicates, according to Hursthouse, that “an action 
is right if it is what an X 64  agent would characteristically do in the 
circumstances, and an X agent is one who has and exercises certain character 
traits, namely the Xs.”65 Hursthouse agrees with Plato that the moral agent is 
 
61 Ibid, p. 999. 
62 I do not intend to argue for or against this point about the social contract, but merely 
mention that Glaucon’s ideal on the nature and origin of justice shares similarities with 
Hobbes’ social contract in terms of the justice/ social norms that comes out from the 
agreements formulated by people’s interests for Plato/ the transferring their rights for Hobbes. 
(Hobbes, T., & Tuck, R. (1996). Leviathan (Revised student edition / edited by Richard Tuck.. 
ed., Cambridge texts in the history of political thought). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.)  
63 Annas, J. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 61. 
64 X denotes a virtuous trait. 
65 Hursthouse, R., (1999). On virtue ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 29. 
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the criterion of justifying the action that is right or not. However, Hursthouse’s 
stance predominately descends from Aristotelian thinking that, albeit agreeing 
with Plato that virtues are crucial to a flourishing life, the attainment of virtues 
is not acquired by understanding of the goodness as Plato advocates, rather it 
is acquired by learning and understanding through proper education and 
habits. Plato believes that the understanding of the goodness is a prerequisite 
of living a wholesome life. That is why Plato articulates on the distinction of 
goodness in this passage. Plato revealingly did not elaborate the first kind of 
goodness because he considers goodness in itself to be comparatively trivial.66 
However, we can find that Socrates thinks that justice is good, because it is 
good for its own sake and for its consequence.67 However, if justice is good 
merely for its consequences, then it takes the consequentialist stance, which 
Socrates argues against. Justice is merely an approach to govern the states 
and its people and that without punishment a life of injustice will be better than 
a life of justice.  
In terms of the distinction of goodness, Julia Annas suggests that Platonic 
ethics in the Republic are a genuine alternative to deontology and 
consequentialism. Firstly, she believes that Plato would consider the first kind 
of goodness to be trivial, compared to the other two; and secondly that 
considering the first kind of goodness as a deontological assumption is a 
misunderstanding of the Republic, because Plato does not attempt to discuss 
moral duty or obligation. Annas credits the third kind of goodness to 
consequentialism, arguing that, although contemporary deontology and 
consequentialism are more revisionary and modified versions than Plato’s 
argument in the Republic, Plato provides a recognizable moral judgment to 
demonstrate virtue/justice is good both in itself and its consequences. 68 
However, G.R.F. Ferrari thinks it is unnecessary to evaluate the argument of 
 
66 Annas, J. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 61. 
67 Pappas, N. (1995). Plato and the Republic (Routledge philosophy guidebooks). London: 
Routledge  p.52. 
68 Annas, J. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 61-64. 
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the distinction of goodness in the Republic 359a-b, because he thinks that if 
this distinction is important, Plato would have Socrates say it rather than 
Glaucon. Ferrari instead believes that the distinction between the means and 
the ends that we pursue in Lysis 220 a-b, Gorgias 467c, and the divided 
goodness of the soul separated from the bodily and social goodness in 
Apology 29d, Phaedo 68c, Laws 697b are the more important moral concerns 
for Plato.69  
The nature of the contrasting views between Ferrari and Annas over this 
passage raises two questions. First, whether or not it is necessary to evaluate 
Plato’s passage from the perspective of contemporary moral theory? Second, 
who should be the proper protagonist in Platonic dialogues to reveal Plato’s 
authentic ideas?  
Understanding Plato’s dialogues and the writing of the Laozi and comparing 
them with contemporary moral theory demonstrates how philosophical 
discussions in ancient texts can inaugurate new discussion. In terms of 
interpreting the passage, I disagree with Ferrari that any important argument 
would be raised by Socrates in Plato’s dialogue. I argue that Plato uses all his 
interlocutors to develop arguments that could not be raised by an individual 
alone, even Socrates. For example, by employing Glaucon to raise the 
distinction of goodness, Plato is then able to use Socrates to argue against 
Glaucon’s classification of justice as a consequentialist assumption and go on 
to prove how justice is both good in itself and has good consequences. Plato’s 
back and forth dialogues between interlocutors are a means to elaborate and 
elucidate an argument. That is to say, not all of the philosophic arguments or 
important concepts have to be delivered from the mouth of Socrates. For 
example, it is unwise to neglect that the momentous speeches regarding the 
creation of the cosmos in the Timaeus, are not delivered by Socrates but by 
Timaeus.  
 
69 Ferrari, G. (2003). City and soul in Plato’s Republic (Lecturae Platonis ; v. 2). Sankt Augustin 
[Germany]: Academia Verlag, p. 16. 
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I have set out the discussion on the comparison of moral agents between the 
Laozi and Plato with the distinction of goodness in the Laozi and Plato. In this 
section, I have noted the three kinds of goodness revealed in Plato’s Republic. 
Having listed them, Plato sets up a hierarchy of normative orientations that the 
moral agent should follow. The highest goodness is to acquire virtues that 
contain good for their own sake and achieve the best consequences.  
1.2.2 The Distinction of Goodness in the Laozi  
Chapter 2 of the Laozi, shows that once a concept is created, then its 
oppositional pair is simultaneously created, which seemingly goes against my 
idea of distinguishing goodness in the Laozi.70 The Laozi believes that the 
moral agent should renounce the distinction of concepts, social values and 
moral values in chapter 19, but at the same time advocates living as much in 





in human society knows what beauty is; doing this they have ugliness; Everyone in human 
society knows what good is, doing this they have the opposite of good. Thus, having and not-
having mutually generate each other difficulty and easiness mutually produce each other, 
length and shortness mutually compare each other, height and lowness mutually raises each 
other, notes and tones mutually harmonises each other, before and behind mutually follows 
each other. That is why the sage does the affairs of wuwei and does wordless teaching; ten 
thousand things spring up and they do not decline to display themselves; she produces but does 
not claim ownership. She acts but does not expect anything, she completes the deeds but does 
not take the credits. (I translated all of the Laozi by myself with drawing lessons from James 
Legge’s translation in the website of ctext.org in this thesis hereafter) 
71 Chapter 19 絕聖棄智，民利百倍;絕仁棄義，民復孝慈;絕巧棄利，盜賊無有。此三者
以為文不足。故令有所屬:見素抱樸，少私寡欲。To cut off sagelines and give up the 
wisdom, the people would be benefited a hundredfold; to cut off benevolence and give up 
justice, the people would go back to filiality and parental affection; to cut off cleverness and 
give up benefits, thieves would be gone. These three things are not sufficient for noting down. 
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means the moral agent must pursue and attain the highest goodness possible, 
which is contrary to renouncing the distinction of concepts, social values and 
moral values. Thus, the Laozi advocates that the distinction of concepts should 
not be discerned. Furthermore, and unlike Plato, the explicit elucidation of the 
distinction of ‘goodness’ is not presented in the Laozi. Thus, it is necessary to 
defend the point that there is the distinction of goodness in the Laozi in the first 
place. 
The Laozi suggests that mankind, like all other entities, lives as a part of the 
cosmos regulated by the dao, which is considered as order (zhi 治).72 The term 
zhi 治 appears thirteen times in the Laozi and has two senses; most commonly 
zhi is used as a verb meaning, “to regulate or to govern”,73 and less commonly 
as a noun, meaning “order or regulation”.74 In both cases the notion of order 
zhi indicates a harmonious human society that is regulated by the sage acting 
in accordance with the dao. As chapter 17 notes, the order of society is 
regulated directly by the sage or by the sage making the masses (baixing 百
姓) think that they regulate themselves.75 Furthermore, according to chapter 
25, we can see that there is nothing special about mankind to distinguish it 
from other entities, since mankind, which possesses the same order of the dao 
as others, is just one segment of the cosmos.76 However, when zhi is used as 
a verb, it denotes a regulation of something that is placed in accordance with 
their thinking or desires. In this case, human beings are special to the Laozi,  
because they possess the capability of awareness (知 zhi) of objects, an ability 
 
Thus, to order them to have belonged: to display the pureness and to hold the simplicity, to 
lessen your concern to yourself and reduce the desires. 
72 Chapter 62 The dao is that toward which all things flow. 道者萬物之注也。 
73 Chapters 3, 8, 10, 57, 50, 60, 65, 75 
74 Chapter 3, 64 
75 Chapter 17 people are all said that “we are all as we are of ourselves. 百姓皆曰：“我自然。” 
76 Chapter 25 人法地，地法天，天法道，道法自然。“human is emulated the Earth, the Earth is 
emulated the Heaven, the Heaven is emulated the dao, the dao is acting as itself.” 
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to distinguish concepts and values and have the dispositions and desires (欲 
yu) of pursuing them.77 Compared to other entities, the awareness (知 zhi), 
and ability to distinguish concepts and values and have the dispositions and 
desires (欲 yu)  gives human beings the potential and possibility to overcome 
the obstacle of attaining the dao and to live accordingly.78  
In addition to the paradox that moral agents should drop the distinctions of 
concepts and their values, and yet pursue and attain the highest moral value, 
some good-related concepts encapsulating conventional desirable values are 
demonstrated in the Laozi, such as non-defeat success/triumph (無败 wubai/
勝 sheng), strength (強 qiang), richness (富 fu), intentions (有志 youzhi), 
longevity (壽 shou), sweetness (甘 gan), beauty (美 mei), stability (安 an), and 
happiness (樂  le). The Laozi recognises that people would pursue these 
conventional social and moral values, and, on the one hand, employs them as 
selling points to describe the advantage of  acting wuwei and living in 
accordance with the dao,79 and on the other hand, argues that people should 
not distinguish concepts or pursue conventional values. 80  This requires 
accounts of the features of the dao that should be emulated by moral agents. 
The dao is ever-lasting (久 jiu), although the Laozi does not explicitly articulate 
that ever-lasting can be emulated by the moral agent, but it certainly makes it 
the most important feature of the dao.81 Jiu久 (ever-lasting) is the key feature 
of the dao in the Laozi, and the principles of the dao include staying with the 
 
77 Chapter 3, 28. 
78 Moeller, H. (2006). The Philosophy of the Daodejing. New York: Columbia University Press, 
pp.70-89. 
79 Chapter 3, 33, 55, 76. For example, in chapter 33, 知人者智，自知者明。勝人者有力，
自勝者強。He who knows other men is discerning; he who knows himself is intelligent; He who overcomes 
others is strong; he who overcomes himself is mighty. 
80 Chapter 2. In this chapter, as I have mentioned above, the distinction of concepts should be 
stopped.  
81 In chapter 16, 久 jiu is the most important feature which prevails over other features of the 
dao. 
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weakness (守弱 shouruo) or moving towards the opposites (反 fan) exist for 
the achievement of eternity (久  jiu). For eternity, the related vocabulary 
includes “not to die” 不死 busi82 and “no perishing” 不亡 buwang83. The Laozi 
notes that “not to die” (不死) is the manifestation of the mode of eternity.84 
Furthermore, the exemplary ideal figure, the sage, lives in accordance with the 
dao and acts wuwei.85 The active promotion of being wuwei by means of 
displaying good consequences of acting wuwei can be taken as a way of the 
Laozi to make distinctions between desirable or undesirable values, because 
the Laozi appeals for moral agents to act wuwei so as to achieve good or 
desirable consequences and values.  
However, this actually goes against one of its own traits — being detached 
from objects and values. Being detached from objects and values removes 
impediments from the sage while making decisions.  According to the Laozi  in 
chapter 46, “no fault would be greater than the desire of gaining 欲得 yude”.86 
The Laozi uses “no fault would be greater” to emphasise the fault that the moral 
agent could make. If we follow my argument regarding the contradiction that 
the Laozi creates, by pointing out what the moral agent should not do, the 
Laozi implies what is the right thing to do.  
The distinction of concepts is done only in the realm of human society, because 
the entities that follow the dao treat everything equally without preferences, 
which are invoked by the distinction of concepts, as chapter 5 notes, “Heaven 
and earth do not act from the impulse of any wish to be benevolent; they deal 
with all things as the dogs of grass are dealt with.” 87  Nevertheless, it is 
 
82 Chapter 6, 50 
83 Chapter 33 
84 Moeller, H. (2006), P.121. Moeller has a discussion in his book that death emphasises the 
being of the existence. 
85 Chapter 2, 57.  
86 Chapter 46, 咎大莫过于欲得。 
87 Chapter 5 天地不仁，以萬物為芻狗。 
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intriguing to note that as a means of prescribing the values of the sage and the 
dao, the Laozi employs the conventional good-related concepts and values. 
For example, common sense tells us that winning or prevailing over is a good-
related concept. People attain many advantages by defeating enemies in 
battles, so prevailing over (勝 sheng) rather than defeat (敗 bai) is a more 
desirable outcome. This oppositional pair sheng and bai represent the 
contrasting values between strength and weakness. In chapter 45, the Laozi 
states that “constant action overcomes cold; being still overcomes heat.”88 And 
in chapter 61, “the female always prevails over the male by her stillness. 
Stillness is considered as abasement”.89 As we can see, like the oppositional 
pair sheng and bai, the pairs of terms like cold and heat, male and female are 
all exemplified in the Laozi as the contrasting values of strength and weakness. 
By showing that weakness overcomes strength, the Laozi  advocates that 
staying with the weakness 守弱 shouruo is one of the dao’s features that the 
moral agent should obey.  The Laozi is saying that social values in human 
society can be used to help validate the moral value of wuwei, as articulated 
in chapter 57 “thus the sage says that I act wuwei, then the ruled will be 
transformed of themselves; I am fond of keeping still, then the ruled will correct 
themselves. I do not arise any unnecessary business, then the ruled will enrich 
themselves; I do not have any desires, then the ruled will attain themselves to 
get the primitive simplicity”.90 
To this point, I have explained that the distinction of the concepts does not rule 
out advocating the good of the dao, wuwei and the sage in human society. 
Hereafter, I proffer that we can find two kinds of goodness in the Laozi. The 
first kind of goodness is wuwei that is conducted by the dao or by the one who 
can possess the dao such as the sage; and the second goodness is merely for 
 
88 Chapter45 躁勝寒靜勝熱 
89 Chapter 61 牝常以靜勝牡，以靜為下 
90 Chapter 57 故聖人云：我無為，而民自化；我好靜，而民自正；我無事，而民自富；
我無欲，而民自樸。 
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desirable consequences. Unlike Plato who explicitly articulates justice is good 
for its own sake, the Laozi does not explicitly elucidate that wuwei is good in 
itself. Moreover, the complication of interpreting the exact meaning of wuwei 
is because we can find that different correlations are displayed in the Laozi, 
such as wuwei and dao; wuwei and the sage. Finally, the difference of the 
interpretations of wuwei is manifested by the consequences of conducts of the 
dao, the de and the sage acting wuwei.  
In the Laozi, the first kind of the goodness that can be interpreted as wuwei is 
that conducted by the dao or by the exemplary figure – the sage. Wuwei, as 
one of the most important concepts in the Laozi, denotes a mode of conduct 
that is performed by the agency (in the Laozi  it can be the dao  道, the de 德
,91 and the sage聖人) who possesses the dao or could live in accordance with 
the dao. The mode of conduct indicates that the agency is able to be in the 
self-functioning status that enables them to act spontaneously. As one of the 
traits of the dao, acting spontaneously, not only reveals that the dao conducts 
wuwei, but also indicates that the dao is the totality of the cosmos in being able 
to function in accordance with its own principles. Chapter 25 notes that the dao 
is so-like-itself.92 Scholars like Karyn Lai thinks there is a connection between 
ziran and wuwei, as  she argues that ziran entails wuwei and these two 
 
91 The interpretation of the de in the Laozi is complex like that of the dao. Some scholars like 
D.C. Lau claim that “in the Lao tzu the term de is not a particularly important one and is often 
used in its more conventional sense. Lau, D. (1963). Tao te ching (Penguin classics). 
Harmondsworth; /New York: Penguin Books, p. 42.” Some scholars, such as Chan 1963, 
Waley 1958 and Kaltenmark, interpret it as a kind of intrinsic power of the individual, which 
“makes the de have meanings ranging from magical potency to moral virtue.” (Kaltenmark, 
M. (1969). Lao Tzu and Taoism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, p. 28;) I am 
sympathetic to Kaltenmark’s interpretation of the de since the de in the Laozi  does not 
necessarily reveal a meaning with a moral value, it also possesses a metaphysical meaning 
revealing that the de can be the possessor and nourisher of every creature (chapter 51), and yet, 
like he mentions, the de is always used in the Laozi  in a good sense.   
92 Chapter 25道法自然 
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concepts are woven together to give the conception of spontaneity in the Laozi 
an important philosophical and ethical sense. 93  I agree with Lai that the 
concept of ziran and wuwei in the Laozi are correlated, but I don’t think that 
ziran necessarily entails wuwei. For example in chapter 17, the masses all 
mistakenly claim that “I am so-myself” (wo ziran 我自然) when in fact it is the 
ruler who completes the affairs on behalf of the ruled. “I am so myself” indicates 
the masses are in a state where they are aware of themselves but being in the 
state of ziran does not necessarily mean they perform wuwei in their daily 
activities.  
Whilst there is no explicit elucidation of wuwei as the one that possesses 
goodness in itself and for its consequences, the Laozi rather implicitly presents 
wuwei in different layers of meanings that can be gathered, classified and 
interpreted. In the same way terms like ‘consequentialism’ are not used in the 
Laozi, however the thinking of ‘consequentialism’ can be found as well as the 
reasoning behind it. As Li notes, there is no notion of rationality in the 
Zhuangzi, however it does not rule out finding philosophical discussions 
regarding the topics of rationality and related clusters of ideas. 94  As 
aforementioned, wuwei in the Laozi is the conduct of the dao. In the Laozi, for 
moral agents the highest good is to live in accordance with the dao, thus wuwei 
is the first kind of good.  
Furthermore, it follows that acting wuwei is the ideal and points to the idea that 
it is (entirely done by and of itself and not through any other means wuyiwei 無
以為). The Laozi clearly elaborates that the dao (chapter 37) and the de 
(chapter 38), as agencies, are at all times in the mode of wuwei. The sage can 
sometimes be in the mode of wuwei,(chapters 57,64) and sometimes acts 
wuwei, (chapters 2,3,63) whereas an individual in the form of “I” (吾  wu, 
 
93 Lai, K. (2007). Ziran and Wuwei in the Daodejing: An Ethical Assessment. Dao, 6 (4), 325-337, 
p.326. 
94  Li, X.A., 2017. Comparative encounters between Artaud, Michaux and the Zhuangzi : rationality, 
cosmology and ethics First., London: Taylor and Francis, pp. 27-34. 
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chapter 43) is merely aware of (知 zhi) the benefits (有益) of wuwei (chapter 
43). The consequence of the dao being in the mode of wuwei is that nothing 
cannot be done 無不爲 (chapter 37); The consequence of the de being in the 
mode of wuwei is the idea that something is entirely done by and of itself and 
not through any other means無以為 (chapter 38). The consequence of the 
sage being in the mode of wuwei is for the ruled to be governed (nothing 
cannot be governed 無不治 wubuzhi chapter 3) and that the sage acting wuwei 
results in non-defeat (無败 wubai chapter 57). Lastly the consequence for “I” (
吾 wu) is that an individual can merely be aware of the benefits of wuwei, which 
are rarely attained by anyone but the sage (chapter 43). Even though the 
achieved consequences of the dao acting wuwei are superior than that of the 
de and the sage, it does not mean that the de and the sage are not important 
in the Laozi. 
The Laozi provides a crucial term (有益) that can be considered to denote 




The softest thing in the world dashes against and overcomes the hardest; 
that which has no form enters where there is no crevice. I know hereby what 
advantage belongs to doing nothing (with a purpose). There are few in the 
world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising 
from non-action.” 95 
To consider consequentialism as providing a decision making procedure for 
the moral agent is to expect that the moral theory offers a criterion to the moral 
 
95 I consider the James Legg’s translation on this chapter and with some little changes on it. 
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agent to judge if an action is right.96 In the Laozi, the best consequences are 
related to the higher authorities, such as the dao of the heaven (tiandao 天道
). For example, to be good at winning (善胜  shansheng) is the best 
consequence in the Laozi. In chapter 73, this is displayed as the consequence 
of the characteristics of the higher authority, the dao of heaven (天之道 tian zhi 
dao); or defeat as the antithesis of winning is articulated as an undesirable 
result. The Laozi explicitly shows in chapter 29 that one would be defeated, if 
they are actively doing or interfering with something (為者敗之 weizhe baizhi). 
For good unrelated with the higher authority, the Laozi just considers the 
consequences of the action, which can be considered as a consequentialist 
moral view. 97  
Thus far I have distinguished two kinds of goodness in the Laozi, viz, the 
highest good is the dao and the de being wuwei and the one who can possess 
the dao and act wuwei such as the sage; and the second good is merely for 
the consequences of the good. I will show, as my analysis of Plato showed, 
how this distinction of the good is important in the formation of the moral agent, 
and how in the Laozi I find that merely considering the results of wuwei for the 
moral agent is insufficient to become a sage or sage-like. The moral agent 
should possess the dao and act accordingly in order to have good in itself and 
for its consequences.  
Having depicted the different types of good in Plato and the Laozi, I draw the 
conclusion that both have identified different kinds of good, albeit with some 
similarities. While Plato distinguished three kinds of good, the Laozi 
 
96 Bales, R. (1971). Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-
Making Procedure? American Philosophical Quarterly, 8(3), 257-265, p.261. According to R. 
Eugene Bales, there is a distinction in the consequentialist ethical views between providing “an 
account of right-making characteristics” and “a decision-making procedure”. 
97  The same method has been applied by the paper: Im, M. (2011-10-04). Mencius as 
Consequentialist. In Ethics in Early China: An Anthology. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press. 
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distinguished only two, with good in itself not discussed. At the same time Plato 
placed more emphasis on the comparison between the good in itself and for 
its consequences and the good merely for its consequences, which are the 
two types of good found in the Laozi. In Plato the distinction of goodness is 
articulated explicitly with Plato clearly demonstrating the reflection of some 
contemporary moral views. However, while the Laozi does not demonstrate 
the distinction of goodness explicitly, the comparison between them can be 
interpreted from the text, as I have done above. In the next section, I will show 
how Plato and the Laozi argue that, via the formation of the moral agent, the 
good in itself, as well as for its consequences, is more important than the good 
only for its consequences. 
1.3 The Formation of the Moral Agent in Plato and the 
Laozi 
Having shown the distinctions of goodness in the Laozi and Plato respectively, 
I find that both set out a hierarchy of good for moral agents to pursue. The 
purpose of establishing the distinction of goodness in these two philosophical 
systems is to understand the formation of moral agents. In this section, I will 
show that they use exemplary figures -- the sage for the Laozi and the 
philosopher for Plato, as models for becoming a moral agent.  
In the formation of a moral agent, there are some steps that need to be 
considered, such as how to shape the way the moral agent deliberates things, 
and how to help the moral agent understand good and treat it as a moral goal 
to pursue. How a moral agent deliberates things varies according to which 
action they decide to perform in any given situation. It is not merely systematic, 
such as becoming a virtuous agent, or following the moral rules, or calculating 
the maximised happiness. It is also based on what Hauerwas calls the vision 
of the moral agent with Hauerwas arguing that “moral behaviour is an affair not 
primarily of choice but of vision”.98 When facing a situation where the moral 
 
98 Hauerwas, S. (1981). Vision and virtue : Essays in Christian ethical reflection. Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, p.34 
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agent is required to perform an action accordingly or refuse to act, the moral 
agent first perceives the situation, then rationalizes and understands it, and 
finally makes a decision based on their understanding of the situation. The 
action performed by the moral agent is based on the perception, reasoning 
and understanding of the situation. The action that is performed varies from 
situation to situation based on the moral agent’s deliberations. 
John Stuart Mill argues that “it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of 
thought, to conceive it as implying people should fix their minds upon so wide 
a generality as world, or society at large. … the multiplication of the happiness 
is, according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of virtue: the occasions on 
which any person (except one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this on 
an extended scale, in other words, to be a public benefactor, are but 
exceptional; and on these occasions alone is he called on to consider public 
utility; in every other case, private utility in the interest or happiness of some 
few persons, is all he has to attend to.”99  
John Stuart Mill admits that in most cases the moral agent needs only to 
consider their own benefits or happiness. However, it is also necessary to 
consider their actions, since these impact other people. The moral agent 
should at least have an idea of if they are what Mill considers to be the “one in 
a thousand”; what if they are the important one who should consider their 
action on a larger scale, but do not consider themself as being important? 
Secondly, decision making requires the moral agent’s own understanding of 
the external world. Facing the external world, the moral agent implements their 
actions based on deliberations including their understanding of the situation 
and their attitude and standpoint regarding involvement in the situation. All 
should be considered as factors in the process of decision making. It is 
therefore necessary to show how the moral agent should be cultivated or 
educated to best deliberate those factors, and in the next section I will show 
how moral agents are formed in the Laozi and Plato. 
 
99 Mill, J. (2009). Utilitarianism. Auckland, New Zealand]: The Floating Press, pp.33-4. 
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1.3.1 The Formation of the Moral Agent in the Laozi  
As explained in the introduction, I argue that the moral agent in the Laozi can 
be categorised in both a socio-political and a philosophical sense, although the 
two are interconnected. Before addressing the formation of the moral agent in 
the Laozi, it is necessary to consider what kind of moral agent is mentioned 
and discussed in the Laozi. In the philosophical sense, the moral agent could 
be the sage and non-sage (I name all moral agents other than the sage as 
non-sage to enable easier comparison between Plato’s idea of philosopher 
and non-philosopher). In the Laozi moral agents could be rulers within the 
socio-political system, such as kings and dukes 王公 wanggong (chapter 42), 
nobles and kings 侯王  houwang (chapter 39), officers and heads 官长 
guanzhang (chapter 28), generals and armies 将军 jiangjun (chapter 31), and 
generic rulers (chapter 30).100 At this point, it is vital to clarify the distinction 
between the rulers and the sage in the Laozi.  In the Laozi the sage is the 
pinnacle of what a moral agent can be and there can be no equal. 
Demonstrating how the sage is formed provides a model for all other moral 
agents to follow. 
In the Laozi some chapters depict the sage,101 some depict rulers,102 and 
some depict both the sage and rulers.103 Some chapters can be interpreted as 
both depicting the sage or the rulers because they employ the image of the 
sage as an example for the best rulers. Chapters 5, 28, 60, 71 and 81 
specifically depict how the sage would act. The other chapters referencing the 
sage (shengren) can be interpreted as a depiction of either the sage or rulers, 
because these chapters end with the phrase ‘that is why the sage... 是以聖人
 
100 These generic rulers do not have a specific term referring to them, but in chapter 30, the 
Laozi  mentions “以道佐人主者 the person who assists the rulers of men with the dao ” depicts 
the hierarchy between the ruler and the one who assists her to rule the state, thus I name it as 
the generic rulers.  
101 Chapters 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 47, 49, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 77, 
78, 79, 81 
102 Chapter 3, 26, 28, 32, 37, 39, 42, 57, 58, 61, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 80 
103 Chapter 13, 17, 19, 29, 46, 48, 50, 54 
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...’. This phrase depicts the ideal image of the sage, which the sage or rulers 
can follow to ensure they perform the correct actions. 
Regarding rulers, the Laozi references them in two ways. Firstly it emphasises 
that the best rulers are sage-like rulers,104 in those chapters that end with the 
phrase “that is why... 是以聖人...” which reveals the sage’s conduct as the 
model for the moral agent/rulers to emulate; or the chapters link the rulers with 
the description of the principles of the dao as the best way to rule. Secondly, 
the Laozi deals with how rulers should deal with real situations in order to 
achieve desired consequences, irrespective of whether the rule emulates the 
sage or not. 
Given the various categories of moral agents in the Laozi, we can find that the 
notions of the sage and other moral agents are interweaved with philosophical 
and political ideas. That is to say, as the exemplary figure of the moral agent, 
the sage acts as the role model for rulers to emulate, based on an ideal world 
where the sage is at one with the dao. However, rulers do not operate in an 
ideal world but have to govern states subject to corrupt and imperial courts. 
So, while the Laozi claims the best rulers rule their states in accordance with 
how the sage acts or at least try to emulate the actions of the sage, it also 
recognizes that rulers have to rule in a world where things are not ideal. As 
mentioned previously, the Laozi advocates that rulers should aim to emulate 
the sage who, as the exemplary figure for the moral agent, is completely 
engaged in the dao. The question, arising from this instruction is how to foster 
the moral agents to attain the standard of sage-like rulers? Being completely 
engaged in the dao, means the sage attains the dao, and lives and acts 
accordingly, like the dao. At this stage it is useful to provide a brief description 
of what living and acting in accordance with the dao consists of, which can be 
understood through the interpretation of ziran and wuwei. As I mentioned 
above in the first section, ziran and wuwei in the Laozi  are correlated but I 
 
104 Moeller in his book does not really distinguish between the sage and the sage-like rulers, 
since following his reading of the Laozi, it is understandable to read them indistinguishably 
because he argues that the Laozi should be read by only one person, the ruler. (Moeller, 20016, 
pp. 56-57.) 
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disagree with Karyn Lai’s argument that ziran entails wuwei.105 I suggest that 
wuwei is the action that the moral agent takes in the state of ziran, and the 
state of ziran is a kind of cultivated disposition for the moral agent. As Roger 
Ames argues “spontaneity (ziran) must be clearly distinguished from 
randomness and impetuosity, in fact, far from being ‘uncaused’,106 it is novelty 
made possible by a cultivated disposition.”107 I agree that ziran for the moral 
agent in realistic human society is a sort of cultivated disposition that 
implements the thinking for the moral agent to make decisions about choices. 
But I do not think that it is convincing to argue the notion of ziran in the Laozi 
by using an interpretation of the story of Cook Ding in the Zhuangzi, since it is 
clearly different from the notion of ziran in the Laozi, not only the contents of 
the state of ziran adopted by the moral agent but also by the dao. It is certainly 
possible to interpret that the butcher in Cook Ding in the Zhuangzi is in the 
state of ziran, moreover the way he butchers an ox is shaped and cultivated 
through the progress of his practice and finally reaching the state of ziran.108 
However, we cannot find any evidence in the Laozi explicitly upholding the 
idea that the moral agent can reach the state of ziran by means of practice.    
In the Laozi, ziran is depicted as a state indicating a condition either for the 
dao or for the moral agent to be or to conduct. For the dao, ziran is to follow 
itself as being what it is, as stated in chapter 25, “the dao emulates ziran being 
so-itself.”109 For the moral agent, ziran involves perceiving and recognising 
 
105 Lai, K. (2007). Ziran and Wuwei in the Daodejing: An Ethical Assessment. Dao , 6(4), 325-337. 
106 For more discussion on this issue to see the paper, freedom in Freedom in Parts of the 
Zhuangzi and Epictetus by Richard King who has done a good discussion about spontaneity 
in the Zhuangzi. King, R. (2018). Freedom in Parts of the Zhuangzi and Epictetus. In G. Lloyd 
& J. Zhao (Eds.), Ancient Greece and China Compared (pp. 83-109). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
107 Ames, R.T. & Hall, D.L., (2004). Dao dejing : "making this life significant" : a philosophical 
translation First trade paperback., New York: Ballantine Books, pp. 23-4.  
108 Ziporyn, B., (2009). Zhuangzi : the essential writings : with selections from traditional 
commentaries, Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett. 
109 道法自然。 the dao emulates ziran  being so-itself.  
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oneself, others and the relationships among them; and reacting to others in 
the same way as the sage (as the moral agent). Ames argues similarly that 
“spontaneous action is a mirroring response. As such, it is action that 
accommodates the ‘other’ to who one is responding.”110 As stated in Chapter 
17, “the best (ruler), (the ruled) barely knows where she is; the second best, 
(the ruled) love and praise her; the next level, they fear her, they despise her. 
There is not enough trust in the ruler, the ruled would not trust her. She 
appears to be leisure, does not command much. The deed is completed, and 
her undertaking is successful, while the ruled people all said: “We are who we 
are of ourselves.”111 The ruled (百姓 baixing) claim in this chapter that they are 
being ziran, which expresses that the ruled recognise themselves being ziran 
because, under the government of the best ruler who is not, or is only barely, 
recognised or known by the ruled, the ruled recognise that their behaviours 
and situations occur without being guided, manipulated or coerced by anyone. 
The best rulers do not take any credit for such achievements, but rather step 
back and give the credit to the ruled; they do not command, but take 
responsibility for their actions, thus establishing the ideal or the best 
relationship with the ruled. The ruled, thus, believe that “百姓皆謂我自然 all 
has been done by themselves and that they are being themselves naturally or 
spontaneously” (Chapter 17).  
Having articulated how ziran is the state that the Laozi aims the moral agent 
to achieve after the formation of the moral agent, I shall now consider wuwei. 
The Laozi addresses that the sage (shengren 聖人) acts wuwei because it is 
in the state of ziran that enables the sage to be capable of deciding which 
action is appropriate to any given and related situation. Slingerland argues that 
individual wuwei as the “personal spiritual ideal” is more essential than wuwei 
 
110 Ames, R.T. & Hall, D.L., (2004). Dao dejing : "making this life significant" : a philosophical 
translation First trade paperback., New York: Ballantine Books, p. 24.  
111 Chapter 17 太上，不知有之;其次，親而譽之;其次，畏之;其次，侮之。信不足焉有
不信焉。悠兮， 其貴言。功成事遂，百姓皆謂我自然。(all the translation of the Laozi is 
based on James Legge’s.) 
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as the governmental ideal. 112  He further argues that wuwei in the Laozi 
“becomes something of a polemical barb aimed at the Confucians: ‘not-doing’ 
is held up as an ideal in order to pointedly contrast with the incessant and 
harmful ‘doing’ or ‘regarding’ of Confucianism.”113 On the other hand, Roger 
Ames argues that wuwei is a principle of ruling the states instead of the 
personal ideal.114 I agree both that wuwei is not simply regarding or functioning 
on the level of ruling the states, but is also associated with the personal 
understanding of the interaction between the moral agent and the external 
world. For the sage, or the sage-like ruler, the personal level and the ruling 
level are interconnected, because being in the state of wuwei for the moral 
agent is about being harmonised with the dao that leads the moral agent, i.e. 
the sage and the sage-like ruler in this case, to the action without any purpose 
and to act and react in accordance with the related situation. For example, in 
chapter 2, wuwei is related to the action of the sage at both the personal and 
ruling level, and in chapter 43, it is about the generic benefits of wuwei, which 
can also be interpreted at both levels.115  
As the exemplary moral agent in the socio-political sense, the formation of 
becoming a sage-like ruler requires the moral agent to become in the state of 
ziran and act wuwei in front of the ordinary masses. I suggest that there are 
two steps for the rulers to follow. Firstly, the ruler ameliorates from the conduct 
 
112 Slingerland, E. (2000). Effortless Action: The Chinese Spiritual Ideal of wu-wei. Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion, 68(2), 293-327, p. 297.  
113  Slingerland, E. (2014-12-12). The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue 
Ethics. In Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Psychology. : 
Oxford University Press, p.77.  
114  Ames, R., (1983). The art of rulership: A study in ancient Chinese political thought. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, pp. 33-39. 
115 Chapter 2 是以聖人处無為之事。that is why the sage is doing the affairs of wuwei. 
Chapter 43 吾是以知無為之有益。I, thus, am aware of the benefits of wuwei.  
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of ‘acting’ 為 wei to one of ‘acting’ wuwei.116 Secondly, the rulers will change 
their visions of the external human society from wishing to rule well to 
immersing themselves among the ruled to perceive and think from the 
perspectives of the ruled. The latter vision implemented from the state of ziran 
and acting wuwei prevails over the one just aiming at wishing to rule the state 
well.  
The hierarchy of rulers is shown in chapter 17, “the best (ruler), (the ruled) 
barely knows where she is; the second best, (the ruled) love and praise her; 
the next level, they fear her, they despise her. There is not enough trust in the 
ruler, the ruled would not trust her.”117 The Laozi displays three types of rulers, 
each ruling in a different way, which results in different reactions from the ruled, 
ranging from barely knowing the ruler to fearing and despising the ruler. As 
Moeller noted, the Laozi believes that it is best for the ruled not to know there 
is a ruler at all, because it proves that the ruler does not press, command or 
coerce the ruled.118 The best ruler is one who would rule in the manner of the 
sage.  
In addition to Moeller’s view, I believe the Laozi shows that one who rules in 
the manner of the sage perceives human society differently from the majority 
of rulers, which do not rule in the manner of the sage. As the Laozi states in 
chapter 49, “the sage does not have an invariable heart of their own but uses 
the heart of the ruled as their heart.”119 The sage immerses themself into the 
 
116 Slingerland has done a great job to distinguish the semantic meanings of wei in accordance 
with the linguistic usage in the text of the Laozi. See his book: Slingerland, Edward Gilman 
(1998). Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as a Spiritual Ideal in Early China. Dissertation, Stanford 
University, p.303. 
117 Chapter 17 太上，不知有之;其次，親而譽之;其次，畏之;其次，侮之。 
118 Moeller, H., & Laozi. (2007). Daodejing (Laozi) : A complete translation and commentary. Chicago, 
Ill.: Open Court, p. 46. 
119 Chapter 49 聖人無常心，以百姓心為心。… 聖人在天下，歙歙為天下渾其心，百姓
皆注其耳目，聖人皆孩之。The sage in the world, with no inclination, and keeps her heart 
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ruled by means of using the heart of the ruled to perceive human society. As I 
mentioned above, the vision of the moral agent determines the thinking 
regarding their actions, since it correlates with their appreciation of the 
situation and the decision upon it. The differences of the rulers in chapter 17 
demonstrate the different visions of the rulers. The best ruler takes the visions 
of the ruled, immerses themself in the ruled and takes care of and nourishes 
them without being noticed. The best ruler does not differentiate their own 
perceptions from those of the ruled, rather the best ruler understands what the 
ruled perceive and determines the best course of action to take based on the 
ruled’s perceptions. This process means that the sage or the sage-like ruler, 
the best ruler in chapter 17, is barely noticed by the ruled.  
As Moeller indicated, in chapter 17, the Laozi rigorously asserts that Daoist 
rulers are the best, and places Confucian rulers below them.120 Confucian 
rulers are loved by the ruled, because, according to Mencius’s view about 
ruling, rulers should be benevolent to the ruled. A benevolent ruler has 
compassion for the ruled and brings peace and prosperity.121 These types of 
rulers are displaying their capabilities and credibility 見 jian to the masses and 
are proud of themselves 自矜 zijin in the way their ruling has brought peace 
and prosperity to the ruled and the states.122 Furthermore, the ruler who has 
compassion for the ruled is different from the sage, who has no heart but uses 
the hearts of the ruled. Bestowing compassion illustrates the political hierarchy 
between the ruler and the ruled, with the ruler clearly in the position of 
authority. Indeed, this position of authority gives the ruler the power to treat the 
ruled well, and equally to treat them brutally as the ruler chooses. This is 
 
in the state of simplicity to all. The ruled are all poured into her eyes and ears, and she treats 
them all as her children. 
120 Moeller, H., (2007). Daodejing (Laozi) : A complete translation and commentary. Chicago, Ill.: Open 
Court, p. 46. 
121 Im, M. (2011-10-04). Mencius as Consequentialist. In Ethics in Early China: An Anthology. 
: Hong Kong University Press, p. 56. 
122 Chapter 24 
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radically different from the sage, who by having no heart and taking the heart 
of the ruled is at one with the community of the ruled. This is why sage like 
rulers are considered to be the best, because there is no political hierarchy 
between the ruler and the ruled. Thus, the Laozi demonstrates the 
consequentialist view through the second-best rulers who bring good 
consequences for the ruled. In Chapter 17, the Laozi shows that although they 
are considered as good rulers, they do not possess the highest good. 
The Laozi does not explicitly reveal how moral agents can reach the state of 
ziran and act wuwei. Instead it offers an obscure approach for moral agents to 
possess the dao and act wuwei by reducing their acquisition of knowledge. To 
wit, the more knowledge the moral agent attains, the less chance they have of 
possessing the dao and acting wuwei. Nonetheless, it is difficult to understand 
why less knowledge will lead a moral agent to act wuwei as stated in chapter 
48 as, “they who devote themselves to learning (seek) from day to day to 
increase (his knowledge); they who devote themselves to the Dao (seek) from 
day to day to diminish (his doing). they diminish it and again diminish it, till they 
arrive at doing nothing (on purpose). Having arrived at this point of non-action, 
there is nothing which he does not do. They who get as his own all under 
heaven does so by giving himself no trouble (with that end). If one take trouble 
(with that end), they are equal to getting as his own all under heaven”.123 The 
Laozi also fails to provide an explanation on how the sage knows about the 
world without experiencing the world, as stated in chapter 47, “one does not 
step out the house but knows about the world; (the agent) does not look out of 
the windows but sees the dao of heaven. The further the sage goes, the less 
the sage knows. That is why the sage knows without going out anywhere, 
names things without seeing anything, completes things without actions.”124 It 
seems contrary to common sense that knowledge is an impediment for moral 
 
123 Chapter 48 為學日益，為道日損。損之又損，以至於無為。無為而無不為。取天下
常以無事，及其有事，不足以取天下。Translated by James Legge. 
124 Chapter 47 不出戶知天下；不闚牖見天道。其出彌遠，其知彌少。是以聖人不行而
知，不見而名，不為而成。 
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agents to achieve the state of ziran and act wuwei, but the Laozi suggests the 
less one obtains knowledge, the more likely one can be in a state of ziran and 
act wuwei. Roger Ames argues that “knowing, seeing and doing in Daoism are 
always local… Knowledge is not the subjective representation of some 
objective reality, but a quality of the local experience itself. It is the realising of 
a particular kind of experience in the sense of bringing it about and making it 
real.” 125  It is plausible that the Daoist knowledge always bears the local 
experience that moral agents have. However, Ames does not justify how moral 
agents are capable of having the knowledge of the world by the attainment of 
local experience. And to what extent, can the Laozi argue that the further one 
goes, the less one knows? My own research does not fully solve the tension 
between knowledge and acting wuwei and this remains an area for future 
research.  
1.3.2 The Formation of the Moral Agent in Plato 
Unlike the Laozi, Plato’s philosophic ideas and thoughts on the formation of 
the moral agent can be interpreted and developed in different ways, such as 
the education of the moral agent or how to become a philosopher-king. In order 
to enable comparison, I will first highlight the representations of the moral 
agent in Plato, then demonstrate the formation of the moral agent in terms of 
how to become a philosopher-king. I will then compare Plato’s philosopher-
king with the Laozi’s sage-like ruler to argue in both cases that the quality of 
the moral agent takes priority over the decision-making process. In particular, 
in order to parallel the point of formation of the moral agent between the Laozi 
and Plato, I argue that the formation of the moral agent demonstrated by Plato 
provides the moral agent an advantage in experience, insight and reasoning 
(Republic 580d-583b). All of these traits will further influence their point of 
vision and choices in the decision procedures.  
We can distinguish two senses of the moral agent in Plato: philosophically the 
moral agent can be a philosopher or a non-philosopher; socio-politically the 
 
125 Ames, R. and Hill, D., (2006), p.150. 
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moral agent can be a professional in a variety of roles, such as a guardian or 
ruler. The two senses interconnect, which is to say, the best ruler for Plato 
should be either a philosopher or a ruler who practices philosophy, the so-
called philosopher-king (Republic 473d-e). Plato goes to great lengths to 
differentiate philosophers from common people and argues that the 
philosopher is the best person to rule the state in Book VI. Before moving on 
to my discussion of the formation of the moral agent, I will explore the 
distinction between these two senses of moral agent in Plato in more detail. 
Socio-politically, Plato’s idea of the moral agent is different from the Laozi’s in 
that we can find that Plato considers the notion of the moral agent within the 
discussion of virtue/justice. Plato initially illustrates that citizens are moral 
agents in the first city by using Glaucon’s arguments that the rules of justice 
come out of agreement regarding the moral agent’s interests in society, and in 
which the moral agent neither does unjust action nor is harmed by unjust 
action; and the life of injustice is better than that of justice. In order to argue 
against this, (Republic 359-362) Plato uses Socrates to show Glaucon and 
Adeimantus that justice is good for its own sake; and justice will bring the best 
consequences. Plato starts with the analogy between the justice of the city and 
that of the person.126 Plato depicts what Glaucon calls a city of pigs (Republic 
372d) and an ideal city (Republic 412b-427d). In the city of pigs, “the essential 
minimum amount of people would be four or five for a city, including famer, 
builder, weaver and cobbler … let’s see what sort of life our citizens will lead 
when they’ve been provided for in the way we have been describing” (Republic 
369d-372d). According to Socrates, each professional should focus on what 
they are good at and produce products for the whole city and the result will be 
 
126 It is true that if Plato wants to validate the argument, he must show that, as Julia Annas 
argues, the justice of the city contains the same sense with that of the person. But I will not 
discuss this point now, since the main focus at this stage is on the moral agent in the social-
political sense. Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 72-3. 
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that they will live a peaceful life without poverty and wars.127 After Glaucon 
says he does not want to live in a city of pigs, Socrates agrees to expand it 
into a “luxurious” city (Republic 372e). In this city, a class of soldier emerges 
as Guardians of the state (Republic 376d), who are later subdivided into two 
classes: warrior-guardians and rulers (Republic 412e, 413c, 414a-b), and non-
philosophers and philosophers (Republic 486a).128  
In this section I will consider how the moral agent attains the highest status of 
philosopher-king. Plato demonstrates two steps in the cultivation and formation 
of the moral agent in the Republic; first, he reveals the ruler of the states is 
generated from the class of guardians in the social-political system; second, 
he reveals the process of how the ruler becomes a philosopher king, the ideal 
ruler. I will further demonstrate that having achieved philosopher-king status, 
the moral agent attains virtue as the highest good, which makes their actions 
good in themselves and for their consequences.  
Plato develops his accounts of the best ruler in two stages, the second stage, 
found in Books V-IX, is more important to my argument, but is best understood 
with awareness of the first stage from Books II - IV. The first stage considers 
how a state and its rulers are created through the description of three cities. 
Plato recounts how Socrates describes a first city, which he considers to be 
an ideal city, but Glaucon argues it is actually a city of pigs (Republic 372d). 
Socrates therefore describes a second luxurious city in which the class of 
 
127 Within these professionals, there are rankings. Socrates thinks that the farmer is the most 
important because they need to provide food to the city. And this argument arises out of two 
premises: 1. Individuals are insufficient to live in the city, they have to cooperate with each 
other, and the justice is dwelled in the cooperation. (R 376d-e) 2. Individuals tend to practice 
different professions from each other naturally. (R. 370b) (a similar idea can be seen in Pappas, 
N. (1995). /Plato and the Republic (Routledge philosophy guidebooks). London: Routledge, 
p. 67.)  
128 Plato uses poets who write music and poems to educate the youth becoming guardians, but 
does not considers or illustrates that poets functions as a moral agent in the social-political 
system. The main discussion is just on the educational process of guardians. 
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guardian is created (Republic 372e-373e) and finally the third city is the good-
state, the Kallipolis (Republic 472c).  
Plato’s depiction of the first city illustrates that justice can only be derived from 
co-operation among all the professionals, since Plato does not explicitly 
display what justice is and how it functions. Socrates thinks and presumes that 
people in the first city cannot be self-sufficient (Republic 369b), and so must 
focus on their own job and cooperate with others to meet their needs. Justice 
is demonstrated by each professional completing their own job and 
cooperating with all the other professionals.129 However, when Glaucon calls 
the first city the city of pigs, not only does Socrates not contradict this, but 
ironically mentions that there should be a professional pig feeder in the second 
city (Republic 373c). It seems that although Socrates says that the first city is 
a healthy state, he does not believe that justice explicitly appears within it. 
According to Pappas, Plato believes that it is not possible to find justice in the 
first city because it is not philosophical and this does not allow the moral agent 
to become cultivated and a virtuous person.130  
In Plato’s second city the growth in population and the ensuing need for land 
led to war between citizens, which led to the creation of the role of Guardian 
to protect the state (Republic 373d). Plato utilises the same premise to argue 
for the establishment of a guardian who is capable of only doing one thing well 
as a professional (Republic 374a-375a). Plato further believes that rulers are 
generated from the class of guardians.131 However, Plato also suggests that 
the ruler is created from citizens who contain ‘gold’ in their body mixed by the 
gods (Republic 415a).  
 
129 Annas, J. (1981), p. 75; Pappas, N. (1995), p. 61. 
130 Pappas, N. (1995). /Plato and the Republic/ (Routledge philosophy guidebooks). London: 
Routledge, p. 69. 
131 “Anyone who is tested in this way as a child, youth, and adult, and always comes out of it 
untainted, is to be made a ruler as well as a guardian; he is to be honoured in life, and to receive 
after his death the most prized tombs and memorials.” (Republic 413e-414a) 
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In constructing the second city, the principle that citizens can only perform one 
professional function remains the same; they cannot carry more than one task. 
The main difference between the second city and the city of pigs is the 
introduction of a professional cadre tasked with protecting the states; 
guardians (Republic 374c). Guardians are radically different from all other 
professionals such as cobblers, farmers or builders and so on, and possess 
conflicting characters which are both gentle and high-spirited at the same time. 
A good guardian is able to distinguish between friends and enemies, treating 
friends gently and bravely fighting enemies (Republic 375c). Distinguishing 
between friends and enemies requires the moral agent to have capabilities of 
reasoning, understanding and decision-making relating to people with whom 
they interact. Plato recognizes that for the moral agent to achieve such 
capabilities requires education from a young age, since he asks, “haven’t you 
noticed that imitations practiced from youth become part of nature and settle 
into habits of gesture, voice, and thought?” (Republic 395d). According to 
Annas, “the well-educated person is not a prodigy in any subject, or a range of 
subjects; the criterion of successful education is a morally mature and, as we 
say, ‘healthy’ outlook on the world.”132 This means that for Plato education for 
guardians and rulers is not about skills, but rather it is about developing the 
right character traits. However, this kind of education can also result in the 
class of armies in the states, which indicates that via the education of music 
and sports, the guardians and rulers are able to formulate good beliefs or 
opinions. Nevertheless, Plato notes that further education for guardians is 
required to become a better ruler (Republic 416 a-c). This indicates that 
education of guardians does not complete the formation of moral agents’ 
rationality, which leads to guardians with good character are not qualified as 
the best rulers in Plato.  
Before Socrates described the ideal state, he was hesitant to say what exactly 
should be changed to make the state ideal, but he did claim that “until 
philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men 
 
132 Annas, J., & Plato. (1981), p. 83. 
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genuinely and adequately philosophise, that is, until political power and 
philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue 
either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no 
rest from evils, nor, I think, will the human race” (Republic 473d-e). However, 
Adeimantus does not accept what Socrates tells him, rather he claims that 
“those who continue in it for a longer time — the greatest number become 
cranks, not to say completely vicious, while those who seem completely decent 
are rendered useless to the city because of the studies you recommend” 
(Republic 487 c-d). Adeimantus seems to suggest that for ordinary people, not 
only is philosophy useless, it is actually harmful. Socrates repudiates the 
uselessness of philosophy by arguing that the reason why it seems useless is 
because philosophers are not valued by others. However, to a certain extent, 
Socrates agrees that philosophers are useless, when he states: “Next tell him 
that what he says is true, that the most decent among the philosophers are 
useless to the majority. Tell him not to blame those decent people for this but 
the ones who don’t make use of them. It isn’t natural for the captain to beg the 
sailors to be ruled by him nor for the wise to knock at the doors of the rich—
the man who came up with that wisecrack made a mistake” (Republic 489b). 
It seems that philosophers are not merely useless but also harmful to the states 
in the analogy of the cave (Republic 514-515c). However, this tension between 
knowledge and opinion reveals the different foundations of visions and 
reasoning between philosophers and other citizens. I will argue this point at 
length in the next section and reveal why philosophers are not understood by 
other citizens and are therefore considered to be useless.  
Having briefly revealed the moral agent in the three states and different social 
classes, including professionals, guardians and rulers, and the philosopher 
king, I shall move on to focus on how the decision making of moral agents 
alters after becoming educated. Furthermore, I will show exactly how the 
formation of the moral agent achieves good in itself and for its consequences.  
I propose that the accounts for decision making of rulers who rely on opinions, 
are different from that of philosopher-kings, who rely on knowledge. On this 
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point, I will compare Plato with the Laozi since the same point differentiates 
the rulers from the sage or sage-like rulers. The Laozi does not explicitly offer 
a guideline for moral agents becoming rulers, nor does it provide a clear 
guideline for rulers to become sage-like rulers. The Laozi instructs rulers to 
become sage-like rulers by depicting the model of the sage including the 
sage’s image, mental state and so on, and holding this model up for moral 
agents to emulate; whereas Plato is rather different in terms of educating 
guardians, rulers and philosopher-kings. At this point, we may ask why is 
education necessary for guardians and rulers, but does not appear in the city 
of pigs? And why couldn’t rulers, after being educated in music and sport, be 
the best ruler in the state as philosopher kings? What has changed through 
these processes of education? 
Moral agents change their perceptions and reasoning for decisions from the 
first city (the city of pigs) to the third city (ideal state) depending on their 
education. In the first city, moral agents, generally speaking, are those 
professionals who merely focus on their own jobs.133 The professionals in the 
first city, according to Plato, do not need to distinguish who friends or enemies 
are, because the city is established based on what Annas calls principles of 
specialisations,134 which mean each professional merely needs to finish their 
own job and exchange their produce with others to fulfil their other needs, 
resulting in a happy life (Republic 372b-c). Although in the second city, 
guardians and rulers, like other professionals, are only doing their own job, the 
nature of the job that guardians and rulers do is to look after the safety of the 
state. (Republic 374-376). The vision of guardians and rulers is to identify if 
other states or people are friendly or not. The process of identification involves 
 
133 On the interpretation of “their own job” see Julia Annas’ interpretation, she argues that 
doing their own job in Plato does not really involve spontaneity and individuality that the 
moral agent can make their own decision on their life-styles and the divergence of jobs, but 
rather Plato means that “‘doing their own job’ implies a great deal of conformity and 
identification with a role share by others.” (Annas, J., [1981], p. 74)  
134 Annas, J., (1981), pp. 75-6. 
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perception, reasoning, and deliberation to decide if a state or person is friend 
or foe. Plato believes that the vision of guardians and rulers determines how 
they guard and govern states, and thus what they learn during their youth 
including what they watch, listen to and read should be refined. This is because 
guardians and rulers would imitate what they have learned, such as the content 
and values of poems, which will thus influence the dispositions of guardians 
and rulers through their habits in daily life (Republic 395d).  
A detailed curriculum is introduced by Plato for the education of guardians and 
rulers, including in the fields of music and sport. At first sight, it seems that the 
teaching of music is to train the soul, and the teaching of sport is to train the 
body (Republic 376e). However, Socrates later claims that the teaching of 
sport is also to train the soul, because a healthy soul ensures a healthy body 
(Republic 403d). On finishing their education, guardians and rulers are merely 
capable of formulating opinions (doxa) rather than knowledge, because the 
learning process for the guardians in the second city is to learn and imitate the 
contents of the poems (Republic 379-394).  The dispositions, visions and 
thoughts of moral agents are formulated in accordance with the content and 
the value of the poems that prevail in the states. This education of guardians, 
which only enables them to formulate opinions rather than knowledge, lays the 
foundation for the point that there must be someone else — a philosopher — 
who is better suited to be the ruler of the state, echoing the argument about 
the dispute between poems and philosophy in Book X (Republic 607b). Plato 
constrains poets from composing anything that depicts confrontations among 
gods or anything describing gods as being immoral or unjust. For example, as 
stated in the passage, “since a god is good, he is not – as most people claim 
– the cause of everything that happens to human beings but of only a few 
things, for good things are fewer than bad ones in our lives. … Then we won’t 
accept from anyone the foolish mistake Homer makes about the gods when 
he says, ‘there are two urns at the threshold of Zeus, one filled with good fates, 
the other with bad ones” (the Republic 379c-d). 
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According to Plato’s description of the learning of guardians and rulers, their 
quality as moral agents depends on the contents of the poems used in their 
education. Plato also believes that guardians and rulers are not able to reflect 
upon their learning because everything they learn is opinion rather than factual 
knowledge. If the poems from which they are educated are changed then what 
the guardians and rulers learn would be different, leaving them in a state of 
flux.  As Sedley noted, it seems to him that what Plato believes is that 
knowledge is “something incapable of change”.135 This denotes that not only 
are guardians’ and rulers’ opinions unstable for the governing of the states, but 
also the learning process seems endless, in order to attain knowledge instead 
of opinions. Plato takes another stance to elucidate this point: “First, none of 
them should possess any private property beyond what is wholly necessary. 
Second, none of them should have a house or storeroom that isn’t open for all 
to enter at will. Third, whatever sustenance moderate and courageous warrior-
athletes require in order to have neither shortfall nor surplus in a given year 
they’ll receive by taxation on the other citizens as a salary for their 
guardianship. Fourth, they’ll have common messes and live together like 
soldiers in a camp” (Republic 416b-e). I agree with Pappas’ view that in order 
to remove the temptation of money, the education of guardians and rulers is 
endless.136 Nevertheless, the beliefs of guardians and rulers can be easily 
changed because, as Plato showed, the learning process and materials are in 
flux and only formulate opinions (Republic 416b-e). Keeping rulers and 
guardians unchanged is achieved by keeping them away from the temptations 
of money and other personal things. The premise that a professional can only 
do one job is set in the establishment of the first and second cities, which is to 
say each farmer, doctor, builder and so on, do their own work and exchange 
their output for the output of others. However, the guardians’ and rulers’ job 
are to protect the states. They are not supposed to own any money other than 
 
135 Sedley, D. (2007). Philosophy, the Forms, and the Art of Ruling. In G. Ferrari (Ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, pp. 256-
283). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 258. 
136  Pappas, N. (1995). Plato and the Republic (Routledge philosophy guidebooks). London: 
Routledge, p. 73.  
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for essential needs of living. Otherwise, guardians and rulers will become 
indistinguishable from other professionals. This goes against the premise 
mentioned in the Republic 370a-b that a person should only do one job in 
accordance with their nature. Thus, guardians and rulers must be constrained 
to encounter objects or own wealth and as a result what they learn is basically 
music and sports. The guardians and rulers share the first stage of education, 
i.e. the music and sports, but the ruler does not merely have opinions but also 
knowledge. The key difference between guardians and other professionals is 
that professionals need to only have knowledge about their own profession, 
which is based on factual knowledge. Guardians and rulers, however, need to 
perceive and judge if the state is safe and make decisions upon it, thus they 
require education that cultivates their soul in order to enable them to 
distinguish just or unjust, moral or immoral, right or wrong.137  
Knowledge, as we can see from the aforementioned, is the criterion to 
distinguish between philosopher-kings and non-philosopher rulers and 
guardians. As David Sedley indicated, the readers of the Republic are a group 
of imaginary people who are well educated and who believe they are 
knowledgeable and own knowledge themselves. He further noted that he 
believes Plato attempts to persuade the readers that what they own is not 
knowledge but rather opinions, thus they should hand themselves over to the 
philosopher-king’s governing.138 I am sympathetic to Sedley’s suggestion for 
readers of the Republic to humble themselves in front of knowledge. 
Nevertheless, my focus is rather on the discrepancy of the perceptions and 
decision making caused by the possession of knowledge between philosopher 
and rulers/guardians. 
In the analogy of the story of the cave in the Republic Book VII, Plato writes: 
“Therefore each of you in turn must go down to live in the common dwelling 
place of the others and grow accustomed to seeing in the dark. When you are 
 
137 I will discuss the tripartite soul and the virtuous actions in chapter 3.  
138 Sedley, D. (2007)., p.257. 
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used to it, you will see vastly better than the people there. And because you 
have seen the truth about fine, just, and good things, you will know each image 
for what it is and also that of which it is the image. Thus, for you and for us, the 
city will be governed” (Republic 520c-d). Plato indicates the difference 
between knowledge and opinions through depiction of the cave. He believes 
that the opinions, like the images on the wall, are in flux. They are variable 
between true and false, and subjective to different people. However, 
knowledge is incapable of change. On the one hand, Plato indicates that 
philosophers who have seen the form of good do not want to dwell in human 
society. On the other hand, since they have seen the form of good, based on 
this knowledge, the philosopher is the best ruler of the state. A similar portrait 
of philosophers is displayed in Theaetetus in which the philosophers want to 
fly up and away from human society (Theaetetus 172c-176b). This passage is 
similar to the beginning of the Republic when Thrasymachus makes Socrates 
stay for the discussion about justice (Republic 327c). In addition to 
philosopher-kings being most suited because of their knowledge, Plato also 
calculated that the happiness of the philosopher king is 729 times greater than 
that of tyrants (Republic 587d-e). 
1.4 Comparison of the Moral Agent in the Laozi and 
Plato 
Comparing how the Laozi and Plato shape and educate the moral agent to 
become the exemplar figure in each philosophy helps to understand how each 
projects the essential perspectives of the discussion of goodness, the process 
of cultivation/education and the respective treatment of knowledge. By 
comparing these perspectives between the Laozi and Plato, not only enables 
a thorough analysis of the similarities and differences of these points, but also 
allows more insightful reflections, such as what knowledge is to moral agents 
in general, and whether the knowledge is necessary for moral agents to attain 
goodness. In this section the comparisons will presented in two ways. First, 
the way the Laozi and Plato present images of ideal states will be compared, 
and second the relationship between knowledge and the formulation of the 
moral agent will be compared. 
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We can find ideal states encompassing ideal rulers, ideal regulations/laws as 
well as ideal ways of life in the Laozi and Plato. In the Laozi, it is depicted as 
the small state in chapter 80 and in Plato, it is depicted as the ideal state in the 
second city.  However, it is pointless to compare these two philosophies if they 
merely agree with each other. Plato reckons that the ideal state is derived from 
the first city that contains the minimum numbers of citizens who are 
professionals in their own fields to fulfil the basic needs of the whole city. 
However, the good state is radically different from the city of pigs, because the 
city of pigs is built in accordance with what Julia Annas calls the principle of 
specialisation, which means each person does only one job.139 As Annas 
argues, Plato is aware of the importance of the existence of different kinds of 
people, although he is not primarily interested in the differentiation of the 
professions such as shoemakers or farmers. Rather, his interest is in the wider 
differences of type, i.e. three classes of the state in accordance with the 
tripartite soul.140  Furthermore, Plato believes that there will be merchants 
operating between different states, which will fuel the development and the 
corruption of the first city (Republic 370e-371b).141 This is contrary to the view 
of the Laozi, which expresses that the state should remain simple, live and 
work in an old-fashioned style and should not come into contact with its 
neighbour-states. It seems that the depiction of the city of pigs is similar to the 
state in the Laozi in terms of self-sufficiency. In chapter 80,142 the Laozi vividly 
 
139 Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
pp. 73. 
140 Annas, J. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 75. 
141 Ibid, p. 76. 
142 Chapter 80 小國寡民。使有什伯之器而不用；使民重死而不遠徙。雖有舟輿，無所
乘之，雖有甲兵，無所陳之。使民復結繩而用之，甘其食，美其服，安其居，樂其俗。
鄰國相望，雞犬之聲相聞，民至老死，不相往來。As chapter 80 notes: “the state is small 
with small amount of people. Though there were individuals with the abilities of ten or a hundred men, there 
should be no employment of them; I would make the people, while looking on death as a grievous thing, yet not 
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reveals a self-sufficient and simple lifestyle of the ruled living in a small state, 
and Moeller notes that this state is “the ideal Daoist state” full of contentment 
in the virtue of a lack of desire for luxury goods.143 Although the city of pigs and 
Moeller’s so called “ideal Daoist state”, a view I incidentally disagree with, both 
portray self-sufficiency and contentment, the small state in the Laozi does not 
contain any specific professionals, which is at variance to the city of pigs. This 
conflicting idea on the simplest states foreshadows the discrepancy of the 
formation of the moral agent between the Laozi and Plato.  
The differences of the ideal states between the Laozi and Plato triggers their 
discrepancy of the formation of the moral agent with regard to the treatment of 
knowledge. On the basis of this understanding of these kinds of goodness, 
they have considered how to shape and educate the moral agent in order to 
possess the best good, that is for the moral agent to have both the intrinsic 
good and the best consequences. Although they have demonstrated the 
process of the formation of the moral agent differently, based on my analysis 
of the process of cultivating the moral agent in the Laozi and Plato, I believe 
that both think that there is a different way of cultivating the moral agent to 
obtain good in itself and for its consequences.  
It is intriguing that we find that the Laozi and Plato recognise consequentialist 
views as being good, but neither regard such views as the highest good. The 
highest good is something that possesses both good in itself and achieves 
good consequences. The Laozi consider the kind of Confucian ruler who is 
 
remove elsewhere (to avoid it). Though they had boats and carriages, they should have no occasion to ride in 
them; though they had buff coats and sharp weapons, they should have no occasion to don or use them. I would 
make the people return to the use of knotted cords (instead of the written characters). They should think their 
(coarse) food sweet; their (plain) clothes beautiful; their (poor) dwellings places of rest; and their common (simple) 
ways sources of enjoyment. There should be a neighbouring state within sight, and the voices of the fowls and 
dogs should be heard all the way from it to us, but I would make the people to old age, even to death, not have 
any intercourse with it.” 
143 Moeller, H.-G. & Laozi, 2007. Daodejing (Laozi) : a complete translation and commentary, Chicago, 
Ill.: Open Court, p.184. 
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loved by the ruled to be a good ruler, but ranks it below the Daoist ruler, which 
it considers to be the best. The advocates for different preferred concepts will 
lead to disputes within the ruled, since the ruled may value items differently. 
Some may think that they are righteous and believe others are unrighteous 
and should be punished, while the others may consider themselves to be the 
righteous ones. The actions of the ruler in managing these diverse views could 
result in fights between the ruled, against the state itself and between states. 
The Laozi considers the best ruler as the sage-like ruler, who rules by being in 
the state of ziran and acting wuwei. The process to become a sage-like ruler 
involves the moral agent abandoning the distinction of conventional social and 
moral values that Confucians would pursue, such as benevolence (仁 ren) and 
righteousness (義  yi), 144  and also well-established preferred concepts or 
properties, such as the strong (强 qiang), full (全 quan), more (多 duo), and 
new (新  xin). 145  The features, qiang, quan, duo, and xin, reveal the 
conventional advantageous traits, but each has an opposing pair; weak, 
empty, less and old. By first distinguishing the opposing pairs and then 
comparing and contrasting the pros and cons of each enables the moral agent 
to pursue the feature that will achieve the best consequences, For example, in 
chapter 22, qiang, quan, and xin are the conventional desired properties and 
are beneficial for people with conventional valued minds. However, the Laozi 
shows that both sides have advantageous features, revealing that the 
conventionally weaker parts, such as the compressed (曲 qu), the hollow (漥 
wa), and the worn-out (弊  bi) also have merits. The Laozi considers the 
opposing pairs to be united as a whole, with the two moving from one side to 
the other as the movement of the dao.146 The moral agent should learn from 
the sage who holds both of them, instead of merely cherishing one side. In this 
way, the moral agent or the ruler can become like the sage, who is immersed 
in human society and does not appear conspicuous compared with the rest. 
 
144 Chapter 38 
145 Chapter 22 
146 Chapter 40 反者道之動 
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The sage in the state of ziran does not conduct themself based on, or derived 
from, any teleological aims with preference or consideration of the best 
consequences. Rather, the conduct is performed by the sage recognising, 
considering and deciding it is in accordance with different situations, or as 
Ames coins it as the “mirroring response”.147 However, it will result in the best 
for both the ruler and the ruled as both of them would be in the state of ziran. 
Thus the best ruler lives and acts in accordance with the dao, which leads to 
the states and the ruled being well ruled, because the ruler is in a state of ziran, 
which will lead to a good consequence in the same way as a Confucian ruler; 
but also by being in the state of ziran and acting wuwei is good in itself and for 
the moral agent to reach the personal ideal state. 
Both the Laozi and Plato appear to distinguish the best ruler from the ruler 
based on their theory of knowledge that correlates and corresponds with the 
change of their visions and decisions about choice respectively. However, in 
the detailed analysis, it was shown that knowledge in the Laozi is not 
distinguished from opinions. To put it another way, the knowledge in the Laozi 
is as simple as “being aware of” (知 zhi) or personal experiences. Rather we 
could find more on the depiction of the states of ziran and wuwei in the Laozi. 
Unlike the Laozi that does not explicitly express the procedure of the 
attainment of knowledge and pass the knowledge to the moral agent, the 
distinction between knowledge and opinions has been explicitly displayed and 
has the metaphysical significance for Plato. The philosopher-king who is the 
best ruler has the knowledge and has been able to conceptualise the form of 
the good that makes them see through the changing images in human society 
to make the best decision for the states. However, the non-philosopher rulers 
are rather different; they have to be kept away from the temptation of wealth 
and fame so as to govern the state better, because their opinions would be 
variable between true and false, when facing different situations.  
 
147 Ames, R.T. & Hall, D.L., (2004), p. 24. 
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The fundamental difference between the Laozi and Plato in terms of the best 
rulers is how the best ruler deals with the relations between themself and the 
ruled. In the Laozi, the sage aims to become immersed into the ruled and 
become one of them. In this way, the ruler is capable of governing the ruled in 
a natural way so as not to let the ruled even notice that there is a ruler in the 
state; whereas for Plato the philosopher has to be persuaded to become the 
king. The states and the ruled force the philosopher-king to stay and govern 
the states because he could provide the best governing based on his vision 
and knowledge. Thus, in the Theaetetus, the philosopher would like to fly away 
from human society but instead must stay and rule the state (Theaetetus 
172c). Based on my analysis, I conclude that the moral agent can be educated 
to become the ideal/role model for both the Laozi and Plato. This moral agent 
possesses the intrinsic good that for the Laozi is to live in accordance with the 
dao, which makes the moral agent act wuwei and be in the state of ziran; 
whereas for Plato the moral agent would be educated in a certain way so as 
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Chapter 2 The Final Moral Ends in Plato and 
the Laozi 
 
2.1 Introduction  
“In this world, nothing is certain except death and taxes”, so said US President 
Benjamin Franklin as he neared his own demise in 1790. Given their respective 
discussions of eternity of the dao in the Laozi and immortality of the soul in 
Plato, philosophers might argue that even death is only certain in a physical 
sense. Death is an important philosophical topic, as it is an important religious 
topic, since it is related to the existence of mankind and the meaning of life. As 
the end of life, death brings the need for human beings to introspectively 
scrutinise and reflect on their existence and morality. In both Plato and the 
Laozi we can find that there are substantive discussions focusing on the 
lifespan of individuals and the morality of human life. Contrasted with the 
eternity of the dao in the Laozi and the immortality of the soul in Plato, human 
life is finite and can be easily destroyed.148 The kind of life the moral agent 
should live and what is the final moral goal in such a limited lifespan are crucial 
questions. This chapter compares the Laozi and Plato and claims that the final 
moral ends function as the lighthouse guiding moral agents in the pursuit of an 
ethical life. In order to justify this claim, we need to initially look at the telos of 
human beings to verify whether there are teleological aims in the Laozi and 
Plato, and then to justify if those aims guide human beings’ moral lives. 
Thereafter, I will articulate separately what the dao is and what the soul is in 
the Laozi and Plato respectively. In this section, not only will I offer my 
interpretation of the Laozi that there are three-fold Weltanschauungen related 
to three-fold of the dao, but also I intend to further the claim that both the Laozi 
and Plato identify that the best human beings are able to achieve being as 
 
148 Both the dao and soul are generalised terms here. There are more detailed descriptions of 
these two concepts, for example, the dao of heaven tiandao 天道, the dao of the sage shengrenzhidao 
聖人之道, the rational soul, and the cosmic soul, and the mortal soul etc. I will discuss them 
at length later.  
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close as possible to the higher authorities – the dao and the cosmic soul. If we 
consider the dao and the cosmic soul to be the final moral goal, I argue that 
the different traits in the constitution of the dao and the cosmic soul act as a 
guide to cultivate and educate the moral agent. 
The conclusion of the first chapter that the formation of the moral agent in the 
Laozi and Plato are derived from the understanding of good, leads us to 
question how they respectively treat knowledge. Understanding the 
differences in how they treat knowledge lies in how they treat the final moral 
goal as the teleology of human life. It is therefore necessary to examine what 
teleology signifies in each, and in particular under what considerations can 
teleology be applied to the Laozi. 
To understand teleology, it is useful to consider the teachings of Aristotle. A 
fundamental aspect of Aristotle’s teaching is the final cause (Metaphysics 1032 
a 25, 1033 b 32, 1049 b 25), where he indicates that any action should have a 
targeted outcome, such as health being the final cause of walking. Andrew 
Payne149 indicates that there are two kinds of teleology noted by Aristotle and 
more generally for all the ancient philosophy - intentional teleology and 
teleology of nature. Payne also argues that there is a further teleology in Plato, 
which is, “the variety centres on the performance of functions or characteristic 
activities in the course of action.”150  
Payne terms the first type of teleology as intentional teleology, which is an 
action performed for the sake of something with the ‘something’ directing the 
action. This kind of teleology can be seen in many dialogues of Plato. For 
example, as stated in the Lysis 291 d-e, “a man who loves his sick son will go 
to great trouble to obtain wine and a cup to hold the wine if it will cure his son.” 
This example clearly shows that the particular human action is performed for 
the sake of a desirable end. Another example is “humans being just is not 
 
149 Payne, A., 2017. The teleology of action in Plato's Republic First., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 3. 
150 Ibid, p. 1-2. 
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because justice is good in itself, but rather for the sake of not being harmed by 
injustice of others.”151 (the Republic 358e-359b)  
I also believe that intentional teleology is discursively and implicitly shown in 
the Laozi in the way in which results are derived directly from an action. For 
example, intentional teleology is shown in chapter 73; “the way of Heaven, win 
without contention”152. I interpret this stanza as an imperative expression and 
promotion of guidelines for the moral agent to strive towards. That is to say, 
‘the way of Heaven’ depicts striving to achieve the dao, whereas ‘win without 
contention’ denotes that winning alone is not enough if it is achieved at the 
expense of others. That is to say that winning is the desirable result for the 
moral agent but the way of winning, ‘without contention’ is equally important. 
However, interpretations vary, and Moeller suggests that this stanza denotes 
the defensive nature of Daoism.153 In his commentary he treats this stanza as 
the manifestation of the dao of Heaven that results in what it acts. I agree with 
his point, but my interpretation actually goes further than Moeller’s because 
the prescriptive suggestions of actions is derived from the factual manifestation 
of the higher authorities in the Laozi. That is to say, the Laozi discursively 
displays the instances of the kinds of actions performed by the sage, the dao 
of the Heaven and the dao per se. Intentional teleology is focused specifically 
on actions, which means, if an action has an objective it is directed and 
performed for the sake of achieving the objective. In this case teleology 
indicates that the result of the action functions as the cause of the action. In 
this sense, both consequentialism and deontology have teleological aims for 
 
151 I have also discussed it in the first chapter on the distinction of goods 
152 Chapter 73 天之道，不爭而善勝 This kind of syntactical specimens having the same 
nature of conducing the action for the sake of the promotive results is scatted over the texts of 
the Laozi. For example, in chapter 73, “不言而善應，不召而自來，繟然而善謀。Not to 
speak, and yet it is skilful in (obtaining a reply); does not call, and yet men come to it of 
themselves”. (translated by James Legg) 
153 Moeller, H.-G. & Laozi, 2007. Daodejing (Laozi) : a complete translation and commentary, 
Chicago, Ill.: Open court, pp. 168-9. 
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actions. Consequentialism argues that the best consequences are the telos of 
actions; whereas the teleological aims of deontology vary depending on the 
motives of the moral agents, although all intend to follow moral rules in pursuit 
of fulfilling their duties. 154  As an example, let us consider how 
consequentialists and deontologists would consider the killing of a person. In 
general, a moral agent would consider killing someone as being morally wrong, 
whether that be because they consider it morally wrong to kill someone or 
because they could solve a problem by means other than killing. 
Consequentialists in a broad sense are considered to be those who consider 
the teleological aim of actions, which is the maximisation of good/happiness. 
To maximise good/happiness, the action must lead to positive good. This 
would lead a consequentialist to kill one person if it saved the lives of two or 
more others, regardless of the moral right or wrong of killing a person. 
However, the teleological aim for deontologists is for the moral agent to follow 
the moral rules and killing one person is morally wrong, regardless of whether 
this leads to an overall good outcome. In the case of a deontologist, even if a 
small lie would prevent a war from breaking out, it would still be immoral for 
the moral agent to lie. 
Payne’s second type of teleology is the teleology of nature which he describes 
as “the sort of purposive behaviour and structure seen in nature, as when a 
spider spins its web in such a way as to serve the purpose of catching 
 
154 This discussion is well-known as the distinction between ‘agent-neutral’ and ‘agent-relative’ 
moral theories. ‘Agent-neutral’ and ‘agent-centred’ have wider focuses and discussions, but 
regarding the issue of the teleology, ‘agent-neutral’ theory indicates that since the teleological 
aims are the same for every moral agent, thus the reasoning of moral agents are neutral while 
making the decision of the performed actions; whereas ‘agent-relative’ theory indicates that 
the teleological aims vary among moral agent, thus the reasoning of moral agents is relative, 
while making decisions. (the discussion to see papers: Dougherty, T. (2013). Agent-neutral 
deontology. Philosophical Studies, 163(2), 527-537. Scheffler, S. (1989). Deontology and the 
Agent: A Reply to Jonathan Bennett. Ethics, 100(1), 67-76. Hammerton, Matthew. (2017). Is 
agent-neutral deontology possible? Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 12(3), 319.) 
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insects.”155 The prime example of this teleology is the creation of the cosmos 
by the Demiurge, who was responsible for creating and maintaining the 
physical structure of the universe as a living and structured being (Timaeus 
30c-31a).156 Although there is no explicit example of teleology of nature in the 
Laozi, we can see that living in accordance with the dao for all entities is 
depicted as the teleology of nature (chapter 25 and 39). In addition to these 
two kinds of teleology, Payne believes there is a third kind of teleology in Plato 
which is “the performance of functions or characteristic activities in the course 
of action”. He illustrates this kind of teleology by arguing that in the analogy of 
the cave in the Republic, the moral agent lacks wisdom, but if the moral agent 
“carries out a function that promotes understanding of intelligible reality [they] 
can still act for the sake of understanding Forms”.157  Payne’s concept of 
functional teleology attempts to reconcile the tension between the final cause 
of the philosopher’s understanding of the form and at the same time 
philosophers living in human society, lacking wisdom of the best action to 
pursue the understanding of the form.  
In this chapter I conduct a more detailed examination of the relationship 
between Payne’s natural teleology and the development of moral agents by 
looking at the final moral goal of the moral agent in the Laozi and Plato. This 
essentially means considering what is the final goal or the telos of human life, 
or what kind of person does the moral agent intend to become. In each ethical 
realm there is a higher or teleological aim; maximising happiness is the 
teleological aim for consequentialists, and the cultivation of a virtuous agent in 
 
155 Payne, A., 2017. The teleology of action in Plato's Republic First., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 4. 
156 Johansen, T.K., 2004. Plato's Natural Philosophy : A Study of the Timaeus-Critias, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 2, Johansen argues that the Platonic cosmos does not happen 
to have goodness and beauty, but rather it is so as designed so. The teleological explanation 
will offer the elaboration of its end or goal. I am sympathetic to Johansen, nevertheless, I think 
not only this teleological explanation gives the interpretation of the ends of cosmos, but also 
give the final moral ends for human beings. 
157 Ibid, p.11. 
The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
74  Chapter 2 
virtue ethics. In the realm of Plato, the teleological aim is to live as much as 
possible like the gods and for the Laozi the teleological aim is to live in accord 
with the dao. The teleological aim is the goal for moral agents, and as such it 
provides a moral compass for moral agents to guide their actions and help 
them understand the rationale of their moral psychology. In ancient Greece, 
the final moral goal or telos of human life, homoiosis theoi kata to dunaton, 
becoming as close to godlike as possible, has become more widely recognised 
and accepted in the field of ancient philosophy. As David Sedley points out, it 
is for human beings to become like the gods as much as possible.158 John M. 
Armstrong furthers Sedley’s point by arguing that with the endorsement of the 
idea that the identification of god with intelligence in the Timaeus, the Philebus 
and the Laws, becoming like a god is not moving away from the sensible 
world 159  but rather improving it, in particular in the Laws. 160  Similarly, in 
Chinese culture during the Warring States period, discussion of what kind of 
lives people should pursue was prevalent. For the Laozi, to live in accordance 
with the dao is the ideal and final moral goal for mankind, as claimed in chapter 
39.161 The dao will impose order into the entities in the cosmos. Order, as I 
 
158 Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca, NY, 1999), ch. 3; Sedley, D (1999). The Ideal 
of Godlikeness. In G. Fine (ed.), Plato Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Oxford 
University Press. pp. 309-28, p.309.For other discussions see J. Duerlinger, ‘Ethics and the 
Divine Life in Plato’s Philosophy’, Journal of Religious Ethics, 13 (1985), 312–31; H. Merki, 
Homoiosis theoi: Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gott•ahnlichkeit bei Gregor 
von Nyssa (Freiburg, 1952); and C. G. Rutenber, The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in 
Plato (New York, 1946). 
159 By sensible world, I mean the physical world that is paralleled to human society in the Laozi 
part. 
160 Armstrong, J. (2004). After the Ascent: Plato on Becoming Like God. Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy 26:171-183, p.171. 
161 Chapter 39 昔之得一者:天得一以清;地得一以寧;神得一以靈;谷得一以盈;萬物得一以
生;侯王得 一以為天下貞。其致之，天無以清，將恐裂;地無以寧，將恐發;神無以靈，
將恐歇;谷無 以盈，將恐竭;萬物無以生，將恐滅;侯王無以貴高將恐蹶。故貴以賤為本，
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mentioned in the last chapter, appears in the Laozi as 治 zhi, which is normally 
correlated to a political sense. I use the term order (zhi) here in both political 
and natural senses, since in chapter 39162 that is how they are portrayed with 
the feature of each entity appearing in their best state as clear 清, heaven 天, 
quietness 宁 earth 地, and well-ordered 貞 zhen for the world 天下. 
My belief on the relevance of the teleology of nature for the Laozi and Plato is 
that having gone through the formation of education or cultivation for the moral 
agent, they aim to achieve the highest good as their telo of human life, an 
approach that will likely be challenged by others. Kant clearly takes a different 
stance when he argues that mankind is not only the means of anything, but 
also the end in themselves, since all humans are rational autonomous beings 
capable of making decisions for themselves.  He argues that people “act in 
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 




The origin of the law, The things which from of old have got the One (the Dao) are the Heaven 
which by it is bright and pure; Earth rendered thereby firm and sure; Spirits with powers by it 
supplied; Valleys kept full throughout their void. All creatures which through it do live Princes 
and kings who from it get. The model which to all they give. All these are the results of the 
One (Dao). If heaven were not thus pure, it soon would rend; If earth were not thus sure, 'would 
break and bend; Without these powers, the spirits soon would fail; If not so filled, the drought 
would parch each vale; Without that life, creatures would pass away; Princes and kings, without 
that moral sway, However grand and high, would all decay. Thus it is that dignity finds its 
(firm) root in its (previous) meanness, and what is lofty finds its stability in the lowness (from 
which it rises). Hence princes and kings call themselves 'Orphans,' 'Men of small virtue,' and 
as 'Carriages without a nave.' Is not this an acknowledgment that in their considering 
themselves mean they see the foundation of their dignity? So it is that in the enumeration of 
the different parts of a carriage we do not come on what makes it answer the ends of a carriage. 
They do not wish to show themselves elegant-looking as jade, but (prefer) to be coarse-looking 
as an (ordinary) stone. (Translated by James Legge) 
162 Ibid. 
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means.”163 As we can see, Kant’s understanding of the highest good differs 
from Plato and the Laozi in that he thinks that the good will of the moral agent 
is an unchanging good, however, the unchanging good for the Laozi and Plato 
are the dao and the cosmic soul respectively. Kant argues: “… in this way, 
there arises the idea of a two-fold metaphysic — a metaphysic of nature and 
a metaphysic of morals. Physics, therefore, will have an empirical part and also 
a rational part, and ethical likewise, though here the empirical part may be 
called more specifically ‘practical anthropology’ and the rational part ‘morals’ 
in the strict sense. … Nothing in the world — or out of it — can possibly be 
conceived that could be called ‘good’ without qualification except a good 
will.”164 In this passage, he notes that only the good will of the moral agent is 
an unchanging good and everything else apart from the good will can be 
morally bad. To take an example, we say that mental talent has instrumental 
value, but it also can be used as a morally bad function if there is no good will 
behind it. The same could apply to other aspects, such as external good and 
so on. Nevertheless, if we accept the premise that good will is good for its own 
sake, could the fulfilment of duties be derived from anything else apart from 
good will? Yes. It is possible or highly possible that the moral agent fulfils the 
duties without any good will. For example, a teacher may teach for the sake of 
their salary rather than recognising and fulfilling a duty to educate students. 
However, the highest good in the Laozi and Plato is different from Kant’s 
concept of “the unchanging good” since, in both, it possesses the transcendent 
sources of the cosmos and the principles of the world respectively that human 
beings aim to emulate.165 The final moral goal for Plato (becoming as godlike 
as possible) points human beings in the direction of a certain way of life that 
 
163 Kant, I., Gregor, M., & Timmermann, J., (2013). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals (Rev. 
edition / translation rev. by Jens Timmermann ed., Cambridge texts in the history of 
philosophy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.90. 
164 Kant, Groundworks of the metaphysics of the ethics, chapter 1. 
165 The higher authority in Plato is presented as the cosmic soul in the Timaeus and the one is 
the dao in the Laozi, as we can see in chapter 51. 
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should be lived during their lifespan. Plato has addressed ‘homoiosis theoi’ in 
different dialogues and various places, such as the Phaedo 69c, 81a, the 
Symposium 207c-209e, the Theaetetus’ digression 176e-177a, the Republic 
613a-b, the Phaedrus 252c-253c, and the Timaeus 29e. In the Phaedrus, a 
passage reveals a close connection between mortal creatures, including 
human beings, and gods. Plato dramatises a scene where human beings 
achieve the final moral goal through the embodied human souls growing wings 
once they get as close as possible to the gods, as seen in the passage: “For 
just this reason it is fair that only a philosopher’s soul grows wings, since its 
memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close 
to which the gods are divine. A man who uses reminders of these things 
correctly is always at the highest, most perfect level of initiation, and he is the 
only one who is perfect as perfect can be.” (the Phaedrus 249 c5-8). This 
passage illustrates the procedure of achieving the final moral goal for the moral 
agent – the philosopher. As we can see, one of the essential activities 
practiced by philosophers during their lives is recollection, because via the 
procedure, the disembodied soul of the philosopher encounters the Forms as 
the right food and drink. The more the disembodied soul has encountered the 
Forms, leads to more nourishment and cultivation, fuelling the philosophers to 
think abstractly, which leads the soul to get closer to the gods. Plato notes that 
the rational accounts of likening the soul of gods and the way of nourishing 
and cultivating the soul is the best way for human beings to get “the soul back 
to where all gods dwell (the Phaedrus 246 d10)”. 166  
The Laozi notes that the sequence of the imitations of the principles among 
humans, heaven, earth and the dao have to be understood as a process of the 
imitation of the principles from humans to the dao. I argue that the dao is the 
highest authority and the final moral goal in the Laozi and, indeed, the Laozi 
claims in chapter 25 that the dao is the highest authority and its principles are 
 
166 Nehamas, A., & Woodruff, P. (1995). Phaedrus. Indianapolis, Ind. ; Cambridge: Hackett, 
p.22. 
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the highest to be emulated.167 Certainly, there is a counter-argument that the 
term – dao – is multivalent in the Laozi and it is therefore misguided to make 
such a general claim that the dao is the highest authority and the final moral 
goal.168 To support my argument I will conduct a detailed analysis of the 
concept of the dao later in this chapter to show why the dao is the highest 
authority that the moral agent can achieve in the Laozi. Briefly I highlight two 
reasons to defend my position. First, the aforementioned chapter 25 explicitly 
reveals the process of the imitation of the principles from the lower part to the 
higher part, although the typological interpretation of the dao has a long history, 
and I do not attempt to deduce such a broad claim out of one chapter.169 
Second, the correlated traits of the dao are discursively expressed for the 
purpose of being emulated by the moral agent. For example, the idea of 
possessing the dao as the ideal state for the moral agent — the rulers — as 
the manifestation of the traits of the dao, such as to not contend 不争 buzheng, 
無為 wuwei and so on. Chapter 81 states that “聖人之道，為而不爭。the dao 
of the sage, to act but not to contend.” shares the same traits of the dao of 
heaven in chapter 73, “the dao of heaven, it is good at winning in virtue of not-
contending 天之道，不爭而善勝”. as well as in chapter 2, “the sage acts the 
affairs of wuwei, and does the wordless teaching 是以聖人處無為之事，行不
言之教” shares the traits of wuwei with the dao in chapter 37, “道常無為而無不
 
167 “道大，天大，地大，王亦大。域中有四大，而王居其一焉。人法地，地法天，天
法道，道法 自然。 The dao is great, heaven is great, earth is great, and the emperor is great. 
In the territories, there are four greats, the emperor is one of them. The human emulates the 
earth, the earth emulates the heaven, the heaven emulates the dao, the dao emulates what it is 
itself.”  
168 Thanks to my internal examiner of PhD viva, Dr. Curie Virág. She raises up this dispute. 
It is a sharp point that pushes me to round up my argument.  
169 Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2015). Thematic Analyses of the Laozi BT  - Dao Companion to Daoist 
Philosophy (X. Liu (ed.); pp. 47–70, pp. 48-51. Csikszentmihalyi’s paper has done a detailed 
work on listing and organising the substantial typological interpretation of the dao in western 
world. 
 The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
Chapter 2  79 
為 the dao always acts wuwei and there is nothing undone.” Thus, not only is 
the teleology of Plato and the Laozi different from Kant’s view that the highest 
authority for mankind is mankind themselves, but, for each, the emulation of 
the higher authority denotes that the final goal of the moral agent would more 
clearly and better help them construct their own ways of life and guide how 
they will make decisions. 
In the philosophical systems of both Plato and the Laozi, the highest authority 
represents the highest ethical good, in Plato it is the soul, and in the Laozi it is 
the dao, with each functioning as the foundation of the whole cosmos and 
representing the highest good to pursue. 170  However, it is important to 
investigate how these principles are adopted and applied to the moral agents 
in human society and assimilated by them. The possession of the highest 
ethical good is exhibited by moral agents demonstrating an understanding of 
the metaphysical doctrines, adopting them into their lives and utilising them in 
the way they live their lives. I shall argue in the following sections that the soul 
and the dao respectively are the ultimate good for moral agents to achieve, 
since Plato believes that the best life or the highest goodness is to live as 
godlike as possible, and the Laozi asserts that the best life to live is one in 
 
170 Although we can find that there is a highest ethical good in both Plato and the Laozi, I do 
not suggest that the Laozi contains a parallel concept to eudaimonia in Plato. There are no such 
direct and categorical concepts conveyed and formulated in the text of the Laozi. However, a 
well-formulated concept does not necessarily have to be expressed by a specific term. For 
example, Plato claims that the best life is to live like gods as much as possible to pursue 
eudaimonia, which, etymologically, contains the implication of living like gods; on the other 
hand, it takes, for a moral agent, a significant portion of their lives to cultivate their souls and 
complete the journey of getting their souls back to the place where gods live. The highest 
ethical good in the Laozi is that the moral agent lives in human society in accordance with the 
dao. Living in accordance with the dao means that the moral agent treats the dao as the guiding 
principles in their way of living and acting, the procedure of making decisions and the means 
of participating in the events in their lives. Before moving on to and wrestling with the 
discussion of the final moral goal, it is necessary to discuss the soul in Plato and the dao in the 
Laozi from which the final moral goals develop. 
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accord with the dao. In each respective philosophical system, humans as the 
moral agent need to either get the rational soul into the right motion for Plato 
or follow the dao to guide decision making and actions for the Laozi.  
Having demonstrated that the Laozi and Plato advocate the moral agent to 
emulate the higher authorities of the dao and the cosmic soul respectively, in 
the following two sections I examine the nature of the dao and the cosmic soul 
and their relationship with the moral agent. The Laozi demonstrates a 
hierarchical ranking of emulation from human being (人 ren) to the dao, as 
aforementioned,171 whereas Plato claims that “whenever the Demiurge looks 
at what is always changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, 
reproduces its form and character, then, of necessity, all that he so completes 
is beautiful” (Timaeus 27e-28a). Thus, the first question which needs 
addressing is what are the dao and the cosmic soul?  
2.2 The Three-Folds of the Dao 
Scholars have explored the Laozi using different concepts. For example, Liu 
Xiaogan starts his research of the Laozi from what he calls the ‘core value’, 
the concept of ziran 自然.172 My research of the ethics of the Laozi starts from 
the concept of the dao, because at some point the dao either needs to be 
considered or becomes the foundation of other concepts. I disagree with Liu 
Xiaogan’s argument that the dao follows the value of ziran, because ziran is 
one of the principles of the dao manifested in human society. The Laozi follows 
only one rule to demonstrate the absolute dao per se as a non-physical 
 
171 Chapter 25, 道大，天大，地大，王亦大。域中有四大，而王居其一焉。人法地，地
法天，天法道，道法 自然。 The dao is great, heaven is great, earth is great, and the emperor 
is great too. In the territories, there are four greats, the emperor is one of them. The human 
emulates the earth, the earth emulates the heaven, the heaven emulates the dao, the dao 
emulates what it is itself 
172 Liu, Xiaogan. (2014) “Laozi’s Philosophy: Textual and Conceptual Analyses” ed. in Dao Companion 
to Daoist Philosophy. Berlin: Springer, in Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, p. 72. I do 
not agree that ziran is the core value in the Laozi since it is presented as a mode rather than a 
value in other chapters such as chapter 17 百姓皆曰：“我自然”.  
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existence which cannot be perceived and expressed.173 The dao can take on 
many manifestations in human society, such as principles and beings, and 
such manifestations can be perceived, articulated and expressed, but they are 
not the absolute dao. That is to say, there is a paradox formulated in the Laozi 
that on one hand it attempts to express and describe what the dao is, but on 
the other hand, it implies that the dao at the macro level is the totality of the 
world with non-physical properties. In addition, the dao has the attributes of 
transiency, limitlessness and ineffability.174 I argue that the dao in the Laozi 
manifests itself in three forms, which are the ideal, ideal-like, and human 
reality. The final goal of the moral agent is to emulate the dao at the ideal level 
and in so doing achieve the ideal-like state at best. Put another way, the best 
that rulers in human society can become is sage-like, since the sage is 
associated with the dao at the ideal level and rulers can never reach sage 
status. I suggest that we can illustrate the images of the three-fold 
Weltanschauungen, which are Weltanschauungen related to the dao at the 
ideal level, the one related to the dao at the ideal-like level and the one related 
to the dao in human reality. Based on this hypothesis of the three-fold of dao, 
I will argue that to achieve the higher authority the moral agent must live in 
accordance with the dao.  
I am not the first to consider the different aspects of the dao in the Laozi, and 
as mentioned above, there are many typological interpretations of the dao. 
Historically, the tradition to interpret the Laozi as a twofold Mystery (chongxuan 
pai 重玄派) by adopting a Buddhist teaching method can be traced back to the 
Tang Dynasty. This school of thought encompasses religion and philosophy 
including the realms of ontology, cosmology and political philosophy. It argues 
that there are two kinds of truth following the tetra lemma method, the worldly 
truth and the absolute truth “depending on the capacity and the spiritual state 
 
173 I follow scholars, such as Chen Guying etc., to name the ineffable dao as the absolute dao, 
and the dao that can be articulated is named as the ordinary dao.  (To see the book: Chen 
Guying 陈鼓应, 2006, Laozi Zhuyi yu Pingjie老子注释与评介, Zhonghua shuju 中華书局.) 
174 To see the Laozi, Chapter 14.  
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of any being”.175 The moral agent has to first attain the worldly truth, in order 
to be able to attain the absolute truth. Scholars like Cheng Xuanying and Livia 
Kohn believe that the Laozi reveals the same doctrines from the first chapter 
and also, that the sage is the only one who has attained the absolute truth. As 
the exemplary figure in the Laozi, the sage, by attaining the worldly truth is 
able to pass knowledge to people, and by attaining the absolute truth attains 
the absolute dao.176  
The typological interpretations of the dao has a long history. Liu Xiaogan has 
identified four categories of interpretation of the dao. The first interpretation is 
that of Benjamin Schwartz and others who assert that the dao is the 
metaphysical Reality (Schwartz, further argues Daoism to be mysticism).177 
The second interpretation is that of Chen Guying and Charles Fu where, 
according to Chen Guying, the dao has to be understood in three dimensions 
including the metaphysical aspect, the phenomenon aspect and the 
application of the dao178: and Charles Fu considers the dao as non-dualistic 
and non-conceptual metaphysics.179 The third interpretation is that of Mou 
Zongsan - the dao is the metaphysics as the consideration of vision contrasting 
with the metaphysics as the consideration of being. The fourth interpretation is 
that of Yuan Baoxin – the dao is the metaphysical basis of the value world.180  
 
175 Assandri, F (2009). Beyond the Daode Jing: Twofold Mystery in Tang Daoism. Three Pines Press, 
p.2 
176 Ibid, p. 1-8. 
177 Schwartz, B.I., 1985. The world of thought in ancient China, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, p. 193. 
178 Chen, G. & Laozi, 2006. Laozi jin zhu jin yi ji ping jie , Taibei: Taiwan shang wu yin shu guan. 
179 Wei‐Hsun Fu, C., 1973. Lao Tzu's conception of Tao. Inquiry, 16(1-4), pp.367–394. 
180 Liu, X 劉笑敢, 2009, Interpretation and Orientation 詮釋與定向, shang wu yin shu guan.The 
reason I will follow Liu Xiaogan’s work is because he does not overlook either the Chinese 
scholarships or the modern western scholarships, which makes his work an extraordinary 
useful literature review.  
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My interpretation synthesises and adds to Chen Guying’s and Charles Fu’s 
interpretations of the notion of the dao, and presents a systematic 
interpretation of the discursive connotations of the notion of the dao.181 Taking 
Charles Fu’s arguments as an example, not only does he represent the 
typological interpretation using his analytical elucidation of the dao, but also 
he criticises the argument that the dao has attributes or properties. He notes 
that all the principles are depicted as different perspectives of the dao which is 
considered as non-conceptualised, non-dualistic metaphysical symbols.182 I 
agree with Fu that the dao in the Laozi is functioning as a symbol conceiving 
the package of the attributes and the principles183. However, if the dao is not 
merely a symbol, we need to consider what the sense and referent of this 
symbol are? For example, in the case of the technology company Apple, the 
Apple logo is the symbol, which refers to the whole company and its products 
as the referents. Fu argues that the dao is a symbol without admitting there is 
a referent, which seems odd that a symbol without a referent has 6 
perspectives.184 As we can see in chapter 25, the term “a thing” 物 wu is used 
as the referent of the dao.185  
Having examined historical scholarly approaches to the typological 
interpretation of the dao, in the following section I will elucidate my 
interpretation of the dao in the Laozi, in which I argue there is actually a three-
fold Weltanschauungen. I intend to confirm my hypothesis of three-fold 
Weltanschauung by elucidating the dao at the ideal level, the dao at the ideal-
like level, and the dao in human reality. 
 
181 Chen, 2006 & Fu, 1973. 
182 Wei-Hsun Fu, C. (1973). Lao Tzu's conception of Tao. Inquiry, 16(1-4), 367-394, p 367.  
183 Chapters 14,25,24 etc. 
184 Chen, 2006. 
185 Chapter 25 有物混成，先天地生。there is a thing mixed and produced, that is born 
before the birth of heaven and earth. 
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First, I start with an assertion from my interpretation of the three-fold dao that 
it is correlated with Weltanschauung. I suggest that an ideal blueprint of the 
cosmos is depicted in accordance with the dao and the image of the sage is 
depicted as the ideal for rulers and other moral agents to emulate. The dao in 
the Laozi is omnipotent, everlasting (久 jiu) and forever good, and at the 
metaphysical level it produces 生 sheng everything in the cosmos by means 
of wuwei. The sage who possesses the dao and lives perfectly in accordance 
with it is living at the ideal dao level. Nevertheless, the Laozi discusses the 
practical implementation of the dao at the ideal level in human society, which 
can only be akin to the dao at the ideal-like level since the dao at the ideal level 
consists of traits that are unattainable for human beings, such as eternal life (
久 jiu). As chapter 23 claims: “A violent wind does not last for a whole morning; 
a sudden rain does not last for the whole day. To whom is it that these (two) 
things are owing? To Heaven and Earth. If Heaven and Earth cannot make 
such (spasmodic) actings last long, how much less can man!”186 This passage 
employs metaphorical speech to depict that if the actions of heaven and earth 
cannot last long, then what hope does man have of reaching an everlasting (
久 jiu) state, which is one of the traits of the dao at the ideal level.  
In the text of the Laozi, we can find that the repertoire of linguistic tools, such 
as metaphorical speech, figurative speech, parallelisms and analogous 
reasoning etc. is employed to elaborate discursively the unreachable dao at 
the ideal level. Some may question the point of the Laozi, comprising a text of 
approximately 5000 words, trying to disclose unreachable, ineffable concepts 
as told by the text itself, particularly as it starts with “the dao that can be spoken 
is not the absolute dao”.187 So whilst necessary, how would it be possible to 
 
186  Chapter 23 故飄風不終朝，驟雨不終日。孰為此者？天地。天地尚不能久，而況於
人乎? The translation is quoted from James Legg’s translation.  
187 For example, Bai Juyi 白居易 writes a poem to satirise the Laozi, saying that: “言者不如知
者默，此语吾闻于老君。若道老君是知者，缘何自著五千文。One who speaks knows 
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disclose, discuss and evaluate the dao and other related concepts? 188 The 
dao is a notoriously difficult concept in the Laozi as it is supposed to be the 
basis of everything in terms of both materials and principles, but the concept 
per se is ineffable. 
The dao at the ideal level is depicted in the Laozi as that everything can 
function in its own way or so-itself, which is termed ziran 自然, which is said to 
be the natural, unmolested way. 189 This assertion is challenged because of 
the way in which the Laozi does not evaluate the dao or any related aspects 
to be ideal. Scholars like Chen Guying and Benjamin Schwartz argue that the 
dao in this case should be the metaphysical reality, which means that they 
recognise the dao to be the metaphysical being without any ineffable and 
unperceivable traits.190 However, my interpretation does not agree that there 
is a sense of the dao as the metaphysical being, but rather I want to interpret 
it as an ideal Weltanschauung formulated and regulated by the dao at the ideal 
level, and which in this Weltanschauung there is no need of commanding rulers 
but rather the sage (shengren) who is driven by desirelessness (無欲 wuyu) 
and motivation to guide the (民 7) masses. In this manner of speaking, the key 
concepts such as the sage (shengren 聖人), desirelessness (wuyu) etc., are 
connected under the situation of an ideal Weltanschauung.  
By interweaving these concepts discursively, I argue that the detection of the 
ideal Weltanschauung can be demonstrated by the analysis of the notion of 
wuwei. The term wuwei appears eleven times in the Laozi and is subject to 
 
not, they who know is mute. These are the words, I'm heard, from Laozi. But if it be said that 
Laozi was one who truly knew, why did he write a thousand words text?” 
188 Chapter 1 道可道，非常道 
189 Möller, 2006, p. 50 
190 Chen, 2006, p. 1-3; Schwartz, B.I., 1985, p. 193. Chen specifically indicates the dao as the 
metaphysical being without ineffable and unperceivable traits can be inferred from chapter 14 
and 25.  
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four kinds of agencies, namely the dao, the de, the sage and ‘I’. 191  The 
consequences of wuwei conducted by the dao, the de, the sage and ‘I’ are 
different, which contrasts those notions, such as the dao, the sage and the de, 
related to the ideal Weltanschauung with the one, ‘I’, related to the reality of 
Weltanschauung in human society. In chapter 37 the Laozi notes that the dao 
merely implements wuwei 192  to be necessary to be able to complete 
everything; and in chapter 38 it notes that the de 德, as mentioned in the last 
chapter, with the implementation of wuwei, does not need to do anything 無以
為 wuyiwei; and the sage, by implementing wuwei, can achieve the state of 
wubai 無败 non-defeat in chapter 64.193 In chapter 37, the dao is depicted as 
the ideal and highest achievement.194 The ideal image of the Weltanschauung 
functions in its own way in accordance with the dao, it is self-corrected 自正 
zizheng, self-settled 自定 ziding, self-calmed 自静 zijing, and self-transformed 
自化 zihua195.These traits are the natural state of an entity if it follows the dao, 
since self自 zi in these chapters implies there is no external interference from 
anything else, but it causes, acts and completes spontaneously out of itself. 
Some may challenge that I am contradicting myself because in the first chapter 
I argued that the consequences are in fact in the crisis between the dao acting 
wuwei and the sage acting wuwei. However, here I consider the dao and the 
sage acting wuwei to be the same to contrast with wuwei conducted by human 
 
191 Chapter 43, I know hereby what advantage belongs to doing nothing (with a purpose). 吾
是以知無為之有益。 
192 I will analyse the concept of wuwei in chapter 3 in detail in the aspects of what wuwei is and 
how to achieve wuwei. I will argue that the moral agent can only achieve completely wuwei in 
the state of wuyu 無欲 no desire. 
193 Chapter 38 上德無為而無以為; Chapter 64 是以聖人無為故無敗。  
194 Chapter 37 道常無為而無不為。侯王若能守之，萬物將自化。化而欲作，吾將鎮之
以無名之樸。無名之樸，夫亦將無欲。不欲以靜，天下將自定。The dao consistently 
acts non-action Wuwei, thus there is nothing that cannot be achieved by it. If the dukes can 
behold the dao, then ten thousands of things can be self-transformed. Having transformed, it 
desires to interfere (other), I will press it down with the nameless simplicity. The nameless 
simplicity, that is also about to clear its desire (be in the status of the no desires). Do not desire 
is for the tranquilness, the world under the heaven will be self- settled.  
195 Ibid. 
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beings “I 吾 wu”, which justifies the discrepancy between the ideal and the 
reality in the Laozi. I defend myself from the challenge of contradiction in two 
ways. First, the argument in the first chapter is still valid, because judging by 
the consequences of acting wuwei by the dao, the de and the sage, the 
consequences are in crisis from nothing can be left undone 無不為 wubuwei 
to no defeat 無敗 wubai. Nothing can be left undone 無不為 wubuwei indicates 
the inherent omnipotence of the dao in the Laozi. However, no defeat 無敗
wubai does not have the omnipotence as the dao does, rather it merely 
possesses the capability of triumph in combat. Second, the dao, the de and 
the sage can be grouped together to be contrasted with human beings in terms 
of  the discrepancy of the Weltanschauung, because in the situation that the 
sage is the exemplar model who fully embodies the dao is ideal, the evidence 
can be seen in chapters 22, 24, and 72, that the action of not displaying 
themselves不自见 buzijian is conducted by the sage, which is the same action 
as performed by the dao. In chapter 24, the Laozi notes that “they who display 
themselves do not shine; they who assert their own views are not 
distinguished; they who vaunt themselves do not find their merit 
acknowledged; they who are self-conceited have no superiority allowed to 
them. Such conditions, viewed from the standpoint of the dao, are like 
remnants of food, or a tumour on the body, which all dislike.”.196 From this 
passage, we can see the dislike to self-display 自见 zijian becomes the act of 
not displaying themselves不自见 buzijian to indicate that the dao promotes 
the action of not displaying themselves, which is a characteristic of the sage. 
Furthermore, wuwei is conducted by the dao consistently, while the ideal 
situation in human society — the ten thousand things (萬物 wanwu)— is that 
self-transformation can be achieved through following the actions of the dao. 
Through this contrast, the Laozi proposes a kind of cosmos that can be self-
regulated 自定 ziding. Human society, which is created 作 zuo after the self-
 
196 Chapter 24 自見者不明；自是者不彰；自伐者無功；自矜者不長。其在道也，曰：
餘食贅行。 
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transformed ten thousand things, does not possess desires, the possession of 
which would arouse the moral agent to go against the principles of the dao. 
Thus, in this ideal world with the dao acting wuwei consistently, having been 
self-transformed, the ten thousand things will be self-regulated due to the 
desireless dao. In conclusion, it is important to recognise that the ideal notion 
of the dao and its corresponding concepts, such as wuwei, and wuyu can be 
used in both ideal and practical senses, which makes interpretation of the 
Laozi more difficult. Nevertheless, the dao in the ideal outlook and the 
corresponding concepts are demonstrated in the Laozi by means of displaying 
the best consequences of acting wuwei in human society. 
As discussed in chapter one, the sage is the ideal exemplary figure for all to 
emulate. The text of the Laozi hints many times that it is impossible for any 
entity to reach the ideal, at best it can only reach as close as possible to the 
dao’s ideal level. For example, in chapter 8, the Laozi notes that water 
possesses the highest good, but merely approaches very close to the dao.197 
Thus, the Laozi on the one hand recites that ‘the dao that can be spoken is not 
the absolute dao’,198 suggesting reaching the dao is unattainable. On the other 
hand, the text of the Laozi acts as a bridge between the unattainable ideal and 
what an ordinary mortal can achieve. Conceptually, the Laozi describes a 
‘likely truth’ or ‘likely outlook’ (which can be compared to Plato’s allegory of the 
cave and Timaeus’s speech on the creation of the cosmos “the likely truth”) 
being really close to the ideal weaved by the ideal concepts, such as the dao 
and the concepts corresponding to it like wuyu, wuwei, ziran and so on, by 
means of the rhetorical repertoire, such as metaphors, analogies, and 
dialectical speeches. 
In the Laozi, the Weltanschauung at ideal-like level is revealed in a very subtle 
way. The moral agent at the ideal-like level, would recognise that it is 
impossible to reach the dao at the ideal level. The masses would live ‘stupidly 
 
197 Chapter 8 上善若水⋯幾於道。 
198 Chapter 1. 
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愚 yu’199, and the ruler would be like the sage who does not interfere in 
anything. However, in this outlook, because it is impossible to be completely 
free of desires, 無欲 wuyu, it is only possible for the sage to have few desires 
寡欲 guayu, or to not desire 不欲 buyu, which refers to an effort made not to 
desire but does not guarantee that the moral agent can be truly in the mode of 
desirelessness. In this ideal-like outlook, the moral agent holds the traits of the 
dao and acts accordingly. Scholars have long overlooked and aggregated 
these different levels of possession of desires. However, to have few desires, 
guayu, cannot be equated to a complete lack of desires, wuyu, or to not desire, 
buyu. (for detailed discussion of desires see chapter 3). 
Instances of signifiers in the Laozi signpost the Weltanschauung at ideal-like 
level, such as few 寡  gua, near/almost 幾  ji and like 若  ruo. In the 
Weltanschauung at ideal-like level, the Laozi employs the term “like若 ruo” to 
describe the images or concepts which are akin to the dao, such as the image 
of the person who is good at living in accordance with the dao in chapter 15. 
Since the Laozi is sceptical about language and the capability of language to 
manifest the truth, it seeks to demonstrate the image of the concept. The term 
“若 ruo” has three usages in the Laozi as “akin to”, “seem like” or “a condition 
‘if’”. The utilisation of “akin to” appears on other occasions in chapters 8, 20, 
and 60. An analogy is conducted between before and after the parts of the 
term “若 ruo”. The former part of “若 ruo”, is the essential concept or image 
that the Laozi wishes to depict. For example, in chapter 8, 上善若水 the highest 
good is like water, the Laozi reveals the essential nature of the highest good 
上善 by means of the analogy of the nature of water, where water does not 
have any shape but takes on the form of the container it is in; ‘it is very soft, 
but is able to conquer the hard stone’. I have demonstrated that there are three 
kinds of moral agents - the sage, sage-like rulers and rulers. The sage-like 
ruler is the bridge between the sage, as the ideal exemplar figure who does 
not possess any desires and can act wuwei, and the rulers, who possess 
 
199 Chapter 65 
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desires to rule the masses and their states well and to conquer and enlarge 
their states.200 Thus, it is clear that there would be a model of principles 
demonstrated by the sage, which are for sage-like rulers who are the ideal like 
rulers and the rulers to emulate and apply to real human society. 
The process of assimilation of goodness of mankind to the profundity of the 
dao is the way in which the moral agent can achieve the final moral goal. The 
dao in the Laozi as the highest authority possesses the ultimate source and 
the ultimate principles that are beyond the cognition of humans, thus the Laozi 
claims that it is forced to give its name (强之為名) and to depict the image of 
the person who possesses it. The sage who possesses the dao and lives 
accordingly becomes the final moral goal for general moral agents to pursue. 
The Laozi connects the features of the dao to the features of the image of the 
moral agent who possesses the dao and acts accordingly. The linkage 
between the dao and the moral agent who possesses the dao (古之善為道者) 
or the sage demonstrates the process for general moral agents to emulate.  
It seems clear that none of the features of the dao, including such things as its 
name, nature, or the image of the person who possesses it, can be precisely 
recognised or perceived. Once the dao at the ideal level is described by 
language, its essence is lost, so the term “强 qiang is forced to”201 is used to 
clarify that the language it uses and the image it depicts are akin to the ideal 
but never would be identical to the ideal. Thus, in chapter 15 it is obvious that 
the person who is good at following the dao possesses a similar outlook of the 
dao, such as “微妙玄通，深不可識。 (they were) minute and wonderful, 
profound and penetrated; were too abstruse to be recognised”. The term “微 
 
200 this may seem to go against the philosophy of the Laozi, but the Laozi states it in chapter 36 
that “將欲取之，必先與之。if one desires to take over it, she must offer in advance”. This 
chapter relates to the realistic human society thanks to the use of ‘欲 yu’, since the dao and the 
sage are in the mode of desirelessness 無欲 wuyu. I will go through the relation between human 
motives and human action in detail in the next chapter. 
201 “强 qiang is forced to” is used in used on two occasions, chapter 15 and 25. In chapter 15, 
the Laozi is forced to depict the appearance of the person who contains the dao; and in chapter 
25, the Laozi is forced to give a name of the dao. 夫唯不可識，故強為之容。(chapter 15) 吾
不知其名，字之曰道，強為之名曰大。(chapter 25)  
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minute” in chapter 14 is used as one of the features of the dao, the 
intangibility.202 The terms 妙 “wonderfulness” and 玄 “profundity” appear in 
many chapters in tandem with discussions of the dao, such as in chapter 1 
where it states that the two sides of the dao could be called 玄 profundity with 
different names. These two names are mutually interwoven and emerge from 
the same source, the whole process as the gate of wonderfulness 妙 rather 
appears as more and more 玄  profundity. 203  Since these traits are all 
characteristics of the dao that cannot be recognised by human senses, anyone 
who possesses the dao can also not be recognised, not in the sense of 
material existence, but rather in the sense that the one who possesses the dao 
cannot be distinguished from the masses by appearance. Thus, the Laozi is 
forced to depict the behaviours of one possessing the dao, by manoeuvering 
those nearly indescribable features of the person who possesses the dao by 
employing similes, such as “若冬涉川 like crossing the river in winter” for “豫兮 
reluctant” and “若冰之將釋  like ice that is about to melt away” for “渙兮 
dissipated”. The Laozi sets a goal for the moral agent by means of depicting 
the ideal image of the person who possesses the dao. Although in real human 
society it would be impossible for the moral agent to be identical to the ideal 
image of the person who possesses the dao, the moral agent can seek to be 
akin to the ideal-like as possible.  
Apart from the moral agent, in real human society, there are also entities which 
are in the Weltanschauung at ideal-like level, such as water 水 shui. The water 
in the Laozi is supposed to be the entity holding the features of the dao and 
manifesting them.204 Even though the water manifests the aforementioned 
features of the dao, it would only reach the state of near (幾 ji ) to the dao. 
 
202 搏之不得，名曰微。to touch but cannot be touched, that is named as the minute. I will 
give a full elaboration of the reason why xi, yi, wei are three features of the dao in chapter 14.  
203 Chapter 1 此兩者，同出而異名，同謂之玄。玄之又玄，衆妙之門。These two, (they) 
come out from the same one with different names, both can be called as profundity. More and 
more profundity, that is the gate of the various wonderfulness.  
204 Chapter 43 天下之至柔，馳騁天下之至堅。 The softest in the world would conquer and 
overcome the hardest in the world. 
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However, I do not propose that the Laozi is pessimistic about the capability of 
humans and real human society, but rather it displays a possibility that for 
humans and the real human society it could be possible to reach the 
Weltanschauung at ideal-like level close to the dao in a similar way water is 
close to the dao. It would be impossible to know, to tell and to reach the dao 
and to be in the Weltanschauung at ideal level, but the Weltanschauung at 
ideal-like level can be achieved. In chapter 8, just as in real human society, 
water manifests what the dao would appear like, but the best it can be is being 
ideal-like, and it will never be identical to the dao.  
Nevertheless, the thoughts of real human society are always displayed in the 
Laozi, and the political issues of real human society are concerns to be 
resolved for the Laozi. The approach used by the Laozi is to advise the moral 
agent to work towards achieving as close as possible to the ideal-like condition. 
The Laozi argues that the ruled should live a good life and enjoy their work, 
and the politics of the states should be stable and peaceful. In order to rule the 
ruled and the states well, sage-like rulers shall abandon the conventional 
social and moral values such as wisdom 聖 sheng, benevolence 仁 ren for the 
benefit of the ruled, because these conventional values can give rise to 
unnecessary desires for both rulers and the ruled. Those unnecessary human 
desires are the root of chaos at different levels, i.e. at state level, they incite 
wars; at individual level, they lead to scheming against each other; at society 
level, they cause instability. As chapter 19 declares, the best conditions are to 
give up wisdom, benevolence, justice, cleverness and benefits, to provide 
maximum benefit for the ruled people.205 In order to achieve this (giving up 
 
205 Chapter 19 絕聖棄智，民利百倍;絕仁棄義，民復孝慈;絕巧棄利，盜賊無有。此三
者以為文不足。故令有所屬:見素抱樸，少私寡欲。To cut off sagacity and give up the 
wisdom, the people would be benefited a hundredfold; to cut off benevolence and give up 
justice, the people would go back to filiality and parental affection; to cut off cleverness and 
give up benefits, thieves would be gone. These three things are not sufficient for taking it as a 
pattern. Thus, to order them to have belonged: to display the pureness and to hold the 
simplicity, to lessen your concern to yourself and reduce the desires.  
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those qualities), the moral agent shall reduce their desires and lessen their 
self-awareness. Not only is it obvious that those qualities are what the 
Confucianists advocate pursuing, but they are also the conventional virtues for 
the moral agent in ancient China. First of all, the ideal condition for the Laozi 
is having no desires 無欲  wuyu; by contrast, in real human society, the 
achievement of no desires is impossible for the moral agent.206 Thus, the Laozi 
employs the term 寡  gua to create a state of few desires instead of 
implementing no desires (無欲  wuyu), since the moral agent cannot rid 
themselves of born bodily desires, but can reduce them to basic needs. 
Secondly, at the level of society, the rulers are also able to cut off the inclination 
to chase qualities such as wisdom, benevolence, justice and so on because 
these desires cause many issues and are taken as signs that the dao has 
perished as chapter 18 reveals.207  
Having explained the Weltanschauung at the ideal and ideal-like levels I now 
turn to articulating the Weltanschauung in human reality. I suggest that an 
analysis of chapter 36 shows that the Laozi attempts to provide an approach 
which assimilates the principles of the dao to the moral agent and teaches 
them how to achieve that which they desire. Furthermore, analysis of this 
chapter tells us that the final moral goal in the Laozi is to live in accordance 
with the dao. Whilst this may seem a bit of a cliché, it is important because the 
reason there is a discrepancy between the dao in real human society and the 
dao at ideal level is the way the dao conducts itself at ideal level is by being 
itself, whereas human society only mimics the dao at ideal level and may still 
 
206 I will give a full elaboration on his point in chapter 3 in my discussion on the human 
motivation. There are different kinds of motivations and desires in the Laozi, but in the real 
human world, it is impossible for the moral agent to have no desires since for any moral agent, 
she cannot escape the born bodily desires.  
207 Chapter 18 大道廢，有仁義;智慧出，有大偽;六親不和，有孝慈;國家昏亂，有忠
臣。 The great dao is perished, the benevolence and justice appear; the wisdom has come out, 
the great forgery appears; the six relationships in the society are not harmonised, filiality and 
parental affection appear; the states are messy and chaotic, the loyal ministers appear.  
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embrace conspiracy. Chapter 36 starts with the imperative mood which invites 
different interpretations because it is unclear to whom this chapter is being 
addressed.208 It is a ubiquitous instance of the imperative mood in the Laozi. 
For example, in addition to chapter 36, chapter 3, 19 etc. contain the imperative 
mood, like “fulfil their belly, yet empty their belly” in chapter 3 and “renounce 
our sageness and discard our wisdom, it would be better for the people a 
hundredfold” in chapter 19. The text implies things and therefore it is open to 
interpretation by commentators and translators and the approach of each 
commentator and translator can impact subsequent interpretations. As 
aforementioned, I think that the subject in chapter 36 should be implied as the 
moral agent who undertakes the cultivation of the Laozi to foster a sage-like 
moral agent. The reason why this chapter presents the imperative mood is that 
the Laozi attempts to provide a generic principle for anyone who reads the text, 
which shows that the achievements, such as closure xi, weakness ruo, 
banishment fei, and coup duo, depend on the conditions, such as openness 
zhang, strengthening qiang, prosperousness xing, and bestow yu.  
However, the analysis of the semantic meaning hints at a contradiction that on 
the one hand, desires are not preferable for the moral agent, but on the other 
hand the Laozi teaches them to achieve their desires. Actually, desires are not 
preferable for the attainment of the dao, because in order to reach the state of 
the dao, the moral agent needs to abolish desires. However, in real human 
society it is impossible for the moral agent to abandon their natural bodily 
desires, and for rulers, the completion of deeds requires setting goals, which 
to a certain degree arouses desires. The Laozi recognises this situation for 
rulers and provides methods to resolve it. Even though rulers cannot be sages 
 
208 Chapter 36 discussing desires and the moral agent, the Laozi says  將欲歙之，必固張之;
將欲弱之，必固強之;將欲廢之，必固興之;將欲奪之，必固與之。 是謂微明。柔弱勝
剛強。 When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a (previous) expiration; 
when he is going to weaken another, he will first strengthen him; when he is going to overthrow 
another, he will first have raised him up; when he is going to despoil another, he will first have 
made gifts to him: - this is called 'Hiding the light (of his procedure).' 
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who completely abandon desires and act in accordance with the dao, they can 
aspire to do what the sage would do in similar situations despite their inability 
of being in the state of the dao. The sage is aware of the regularity of the 
movement of the dao,209 from one side moving towards the opposite, thus the 
sage would do the opposite in order to achieve what is required. That is why 
the Laozi teaches the moral agent that in order to achieve one thing, it would 
be better to do the opposite, as it shows in the text as “if (one) desires … then 
she must … 将欲 jiangyu…必固 bigu…”. 
In addition to the depiction of the distinct images of the ideal and real human 
society in terms of concepts, the Laozi implements the via negativa method to 
describe the dao and related concepts in order to reveal an image of real 
human society. That is to say, by using via negativa,210 the Laozi displays that 
what is generally believed to be good and beneficial for the people in real 
human society is not what the Laozi would consider good, but rather it is the 
opposite of what the dao would do and advocate. In real human society, 
physical strength of the individual and collective strength at society level are 
more valuable than weakness, riches are better than poverty, political 
engagement is better than farming in the field. All of these preferable traits in 
real human society involve artificial interference which is radically against the 
dao. In chapter 53, the Laozi depicts a scene of the conventional idea of the 
good life, which is having good food, putting on nice clothes and being wealthy; 
however, this does not belong with the dao. The court is clean, but the ruled 
have given up farming in the field. As it states in this chapter, “only the 
implement (the artificial interference)” is not preferable. The ruled would hold 
 
209 Chapter 40 反者道之动。moving to the opposites is the movement of the dao.  
210 Charles Fu argues that via negativa cannot explicitly reveal what the dao is. (Fu, Charles Wei-
hsun (1973). Lao Tzu's conception of Tao. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-
4):367 – 394, p 369.) However, I do not argue here that the method of via negativa would reveal 
what the dao is, but rather suggest that via negativa is the method the Laozi implements and by 
using it, the Laozi demonstrates that the situations and the way of the outcome of humans 
cannot and will not arrive at the ideal.  
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the thought that they need to leave the field unplanted and that political 
engagement is the short cut to having a better life.211  
For the present, I have elucidated the three-fold dao in the Laozi as the ideal, 
the ideal-like and in human reality. There are three reasons for my articulation 
of three-fold dao; the first is to parallel with the soul, the cosmic soul and the 
embodied human soul in Plato, the second is to examine the reason why there 
is a contradiction in the treatment of knowledge in Plato and the Laozi, which 
I show to be because of the differences of the traits of the dao and the cosmic 
soul, and the third is to show that there is the emulation of the dao in human 
society from the dao at the ideal level. Now, I shall move on to the articulation 
of the soul, the cosmic soul and the embodied human soul in Plato.  
2.3 The Cosmic Soul and the Embodied Human Soul  
In order to parallel Plato’s idea with the Laozi’s accurately, I will in this section 
elaborate the notion of the cosmic soul and the embodied human soul. Based 
on the discussion of the relationships between the Demiurge, the cosmic soul, 
and the embodied human soul, I will pin down David Sedley’s notion of 
“godlike” and support my argument that the cosmic soul that should be the 
“god” to emulate rather than the cosmos.212  
It is depicted in the Timaeus that humans will become godlike by contemplating 
the circular movements of the heavens to gain an understanding of 
mathematics and in order for the rational soul to function intellectually 
(Timaeus 88e-89b, 90a-c). The rational soul is said to contain the immortal and 
 
211 Chapter 53 使我介(然)有知，行於大道，唯施是畏。大道甚夷，而民好徑。朝甚
除，田甚蕪，倉甚虛;服文 綵，帶利劍，厭飲食，財貨有餘;是謂盜夸。非道也哉! To 
make me have the least awareness, walking on the great dao, it is only implementation that 
makes (me) fear. The great dao is so safe and foreign, but the people prefer short cuts. The 
courts are so clean, the field is so overgrown with weeds, the storehouse is so empty; the clothes 
are embroidered and colourful, are wearing the sharp swords, are hosting the banquette, the 
goods and wealth are sufficient; this is called the great robbery. This is not the dao!  
212 Sedley, D. (2017). Becoming Godlike. In C. Bobonich (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Ancient Ethics (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, pp. 319-337). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 319-25. 
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godlike elements and is placed in the sphere – the head – that resembles the 
shape of the divine bodies (Timaeus 44d-45a). As Sedley notes, “to become 
godlike” as the teleology of human beings in the Timaeus, does not mean to 
become physically godlike and possess omnipotent power, but rather it means 
to have the attributes of the god, such as immortality, happiness, goodness, 
wisdom and self-sufficiency. 213  Sedley’s view that human beings should 
emulate the cosmos in order to become godlike implies three things: first, for 
humans, the cosmos is the higher authority; second, that emulating the 
cosmos will make human beings morally good; and third, to become godlike is 
the ultimate moral goal for human beings.214 By equating gods to the cosmos 
(world),215 and other heavenly divine bodies including the sun, earth, and other 
spheres,216 Sedley provokes discussions of what exactly ‘gods’ refers to, and 
further what is it meant by ‘godlike’? In the Timaeus, there are many entities 
referred to as god, including the Demiurge, the cosmic god and traditional 
gods. It is therefore necessary to identify exactly which god is the one that 
humans should emulate and be assimilated to, since “to become godlike” is 
the teleology of humans in Plato. Indeed, this discussion requires a 
prerequisite of resolving the relationship between the Demiurge and the 
cosmic soul. Some scholars, such as Carone, argue that the Demiurge is 
identical to the cosmic soul, whereas others, such as Broadie, argue that the 
Demiurge is separate from the cosmic soul.217 If the Demiurge and the cosmic 
soul are the same, to become godlike is, as Sedley argues, the relatively 
straightforward task of humans pursuing intellectual fulfilment by means of the 
cultivation of their rational soul. However, if they are not the same entities it is 
 
213 Ibid, p. 320.  
214 Ibid. 
215 In this chapter, I use the world and cosmos interchangeably so as to refer to the same and 
one ordered physical system. Another reason is that scholars use either cosmos or world to 
compose their papers, I thus may use them interchangeable to refer to the same thing.  
216 Sedley, D. (2017)., p. 319. 
217 Carone, G.R., (2005). Plato's Cosmology and its Ethical Dimensions, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 26-9; Broadie, S. (2011). The separateness of the Demiurge. In Nature and 
Divinity in Plato's Timaeus (pp. 7- 26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9.  
The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
98  Chapter 2 
unclear which god humans should emulate in order to become godlike. I 
contend that the Demiurge should be separate from the cosmic soul. 
Therefore, humans become godlike by emulating the cosmic god – the cosmic 
soul – and in the Timaeus becoming godlike is not merely intellectual fulfilment 
but also has moral significance and demonstrates the process of the 
assimilation of the rational part of the human soul to the cosmic soul.  
First, we shall look at the prerequisite that establishes the relationship between 
the Demiurge and the cosmic soul. The Demiurge as the creator of the cosmos 
is an anthropomorphist figure and, possessing the quality of goodness and 
beauty, seems to exist independently from the cosmos. As Timaeus states “if 
this world of ours is beautiful and its craftsman good, then clearly he looked at 
the eternal model” (Timaeus 29a2-3). According to this depiction, the eternal 
model and the Demiurge, as the craftsman, are clearly different ontological 
beings. And the product, the cosmos, is different from the two as well. 
Considering this, we need to carefully note that before Timaeus starts the 
speech, he addresses gods and goddesses to “approve of all we have to say, 
and that in consequence we will too” (Timaeus c5-d1). However, as Cornford 
notes, “neither in the Timaeus nor anywhere else is it suggested that the 
Demiurge should be an object of worship, he is not a religious figure.”218 If we 
take the myth literally, then we are faced with the first issue of what kind of god 
the Demiurge is if he is not a religious figure? It is certainly difficult to identify 
any characteristics of the Demiurge as a god in the Timaeus, particularly for 
humans to emulate. 
To understand the creation of the cosmos in relation to the Demiurge, it is 
necessary to look at the passages in the Timaeus, which throughout uses and 
mentions the term demiourgos as the creator (Timaeus 40c2, 41a7, 69c3). The 
following passage helps explain, so I quote the text at length here: 
 
218 Cornford, F.M., (1937). Plato's cosmology: the Timaeus of Plato, London: Routledge & K. Paul, 
p.35. 
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“As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is 
that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes 
but never is? The former is grasped by understanding, which involves a 
reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which 
involves unreasoning sense perception. It comes to be and passes away, but 
never really is. Now everything that comes to be must of necessity come to be 
by the agency of some cause, for it is impossible for anything to come to be 
without a cause. So whenever the craftsman looks at what is always 
changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form 
and character, then, of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful. But were 
he to look at a thing that has come to be and use as his model something that 
has been begotten, his work will lack beauty…. . Now to find the maker and 
father of this universe [to pan] is hard enough, and even if I succeeded, to 
declare him to everyone is impossible. And so we must go back and raise this 
question about the universe: Which of the two models did the maker use when 
he fashioned it? Was it the one that does not change and stays the same, or 
the one that has come to be? Well, if this world of ours is beautiful and its 
craftsman good, then clearly he looked at the eternal model. But if what it’s 
blasphemous to even say is the case, then he looked at one that has come to 
be. Now surely it’s clear to all that it was the eternal model he looked at, for, of 
all the things that have come to be, our universe is the most beautiful, and of 
causes the craftsman is the most excellent. This, then, is how it has come to 
be: it is a work of craft, modelled after that which is changeless and is grasped 
by a rational account, that is, by wisdom.”219 
As I see it, then, we must begin by making the following distinction: What is 
that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes 
but never is? The former is grasped by understanding, which involves a 
reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, which 
involves unreasoning sense perception. It comes to be and passes away, but 
 
219  Cooper, J., & Hutchinson, D. (1997). Complete works. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing, p.1234-5. 
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never really is. Now everything that comes to be must of necessity come to be 
by the agency of some cause, for it is impossible for anything to come to be 
without a cause. So whenever the craftsman looks at what is always 
changeless and, using a thing of that kind as his model, reproduces its form 
and character, then, of necessity, all that he so completes is beautiful. But were 
he to look at a thing that has come to be and use as his model something that 
has been begotten, his work will lack beauty.  
Now as to the whole universe or world order [kosmos]—let’s just call it by 
whatever name is most acceptable in a given context—there is a question we 
need to consider first. This is the sort of question one should begin with in 
inquiring into any subject. Has it always existed? Was there no origin from 
which it came to be? Or did it come to be and take its start from some origin? 
It has come to be. For it is both visible and tangible and it has a body—and all 
things of that kind are perceptible. And, as we have shown, perceptible things 
are grasped by opinion, which involves sense perception. As such, they are 
things that come to be, things that are begotten. Further, we maintain that, 
necessarily, that which comes to be must come to be by the agency of some 
cause. Now to find the maker and father of this universe [to pan] is hard 
enough, and even if I succeeded, to declare him to everyone is impossible. 
And so we must go back and raise this question about the universe: Which of 
the two models did the maker use when he fashioned it? Was it the one that 
does not change and stays the same, or the one that has come to be? Well, if 
this world of ours is beautiful and its craftsman good, then clearly he looked at 
the eternal model. But if what it’s blasphemous to even say is the case, then 
he looked at one that has come to be. Now surely it’s clear to all that it was the 
eternal model he looked at, for, of all the things that have come to be, our 
universe is the most beautiful, and of causes the craftsman is the most 
excellent. This, then, is how it has come to be: it is a work of craft, modelled 
after that which is changeless and is grasped by a rational account, that is, by 
wisdom.  
In this passage, the cosmos is an empirical and tangible thing that belongs to 
the category of something that is becoming. In contrast with the category of an 
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intelligible being (Timaeus 27d5-28a6), the category of becoming can only be 
perceived by the senses (Timaeus 28c5-29a5). Regarding the model that the 
Demiurge follows, as we have seen in the distinction between “what is that 
which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but 
never is”, someone familiar with the Republic would recognise that this is the 
distinction between the forms and the sensible (Republic 518c, 534a). We can 
interpret the passage above in two ways: first, what are all the things which 
always are and have no becoming, and what are those which become but 
never are? And second, what are they which always are and have no 
becoming, and what are those which become but never are? The distinction 
between the two interpretations is that the former question can be interpreted 
using the theory of the form, and the latter one is the question that the passage 
in the Timaeus attempts to answer, since the cosmos is intangible and 
unchanging (Timaeus 28c, 29b). That is because the process of the creation 
of the cosmos is the start of the discussion on the metaphysical and 
epistemological doctrines, as “the former is grasped by understanding, which 
involves a reasoned account. It is unchanging. The latter is grasped by opinion, 
which involves unreasoning sense perception. It comes to be and passes 
away, but never really is.” (Timaeus 28a). The distinction between knowledge 
and opinion is discussed by the difference between understanding and opinion 
(Republic 507d-511e).220 Intriguingly, Plato uses the term gods to refer to 
many things, including the Demiurge, heavenly bodies and traditional gods, 
and thus he argues that this empirical and tangible cosmos is a god, as stated 
in the Timaeus 34a8, “applying this entire train of reasoning to the god that 
was yet to be, the eternal god made it smooth and even all over, equal from 
the centre, a whole and complete body itself, but also made up of complete 
bodies.” Because of Plato’s variable references to gods it becomes more 
difficult to identify which god humans should emulate and model as the final 
moral goal.  
 
220  Ashbaugh, A. F. (1988): Plato’s Theory of Explanation: A Study of the Cosmological 
Account in the Timaeus, New York, pp. 14-5. 
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Furthermore, it is hard to interpret Timaeus’ speech in the Timaeus, because 
in the introduction the speech is described as “likely myth τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον” 
(Timaeus 29d). This leads to the question how should I deal with the account 
of the creation of the cosmos? Should I interpret it in a mythical/literal way or 
in a philosophical way? Plato is well known for blurring usage of mythos and 
logos in his writings.221  I am not going to debate the distinction between 
Platonic mythos and Platonic logos, but will focus on whether we take the 
speech on the creation of the cosmos literally or philosophically, which will 
determine what we believe the Demiurge is and its relationship with the cosmic 
soul. I believe that there is philosophical significance in this myth, and I hold 
that the Demiurge should be separate from the cosmic soul. However, this 
separation does not affect the assertion that becoming godlike is to become 
akin to the cosmic soul, rather than the Demiurge, because the Demiurge in 
the Timaeus does not really contain explicit characteristics for humans to 
emulate and is unlike the cosmic god which shares the same oncological 
properties with the rational soul of humans. The Demiurge merely appears as 
the anthropomorphic figure whose representatives are variable in the Timaeus, 
for example, the Demiurge is shown as the cause of the cosmos in the 
beginning of the speech (Timaeus 29a8), nonetheless, later on, the father – 
the Demiurge – is transformed to the Being. (Timaeus 50c8-d2)222 
Discourse on the relationship between the Demiurge and the cosmic soul is 
ongoing. As aforementioned, Gabriela Carone and Sarah Broadie both treat 
the Timaeus as’ “likely myth” from a philosophical perspective but hold 
contradictory interpretations on how the cosmos was created leading them to 
 
221 Morgan, K.A., (2000). Myth and philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 155-6. Brisson, L. & Naddaf, G., (1998). Plato the myth maker, Chicago, 
[Ill.] ; London: University of Chicago Press. Betegh, Gabor (2008). Tale, theology, and 
teleology in the phaedo. In Catalin Partenie (ed.), Plato's Myths. Cambridge University Press.  
222 It is true that the Demiurge contains the excessive goodness and lack of envy, which seems 
to share the human characteristic, but in terms of this, the cosmic god also share the same traits 
with the Demiurge because the Father wants to construct the product like him.  (Timaeus 29e-
30a) 
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arrive at opposite conclusions of the relationship between the Demiurge and 
the cosmic soul. Since my perspective is different to both of theirs, it is 
important to understand our respective viewpoints with regard to the creation 
of the cosmos. Carone thinks that the Demiurge represents the cosmic soul, 
whereas Broadie believes that the Demiurge is a separate entity from the 
cosmic soul. Carone believes the myth should be read in the philosophic way. 
She argues that the Demiurge is a god who creates the cosmos and has the 
essential features of a god, i.e. intelligence/rationality and goodness. The 
cosmic soul functions in the system of Plato’s cosmology as a god for humans 
to emulate and thus, the Demiurge represents the cosmic soul, because, 
Carone argues, the separation of the Demiurge from the cosmic soul is 
redundant.223 She, like Broadie, compares and contrasts the Demiurge with 
the god in Judeo-Christian tradition, but her focal point is on the role of the god 
in both philosophical systems. That is to say, the god is the representation of 
the good from which conduct streams. Their conduct is always good. Treating 
this as the premise, then the philosophical system must deal with the problem 
of evil224. On the other hand, Broadie225 focuses on the process of the creation 
of the cosmos and she identifies three key features of the process of a product 
i.e. three key factors of “product, cause and materials” which should be 
separated from one another. Broadie, by contrasting the Timaeus and 
Christianity, argues that Plato is different from the idea of creation ex nihilo 
from Christianity in which the materials that they used are distinct between 
Timaeus and Christianity with regard to the creator and the created world — 
the cosmos.226 Materials are pre-existent, the product is the cosmos and the 
cause is the Demiurge as stated in the Timaeus, thus, they are separate from 
 
223 Carone, G.R., (2005). Plato's Cosmology and its Ethical Dimensions, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 26-9. 
224 The problem of evil creates the dilemma that if the god is all good and never bad, and 
creates the world in a good way, how could the evil be generated? 
225 Broadie, S. (2011). The separateness of the Demiurge. In Nature and Divinity in Plato's Timaeus 
(pp. 7- 26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9.  
226 Ibid.  
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each other. It is incontrovertible that there is an implication in the passage 
Timaeus 30-31 that Plato reveals that the Demiurge places the order and 
intelligence into pre-existing materials rather than creating the cosmos ex 
nihilo (Timaeus 30-31). Moreover, even if we follow Broadie’s arguments to 
resolve the differences between Platonic Timaeus’ cosmological ideas and 
Christian ones, (notwithstanding that I do not think it is necessary), the key 
difference should be the model that the creator follows. It seems to me that 
Timaeus intends to focus on the issue of whether the Demiurge follows the 
eternal and changeless model or the model that is coming to be, rather than 
the material. On the other hand, the idea of ex nihilo creation postulated by 
Christianity is that the creator made the world without following any model. I 
agree with Broadie’s argument that the key factors, “product, cause and 
materials”, should be separated from one another; however, should the third 
factor be classed as materials or model?227 According to this passage (the 
Timaeus 28a-b), three key factors contributing to the creation of the cosmos 
should be product, cause and model, with model being the most beautiful that 
the creator looks at instead of what Broadie suggests “product, cause and 
materials”. Because the key question in the passage the Timaeus 28 b-c is: is 
the creator looking at the best eternal model or the model that is coming to be? 
228 The central discussion about the beauty of the cosmos relies on which 
model the god copies instead of which materials the god uses. Having 
analysed Gabriela Carone’s and Sarah Broadie’s views of the relation between 
the Demiurge and the cosmic god, it shows that Carone believes that it is 
redundant to distinguish between the Demiurge and the cosmic god, thus the 
Demiurge underlines the presence of teleology which pervades the cosmos, 




228 Johansen in his book also mentions this point. Johansen, T. (2004). The status of Timaeus' 
account. In Plato's Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias (pp. 48-68). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 48.  
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According to the myth, the Demiurge has two capabilities; to understand the 
paradigm (Form) of the cosmos; and to create a sensible and tangible cosmos 
in accordance with the paradigm (Timaeus 29a-31b1). The myth further says 
that the gods created by the Demiurge will generate the mortal parts of the 
soul. From this standpoint, we can see that terms like god (theos), gods (theoi), 
and the divine (theion) are used interchangeably in the Timaeus after the 
lesser gods have been created, drawing attention to Plato’s notions of gods 
being blurry. 229  The cosmos, according to Plato, belongs to the realm of 
becoming, “it has come to be. For it is both visible and tangible and it has a 
body – and all things of that kind are perceptible. And, as we have shown, 
perceptible things are grasped by opinion, which involves sense perception” 
(Timaeus 28b8-c1). The meaning of ‘become’ is ambiguous and confusing; on 
the one hand, it can mean that the cosmos has come into existence at some 
point and continues to exist from that point forward; on the other hand, it means 
that the cosmos exists and is in a process of change. The former meaning of 
‘become’ indicates that the cause – the father or the maker (Timaeus 29a9) – 
gives birth to the cosmos out of his materials: the cosmos comes into being 
after his creation. The latter meaning of ‘become’ indicates that the cause 
perpetually sustains the evolution of the cosmos. 230 In addition, according to 
the passage in 29a8 the Demiurge is the cause of the cosmos. What kind of 
cause is the Demiurge to be? First, the Demiurge as a creator is like a 
craftsman in the Republic X who makes a bed out of a Form that is not created 
by anyone; thus, the Demiurge is like the efficient cause in Aristotle. Second, 
the Demiurge as a cause shall keep the cosmos continuously changing. If we 
assume that the aim of creating the cosmos was to reach an ideal goal, then it 
is fair to assume that the Demiurge must also oversee the evolution of the 
cosmos since the ideal goal functions as a force to keep the cosmos changing. 
If so, it contradicts the passage 30b6-c2 in the way the force to keep the 
 
229 This point has been pointed and discussed by Carone (2005, 31), Cornford (1937, 280) etc.  
230 Cornford, 1937, pp. 24-5. 
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cosmos changing is derived from the soul, as it notes “He wanted to produce 
a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would 
allow. This, then, in keeping with our likely account, is how we must say divine 
providence brought our world into being as a truly living thing, endowed with 
soul and intelligence” (Timaeus 30b6-c2). Thus, the Demiurge should be a 
cause like the craftsman in the Republic X which indicates that the Demiurge 
as a cause should be separate from the cosmos including the cosmic soul.  
However, as I stated above, my perspective differs from those of both Broadie 
and Carone. In the following section I will defend my assertion that becoming 
godlike as the final moral end for humans is not to become like the Demiurge, 
but rather it is to become like the cosmic soul or the cosmic god. As we can 
see in the Timaeus, the cosmic soul shares the same materials, ratios and the 
cause with the human rational soul, and demonstrates the mathematical 
science as the timeless, changeless and invariable item for humans to learn 
and emulate. Later on, in the depiction of the receptacle, these three factors 
change to Being, Becoming and Space, the father is changed from the cause 
to the Being (Timaeus 50d), indicating that the Demiurge is separate from the 
cosmos and the cosmic soul. On the other hand, the identity of the Demiurge 
as an anthropomorphic figure is vague in the myth. This shows that the 
Demiurge is not the one for human beings to emulate to become godlike. It 
hereafter moves the discussion to what procedure is necessary for human 
beings to become like the cosmic god – the cosmic soul as the teleology of 
human beings? This will be the central question I will answer in the next 
section. 
2.4 The Cosmic God and Its Features for Humans to 
Emulate 
As I have argued in the last section, becoming godlike is to become like the 
cosmic god. However, since the terms god, gods and divine bodies are used 
multifariously in the Timaeus, it is necessary to confirm that the cosmic soul is 
the referent that Plato intends to point to as the final moral end for humans to 
emulate. I contend that humans becoming godlike is not merely about 
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intellectual fulfilment but also has moral significance, which consists of the 
traits of the final moral end of human beings in Plato.231 My comparative 
analysis will show that the intellectual fulfillment in Plato’s teleology of humans 
is contrary to the Laozi’s, which signifies a fundamentally different treatment of 
knowledge in each of their philosophies. Although the Timaeus is a dialogue 
devoted to physics, it indicates that human beings’ happiness comes from a 
physical perspective. Human beings who harmonize the rational human soul 
with the other parts of the soul can share the feature of immortality with the 
cosmic god by means of being devoted to learning and the attainment of true 
wisdom (Timaeus 90 b1-c5). The passage is important for the discussion: 
“If a man has seriously devoted himself to the love of learning and to true 
wisdom, if he has exercised these aspects of himself above all, then there is 
absolutely no way that his thoughts can fail to achieve this: constantly caring 
for his divine apart as he does keeping well-ordered the guiding spirit that lives 
within him, he must indeed be supremely happy.” (Timaeus 90 b1-c5) 
We can find that the terms eudaimonia (the fulfilment of life) and daimon (god) 
are presented in the passage, which indicates that Plato uses the lexical tool 
to show that eudaimonia contains the etymological root – daimon, as a means 
of showing that the fulfilment of life (eudaimonia) of human beings is based on 
the rational human soul dwelling in the rounded-head becoming well ordered. 
The Timaeus notes that “and because he always takes care of that which is 
divine and has the daimon that lives with him well ordered, he will be supremely 
happy (eudemonia)” (Timaeus 90c5). On the one hand, for the purpose of 
corresponding between the rational human soul and the cosmic soul for the 
sake of implanting the cosmological good in humans, Plato notes the rational 
human soul and the cosmic soul share the same substance and motions. On 
the other hand, the rational human soul is placed within the human body which 
troubles it to get into the right order. As Plato notes, this is not as simple as 
spinning thread because the human body disturbs the revolution of the rational 
 
231 Russell 2004, Armstrong 2004 Mahoney 2008 Silverman 2010a. 
The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
108  Chapter 2 
human soul, unlike the movement of the divine heavenly bodies which have 
nothing to disturb them. From the moment of birth, the human soul is 
influenced by six motions (up-down, backwards-forwards, left-right) which are 
associated with sensation (the Timaeus 43a-d). But why should caring for the 
rational human soul and getting it well-ordered finally lead humans to supreme 
happiness (eudaimonia)? What exactly does ‘caring for’ and ‘getting well-
ordered’ mean in relation to the rational human soul? What should humans do 
to achieve a well-ordered rational human soul? I argue that order is the good 
that the embodied human soul should embrace in accordance with the order 
of the cosmic soul, which indicates order prevails over disorder for humans 
both physically and psychologically and further indicates that the assimilation 
of human beings to the cosmic god is achieved by ordering the rational human 
soul through learning.  
Plato asserts that order indicates the good by saying that something that has 
order is better than something without order (Timaeus 30a1-2). But what 
consists of the good of order and how can humans adopt the order of the 
cosmic soul for themselves? I follow Mason’s argument that order in the 
cosmos consists of “periodicity and predictability” that is manifested by means 
of the motions of the divine heavenly bodies for humans to learn, reason and 
emulate.232 For Plato, order prevails over disorder, because order is good, and 
disorder is bad. Not only is this expressed explicitly in the beginning of the 
Demiurge who creates the cosmos (Timaeus 30a1-6) but is also indicated by 
the demonstration from the beginning of human life to the rational part of the 
human soul becoming ordered (Timaeus 43a-b). The Demiurge “wanted 
 
232  Mason, A. (2006). Plato on Necessity and Chaos. Philosophical Studies, 127(2), 283-298, 
p.290. This argument is proposed by Andrew Mason. He argues in the paper that the relation 
among the necessity, the order and the chaos. He thinks that Plato correlates the necessity with 
the disorder/ the chaos which should not be so alien to us at the first sight, because the necessity 
normally is associated with the order instead of the disorder. However, my focus is different 
from him. My focal point is just on what the order is to Plato and how the order of the cosmos 
is demonstrated for humans to emulate. 
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everything to be good, and nothing to be bad as far as that was possible” 
(Timaeus 30a 1-2) Thus, in the process of the creation of the cosmos the 
Demiurge takes over all of the visible materials of the cosmos, which is pre-
existent but in discordant and disorderly motion, and brings them in order, 
because the Demiurge believes that order is in every way better than disorder 
(Timaeus 30a4-6).  
The totality of the human soul includes the divine part of the human soul that 
is bonded with the non-rational part of the soul and is embodied into the human 
body. The rational human soul gets affected because this divine part of the 
soul is joined with the human body by “many rivets” unlike the cosmos and the 
cosmic soul which is a dynamic construction produced altogether (Timaeus 
34b8-c2). According to Timaeus, every soul in the very beginning is created in 
the same manner and quality (Timaeus 41e), and the rational human soul is 
made with the same ratios of the materials yet is less pure at the same time 
(Timaeus 41d4-7). This indicates that the rational (immortal) soul of the human 
being is supposed to work in the same manner as the cosmic soul including 
the motions and the circles of the Same and the Difference (35b-37c). 
However, once the rational human soul is embedded into the human body, 
then the rational soul does not consist of just a single motion, but rather of 
seven motions. The rational human soul cannot function in the very beginning 
of human life, because, unlike the cosmic soul that only contains two kinds of 
motions and so will not be affected by the other six kinds of motions (back and 
forth, right and left, up and down) (Timaeus 39a4-b2 ff. 43 b6-8). The rational 
human soul is affected by all six kinds of motions at the same time from 
different angles. The motion of the circle of the Same and the Difference that 
is the same with the motions of the cosmic soul (Timaeus 39a4-b2) are 
affected, one stops and the other is deflected. This makes the rational human 
soul, albeit sharing the same make-up as the cosmic soul, not operate properly 
in the human body in the beginning. The human body nourishes the rational 
soul to realign it back to its original motions (Timaeus 44b2-5). “if such a person 
also gets proper nurture to supplement his education, he’ll turn out perfectly 
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whole and healthy, and will have escaped the most grievous of illnesses” 
(Timaeus 44b8-c2). 
The Demiurge implants order into the cosmos during the creation of the cosmic 
body and the cosmic soul. The cosmic body is the physical cosmos that we 
see around us, which includes the sun, the earth, the moon, other planets and 
the wider solar system. The Demiurge uses up the four material elements of 
water, fire, earth and air that he has from the pre-cosmos stage to create a 
cosmic body that is as good as it can be to prevent illness or disaster. Plato 
indicates that the cosmic body is made in the shape of well-ordered geometric 
constructions that can be understood by mathematical logic (Timaeus 31b4-
33d1). In the process of the creation of the cosmic soul, the interaction 
between the motion of the same and the motion of the different are correlated 
with the process of cognition (Timaeus 37b). The Demiurge mixes the same, 
the different and the being according to certain ratios, and then splits the 
mixture down the middle creating two circles, one of which he positions 
vertically and the other horizontally, rather like the equator and any line of 
latitude. The two circles represent the motion of the same and the motion of 
the different, which relate to the recognition and cognition of objects or 
concepts. If the thing is sensible, then the circle of the different will move, 
whereas if there arises judgment and belief that are concerned with the 
rational, then the circle of the same will move.233  The circles of the Same and 
the Different could recognise, reason and proclaim which accounts are 
attributed as soon as it meets the objects (Timaeus 37c-d). On the one hand, 
it reveals that the process of the creation of the cosmic soul is again in the 
shape of well-ordered mathematical calculations of the mixture among Being, 
the Same and the Difference; on the other hand, it pins down how intelligence 
 
233 Cornford, F.M., (1937). Plato's cosmology: the Timaeus of Plato, London: Routledge & K. Paul. 
Cornford argues that the motions of the circles of the same and the different are in the relation 
with the philosophic discourses that is with regard to the affirmative and negative statements 
concerning Forms. “The false judgement is described as mistaking one Form to another.” 
(p.97) 
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works in accordance with the operation of the particular parts of the cosmic 
soul relating to the procedure of thinking and cognition. Thus, for the totality of 
the cosmos including the cosmic soul and the cosmic body is good because, 
as Timaeus stated, it is in order, and the order is organised on the 
mathematical bases for the human being to learn, understand and emulate.  
In Timaeus 43a-c, 44a-c, 47b-c Plato reveals a close connection between the 
motions of the cosmic soul and the rational part of the human soul with respect 
to the relation of moving as well as being situated in different sensible bodies. 
During infancy, the rational human soul, although sharing the same substance 
with the cosmic soul, “is bounded within a mortal body, it at first lacks 
intelligence” (Timaeus 44a). Thus, “whenever they encounter something 
outside of them characterizable as same or different, they will speak of it as 
‘the same as’ something or as ‘different from’ something else when the truth is 
just the opposite, so proving themselves to be misled and unintelligent” 
(Timaeus 44a-b). In order to make the rational part of the human soul get back 
in order, during infancy the body needs to be nourished so as to sustain the 
function of the combination of the mortal body and the rational soul, but also 
the infant needs to be exposed to the revolution of the motions of the orbit for 
learning and “conforming to the configuration each of the circles takes in its 
natural course” (Timaeus 44b). The aim of this process is for the moral agent 
to identify the motions of the same and the different by observing the 
revolutions of the stars and learning mathematics so as to make the rational 
soul assimilate with the cosmic gods. 
In this section, I have demonstrated that, for Plato, the final moral end for 
humans is to become godlike. This can only be achieved by emulating the 
motion of the cosmic gods, which requires the rational human soul to move in 
an ordered way. Watching the revolutions of the heavenly gods and by learning 
and understanding mathematics is the means by which humans can emulate 
the motions of the cosmic gods and become godlike. 
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2.5 Comparison of the Final Moral Ends in the Laozi 
and Plato 
In this chapter, if we try to collate similarities between the Laozi and Plato in 
terms of the final moral ends, a central point to be emphasised is what are the 
final moral ends in the Laozi and Plato. A useful formula to compare the Laozi 
and Plato is what I coin the “as if method”. This formula in the Laozi can be 
interpreted as “as if 若 ruo”; whereas in Plato it can be interpreted as “eikos 
muthos likely accounts”. This “as if method” in fact consists in bridging the 
metaphysical foundation and the physical human reality. Relying on the “as if 
method”, allows us to interpret the final moral ends as the living in accordance 
with the dao in the Laozi and to become godlike as much as possible in Plato. 
But what insightful points will we realise after the comparison of the final moral 
ends between the Laozi and Plato? 
Before answering the question above, it requires some accounts for the 
interpretation of the comparison method – “as if method” – in the Laozi and 
Plato. As aforementioned, I suggest that the “as if method” bridges the truth of 
cosmic soul and human soul depicted by Timaeus in Plato and the dao at the 
ideal level and the dao in the human reality in the Laozi. The Laozi employs 
“as if 若 ruo” to depict either a status or an image that is so close to the dao at 
the ideal level, as I have mentioned earlier in this chapter. This “as if method” 
can be confirmed by the term “as if 若 ruo”234 as well as the similar sense that 
either depicts a comparable image235 or forces to offer a name to the dao236; 
whereas Plato expresses it in the Timaeus 28c-29d to emphasise that it is 
difficult to find out the creator of the cosmos, and even if we had discovered 
the creator, it is impossible to pass the knowledge of it to others. The best 
option for us is to offer a “eikos muthos likely story”. The philosophical intention 
in both the Laozi and Plato appealing for the capability to not acquire 
 
234 Chapter 8 上善若水。 “the highest good is like water.” 
235 Chapter 15 
236 Chapter 25 
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knowledge of the two metaphysical foundations – the dao in the Laozi and the 
cosmic soul in Plato – underline the best approach to get closer to the 
metaphysical foundations. The best that can be obtained is that for the Laozi, 
the moral agent acts in the way water interacts with the external world, and for 
Plato, the moral agent investigates the truth not beyond the likely story. 
In paralleling the final moral ends in the Laozi with Plato, in addition to what 
we have found that the final moral end is to live in accordance with the dao in 
the Laozi and is to become godlike as much as possible in Plato, we can find 
that this natural teleology for human beings guides them to pursue exemplary 
lives. For both, the images of the exemplar life presented in the texts can be 
achieved by the emulation to the higher authorities, the dao in the Laozi and 
the cosmic soul in Plato. The higher authorities in the Laozi and Plato 
respectively possess the highest good including the principles of conduct and 
orders for the moral agent to learn. We found that through the “as if method” 
the Laozi depicts an image of people who has possessed the dao and are 
good at practicing it, as well as conceptualising the process for the moral agent 
to become the exemplary image as the process of emulation of the higher 
authority; whereas Plato depicts it in a different way to express the emulation 
of the higher authority. The rational soul sharing the same materials and ratios 
with the cosmic soul is placed in a different situation, i.e. the human body, 
which makes the rational soul, on the one hand, possess the capability of the 
attainment of knowledge by observing and learning mathematics, and on the 
other hand, is consistently affected by the human body. The order in Plato is 
brought by Demiurge in the pre-existing materials that are in the discordance 
and unordered motions – brought from disorder to order (Timaeus 30a 1-2); 
whereas the order, although the Laozi does not explicitly reveal it and is in very 
different sense from Plato’s, can be interpreted as that which is embedded in 
the dao. Not only is it because the dao can be interpreted as a set of principles 
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to regulate and operate the world237, but also the dao operates itself as so-
itself (ziran 自然).238 
In Plato, disorder precedes order in the level of the cosmos, and the same 
occurs in the level of the rational human soul. When the infant is newly born, 
regardless of the same substance shared between the cosmic soul and the 
rational human soul, the rational human soul is in a state of disorder thanks to 
the affections from various motions and from different directions (Timaeus 43 
b6-8). In the state of disorder, the rational human soul is incapable of 
reasoning. Order which is necessary for the rational soul to get back to its right 
revolutions can be brought back to the rational human soul by learning and 
observing the revolutions of the cosmic gods (Timaeus 88e-89b, 90a-c). 
Learning and observation of the divine bodies are for the purpose of getting 
the rational soul into order, which is akin to bringing the cosmos into order from 
disorder. This is the procedure to become as godlike as possible.  
In the Laozi the notion of order can be interpreted similarly. It has roughly the 
same sense with what Plato coins “order or the order of soul”, which denotes 
periodicity and predictability. We can find that when the topic is on the 
regulation of the states, the Laozi often uses the term zhi 治 that can be 
translated as regulated or put the state in order. For example, in Chapter 60, 
the Laozi depicts that regulating a big state is like cooking a pot of small fish.239 
The conduct of ‘regulate’ implies the sense of putting a state in good order, as 
Ames and Hall note that “bringing proper order to a great nation requires 
patience and a lightness of touch on the part of those who would assume this 
responsibility.”240 Despite the Laozi and Plato having a similar understanding 
of the notion of order and functions of the final moral ends for moral agents, 
the issue of moral motivation and human conduct, despite being related to the 
 
237 Chapter 51 道生之，德畜之，物形之，勢成之。 
238 Chapter 25 道法自然。 
239 Chapter 60 治大國如烹小鮮。 
240 Ames and Hall, 2003, p. 171. 
 The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
Chapter 2  115 
metaphysical foundation in both, is treated in radically different ways. I will 
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Chapter 3 The Moral Motivations in Plato and 
the Laozi  
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I elucidated and examined the different approaches of 
the Laozi and Plato in pursuing the final moral goals associated with the virtues 
of the dao and the cosmic soul. In this chapter I will further the argument that 
the different approaches are associated with the treatment of knowledge, with 
Plato advocating a pursuit of knowledge and the Laozi advocating the opposite 
as the means to reach philosopher-king and sage-like status respectively. 
Despite the pursuit of knowledge being key in Plato and the absence of 
knowledge being key in the Laozi, both advocate the absence of desire as 
being key to reaching truly moral status. In Plato, the function of rationality is 
central to the moral agent becoming truly moral, whereas the absence of 
rationality and desires is central to the moral agent becoming truly moral in the 
Laozi. In the following sections, I will present different kinds of desires in the 
Laozi and Plato to illustrate the different approaches of each; for Plato it is 
educating the moral agent to be rational, whereas for the Laozi it is the 
cultivation of the moral agent to minimise desires to only those that fulfil basic 
needs. 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the final moral goal provides a guideline for the 
masses to identify the life they would need to live to become a moral agent. 
The implication in both Plato and the Laozi is that the standard to judge if 
actions performed by the moral agent are correct depend on whether the agent 
is moral or not. This implication is manifested by the moral exemplar figures – 
the sage and the philosopher – in the Laozi and Plato respectively. 241 
However, it can be seen that desires differ and are not identical in the Laozi 
and Plato. Given that desires in both engender moral motivation yet desires 
 
241 For the details of the arguments, to see chapter 1 and chapter 2 of my thesis. 
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are different, can all motivations be recognised as identical, and can actions 
conducted in accordance with the corresponding motivation be considered as 
identical? If not, what triggers the difference? To answer these questions, it is 
necessary to understand the different kinds of desires and also the 
corresponding motivations in the Laozi and Plato, which I will undertake 
separately.  
3.2 The Desires in the Laozi 
In considering the notion of desire in the Laozi, two kinds of syntactical forms 
are employed for the character “欲  yu” – noun and verb. 242  The lexical 
differentiation of yu does not affect the conceptualisation of human desires in 
the Laozi, because yu being used as a noun or a verb expresses the feeling 
that the moral agent should do something or act upon their will to make 
something happen. For example, in chapter 36, yu is used as a verb - 將欲歙
之，必固張之, When one is about to take an inspiration, he is sure to make a 
(previous) expiration - and in chapter 3, yu is used as a noun - 常使民無知無
欲 constantly (tries to) keep them without knowledge and without desire.243 As 
we can see, when yu is used as a verb in chapter 36, it denotes a kind of 
willingness for the moral agent, and a prescribed act upon their intentions; 
whereas when yu is used as a noun in chapter 3 it denotes an absence of the 
willingness to obtain or act upon anything by the moral agent. Thus, we can 
see that the syntactical forms of yu in the Laozi does not affect the 
conceptualisation of the notion of human desires. 
Conventional thinking, exemplified by Hans-Georg Moeller’s interpretation of 
desires in the Laozi, is that is one of the representative philosophies in the 
promotion of minimising human desires that impede humans achieving or 
developing their potential to accomplish the same as heaven and earth, such 
 
242 This character appears in 15 chapters, chapters1, 3, 15, 19, 29, 34, 36, 37, 39, 46, 57, 61, 
64, 66, 77. 
243 Tse, L. & Legge, James, 2009. Tao Te Ching Or the Tao and its Characteristics, S.l.: The Floating 
Press, p. 12, pp.65-66. 
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as the attainment of the dao, and described by Moeller as the “human problem” 
— “i.e. the problem of achieving the same degree of natural functionality 
among humans as within ‘heaven and earth’”. Moeller further states that the 
best status for the moral agent would be to have no desire, which drives the 
moral agent to be internally and externally peaceful.244 The representation of 
the conventional interpretation of human desire shows that human desire is an 
impediment at personal and societal levels. That is to say, on the one hand, 
human desire is an impediment to moral agents possessing the dao and living 
in accordance with it for the sake of becoming internally and externally 
peaceful; and on the other hand, human desire at societal level generates the 
chaos of society such as an outbreak of war as a result of never satisfying an 
ever growing array of desires. This suggests that human desire is a negative 
emotional possession for the moral agent in the Laozi.245  
However, human desire is not entirely portrayed in a negative light in the Laozi, 
but the positive aspect is usually neglected by scholars. I believe human desire 
is portrayed positively in the Laozi and I will use two points to illustrate that 
conventional thought has not yet shown the panorama of the notion of human 
desire in the Laozi. First, arguing that human desires are entirely negative 
emotional possessions is contrary to the philosophy of the Laozi, which shows 
a dynamic back and forth swing from positive to negative of the opposing pairs. 
As chapter 2 notes: “it is that existence and non-existence give birth of one to 
(the idea of) the other; that difficulty and ease produce the one to (the idea of) 
the other; that length and shortness fashion out one from the figure of the other; 
that (the ideas of) height and lowness arise from the contrast of the one with 
the other; that the musical notes and tones become harmonious through the 
relation of one with another; and that being before and after give the idea of 
 
244 Moeller, H.-G., (2006). The Philosophy of the Daodejing., New York: Columbia University Press, 
p.87； Virág, C. (2017), p.76. 
245 A similar argument can be found in Curie Virág’s book, the emotions in early Chinese 
Philosophy. She also avers that “One of the salient features of this text (the Laozi) is its negative 
account of emotions and desires as fundamentally contrary to the realisation of the perfected 
life—a life in accordance with the natural process of the cosmos.” (p. 77) 
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one following another.”246. As aforementioned in the first chapter of my thesis, 
opposing pairs of concepts of weak and strong appear in the Laozi, albeit 
applauding the idea of staying with the weakness (守弱 shouruo), the radical 
reason of the juxtaposition of the opposing pairs is that the Laozi believes they 
are in flux and always changing from one side to the other. As chapter 30 
notes, “物壯則老，是謂不道，不道早已 - When things have attained their 
strong maturity they become old. This may be said to be not in accordance 
with the Dao: and what is not in accordance with it soon comes to an end.” 
This passage indicates that the state of being strong is the start of getting old, 
which implies that it is propitious to stay with the weakness, because staying 
with the weakness prevents the object from getting strong and in turn 
becoming old. That shows indeed that on the one hand, we find that the Laozi 
is not in agreement with conventional social values, such as the possession of 
strength (壯 Zhuang); and on the other hand, we can say that the Laozi wishes 
to express that every aspect has its own advantage, meaning human desires 
are not merely negative.  
Second, youyu and wuyu are both expressed in chapter 1, as it notes, “故常無
欲，以觀其妙；常有欲，以觀其徼。Always without desire we must be found, 
if its deep mystery we would sound; But if desire always within us be, Its outer 
fringe is all that we shall see.” In this chapter, ‘consistent chang 常’ denotes 
that youyu and wuyu are states consistently possessed by the moral agent.. 
The Laozi asserts that human desires consistently exist in moral agents as 
conditions affecting them. Desires as used in chapter 1 are taken as two kinds 
of condition for moral agents to contemplate (觀 guan) the dao; having desires 
or having no desires. For moral agents, these two moral psychological 
conditions determine their perception of the dao and how they live and act in 
human society. Having no desire is the condition for moral agents to be able 
to contemplate the aspect of the dao at the ideal level as I explained in chapter 
2, whereas having desires is the condition for moral agents to be able to 
 
246 Chapter 2 有無相生，難易相成，長短相較，高下相傾，音聲相和，前後相隨。 
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contemplate the aspect of the dao at the ideal-like level. Yet, conventional 
thinking dismisses the condition for moral agents who can consistently have 
desires in human society and how they deal with those desires. Thus, the 
panorama of the notion of desire in the Laozi is not demonstrated. From this 
perspective, we can tell that desires as the generator of moral motivation have 
a close relation to the dao in the Laozi, but their relationship to moral motivation 
and the mechanism of moral agents’ conducts are unclear. 
To enable comparison between the Laozi and Plato, in terms of moral 
motivation, it is necessary to first understand the notion of desire in the Laozi. 
Since the concept of desire has a close relation to the dao, as I have mentioned 
above, linking the notion of desire with the dao at different levels demonstrated 
in chapter 2 of my thesis will facilitate the further comparison. In the next 
section, I suggest that human desires can be categorised into ‘emotional 
desires’ and ‘bodily desires’. We can find that emotional desires pertain to the 
heart (心  xin), whereas bodily desires pertain to the body (身  shen). 
Furthermore, I argue that three situations of moral agents having human 
desires are depicted in the Laozi, i.e. having no desire (無欲 wuyu) in chapters 
1, 3, 34, 37, 57, having few desires (寡欲 guayu) in chapter 19, and having 
desires (有欲 youyu) in chapter 1. These three conditions indicate the status 
of possession of desires including emotional and bodily desires for moral 
agents, which generates distinct motivations for the moral agent to act. Finally, 
I suggest that we can find the prescriptive approaches in the Laozi to achieving 
the status of wuyu or guayu by means of being aware of fulfilment (知足 zhizu).  
3.3 Bodily Desires and Emotional Desires  
In this section, I suggest that the Laozi indicates the distinction of desires (欲 
yu) in the Laozi as bodily desires and emotional desires for the purpose of 
arguing that the optimal situation is to have no desires at all, but the best 
situation for the moral agent in human society is to have close to no desires (
寡欲 guayu), which is achieved by minimising emotional desires.  
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I term desires that are innate to humans as ‘bodily desires’, and those that are 
not innate as ‘emotional desires’. Bodily desires occur naturally from birth and 
include hunger and thirst, which are essential to sustain life. Such desires will 
be present throughout life since the need for food and water is a pre-requisite 
of life. Emotional desires are those that are not essential to sustain life but add 
value to life, such as the desire to obtain objects or participate in activities.247 
In the Laozi and Plato desires are differentiated according to different criteria, 
but in each they can be attributed to either bodily desires or emotional desires. 
At the same time the desires can have multi-layers. A desire to eat can be both 
a bodily desire and an emotional desire according to circumstance. When a 
person needs to eat because of hunger the desire is a bodily one. However, 
when a person wants to eat something simply because it looks appetising it is 
an emotional desire. In the first case the desire to eat is to sustain life, while in 
the second case the desire to eat is to enhance life. Emotional desires are not 
limited to physical desires but also include the pursuit of knowledge and 
intellectual insight. 
With regard to my definition of bodily desires and emotional desires I share 
some, but not all, of Virág’s arguments in terms of the notion of desires in the 
Laozi. She argues that “the optimal form of desires is the human counterpart 
to the dao itself. This desire is the source from which all things in the world 
arise and move toward fulfilment.”248 This argument is radically different from 
Moeller’s that, apart from agreeing with Virág’s statement that human desires 
in the Laozi becomes the institution to reason and motivate the moral agent, 
human desires are not entirely negative to humans to become “human 
problems”. Conventional thinking of moral philosophy in the Laozi is that it 
 
247 McDaniel, K. and Bradley, B., 2008. “Desires,” Mind, 117: 267–302. It is true that in their 
paper, the main point is to justify the topic of the conditional desire, but they also have a 
detailed discussion regarding the distinction between desires of objects and state of affairs is 
well presented in this paper. 
248 Virág, C. (2017). The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy. Oxford University Press, p. 
77.  
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encourages or promotes wuwei, rather than actions motivated by desires.249 
What is the moral motivation of wuwei in the Laozi? My hypothesis is that 
human desire pertaining to the heart (心 xin250) is in charge of both cognitive 
and affective activities, which is coined as “emotional desire”. As I noted above 
the desires will motivate the moral agent to act upon them while the Laozi also 
provides the means of how to achieve the action. With an empty (虚 xu) heart 
there are no desires, meaning moral agents would not be motivated by any 
emotional desire, instead actions would be performed spontaneously 
according to the situation (actions I describe as wuwei). The relation between 
xin and emotional desires in the Laozi requires some explanation. Based on 
the interpretation of xin, how moral agents are motivated can be explicitly 
shown under different conditions of xin, including the cognitive condition, the 
affective condition, which is presented in the Laozi as xin with desires, and the 
empty xin. I will elucidate this further in the following.  
Chapter 3 in the Laozi notes that “do not see (the thing) that can be desired, 
this makes the heart not disturbed”251, which links sight with desire and desire 
determines whether xin is disturbed or not. If the heart (心 xin) in this chapter 
is implicitly considered to be a physical organ like other sensual organs such 
 
249 Edward Slingerland, effortless actions, Kwong-loi Shun, Moral psychology in the book of 
Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy, p.477. 
250 Kwong-loi Shun, (2003) Moral psychology in Cua, A. (2003). Encyclopedia of Chinese philosophy. 
New York ; London: Routledge, p.469. I am sympathetic to Shun’s argument that xin 心 heart 
is in charge of cognitive and affective activities in the early Daoist works, I will also argue and 
prove with the textual analysis that it is applicable to the Laozi. 
251 Chapter 3 不貴難得之貨，使民不為盜。不見可欲，使心不亂。是以聖人之治，虛
其心，實其腹，弱其志，強其骨。常使民無知無欲。使夫知者不敢為也。為無為，則
無不治。Do not value the goods that is hard to obtain, (this does not) make the (ruled) people become thieves. 
Do not see that (the thing) can be desired, this makes the heart not disturbed. That is the rule of the sage, to 
empty their hearts, (but) to fulfil their belly, to weaken their aspiration, (but) to strengthen their bones (body). 
(The sage) consistently makes the (ruled) people no awareness and no desires. To make the people who are aware 
of do not dare to act. (The sage) acts non-desire triggered actions, then nothing cannot be governed. 
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as the eyes or mouth, then ‘disturb 亂 luan’ would be in the sense of the 
irregular beating of xin, which would affect the way the agents feel. However, 
this would be irrelevant to empty xin252 of moral agents stated later in the same 
chapter. The xin is disturbed by desires that are aroused from what moral 
agents see, and this shows that xin is pivotal in dealing with affections aroused 
by sensual organs. Some emotional desires, that disturb the heart, could lead 
people to perform inappropriate actions, such as the desire for valuable goods 
leading people to become thieves. 253  Thus, in this chapter, the Laozi 
associates moral agents’ xin with emotional desires by showing that emotional 
desire could be aroused by sensual organs of moral agents, which would 
affects the moral agents’ xin.  
是以聖人之治，虛其心，實其腹，弱其志，強其骨。 
That is the rule of the sage, to empty their hearts, (but) to fill their belly, to 
weaken their aspiration, (but) to strengthen their bones (body).  
In this passage, the paired verbs and nouns denote the contrast between body 
and heart, further implying the contrast between bodily desires and emotional 
desires. Belly (腹 fu) and bone (骨 gu) are an example of a pair of words 
representing the body and contrast with heart (心 xin) and intent (志 zhi). The 
juxtaposition of body and heart is indicative of the contrasting way in which the 
sage ruler treats bodily and emotional desires, where bodily desires should be 
fulfilled, but emotional desires should be empty. That is to say, the sage ruler, 
on the one hand, ensures the ruled people’s basic needs are satisfied (欲 yu), 
but on the other hand, emotional desires pertain to xin, and the Laozi’s advice 
 
252 Ibid. 
253 Chapter 3 不貴難得之貨，使民不為盜。I am sympathetic to Curie Virág’s argument 
that the wider sense of the emotion includes human desires. (the emotions in early Chinese 
philosophy, introduction). Kwong-loi Shun also argues that the emotions in the early Chinese 
Philosophy contain the desire, Kwong-loi Shun, (2003), p.469.  
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is to empty desires from their xin.254 This corresponds with the sentence ‘do 
not see (the thing) that can be desired, this makes the heart not disturbed’255 
in terms of keeping xin from being disturbed by avoiding emotional desires. In 
this sentence two pairs of contrasting verbs, to empty (虚 xu) and to fulfil (實 
shi) and to weaken (弱 ruo) and to strengthen (强 qiang), juxtapose human’s 
moral psychology and physical body. The juxtapositions emphasise the verbs 
empty and weaken focusing on the underestimation of human’s moral 
psychology, thus the sage ruler pays more attention to the ruled people’s 
bodies rather than their cognitive aspirations and affective motivation.  
As aforementioned in chapter 2, if wuwei is the ideal status for the moral agent, 
then what is the procedure of motivating the moral agent to achieve wuwei? I 
suggest that the action of wuwei is performed based on the motivation from an 
empty heart, that is the heart (心 xin) without any desires. Actions derived from 
desires are artificial actions, which the Laozi neither forbids nor promotes; 
whereas actions performed from an empty heart are wuwei since they are not 
motivated from any desires, but take place in each particular circumstance. 
Paradoxes of expressions are conveyed in the Laozi through the use of a verb 
with the negation of a noun, in which the verb and the noun are the same 
character used in different word classes. 無 wu and 不 bu are used to indicate 
the negation of a status or an action, such as 無為 wuwei, 不欲 buyu etc. 
Placing the verbs to act (為 wei) and to desire (欲 yu) in front of the same noun 
characters action (為 wei) and desire (欲 yu) expresses the actualisation of the 
negation of the terms. For example, 為無為 weiwuwei means act wuwei, 欲不
欲 yubuyu means desire no desires, and 知不知 zhibuzhi means to know not-
knowing. In chapter 3, “為無為，则無不治 To make the people who are aware 
of that they should not dare to act. (The sage) acts wuwei, then nothing cannot 
 
254 Slingerland, E. (2015). Trying not to try. Edinburgh: Canongate, p. 88. Slingerland also 
argues similarly, but he does not draw any attention to the connections among eyes, heart and 
emotional desires. 
255 Chapter 3 不見可欲，使心不亂。 
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be governed” wuwei is the ideal means of the ruler of the country to show that 
everything can be conquered and governed if the sage ruler can act wuwei. 
Xin functioning as the centre of human cognition generates actions with desire 
and actions without desire. The Laozi refers to this interaction as “weixue 爲学 
in the process of learning”, whereby the moral agent becomes more and more 
aware of different aspects of the world. The Laozi thus claims that in the 
process of learning, the moral agent increases their awareness of objects on 
a daily basis. 256  However, the more aware of the world the moral agent 
becomes, the more desires are generated for the moral agent to pursue. These 
human desires, which are the side products of learning, agitate the hearts of 
moral agents, which in turn make them generate actions to interfere with the 
world. The Laozi is not completely against such interference with the world but, 
notifies the moral agent that contemplating the dao with desires will meet 
boundaries. In chapter 1 the Laozi briefly but profoundly points out that the 
moral agent with human desire contemplates the boundaries of the dao, and 
without human desire contemplates the profundity of the dao.257 
On the other hand, “weidao 爲道 in the practice of the dao” is the process of 
banishing desire from the heart of the moral agent. In chapter 48, weidao notes 
a process for the moral agent to move from the status of having desire to the 
status of having no desire, as had already been depicted in Chapter 1. That is 
to say, the moral agent does not reach the ideal status in one step. Each day 
there is an increase in temptations (desires) for the moral agent, but the more 
they practice the dao, the fewer desires thy hold in their heart; which follows 
my argument in the previous chapter of the ideal status being one of the dao 
having no desires. By practising the dao the moral agent can reach the status 
of having no desires, leading them to be capable of “contemplating the 
 
256  Roger Ames is making similar arguments as myself. He argues that the Daoists are 
suspicious of the process of leaning in the way of expanding their knowledge and experience. 
This way of learning implies that the Daoists need to interact with the environments, but this 
will frustrate its own intentions. (R. Ames and D. L. Hall, 2003, p. 152)   
257 Chapter 1 常無欲，以觀其妙；常有欲，以觀其徼. 
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profundity of the dao”.258 Reaching the ideal status of having no desires like 
the sage and the process of reaching it is what the Laozi calls empty xin. By 
reaching this status, with empty xin, the moral agent can be wuwei. As chapter 
64 notes, “That is why the sage desires the status of having no desires, she 
does not value the hardly obtained goods. 是以聖人欲不欲，不貴難得之貨”. 
Wuwei motivated by no-desires in accordance with the principle of the dao 
interferes with nothing but rather participates as it should. Thus, wuwei for the 
Laozi is the action performed by moral agents who are in the state of having 
no desires and are able to live and act in accordance with the dao. 
3.4 Having Desires 有欲 youyu, Having Few Desires 
寡欲 guayu, and Having No Desires 無欲 wuyu 
Having seen the duality of emotional desires and bodily desire in the Laozi, in 
this section I will start to clarify the distinction among youyu, guayu and wuyu, 
and further suggest, through analysis of chapter 1, that the procedure of 
reaching the ideal status wuyu can be achieved through the approach of guayu 
and to know fulfilment 知足 zhizu. 
Chapter 1：The dao can be spoken, that is not the consistent dao. The name 
can be named, that is not the consistent name. The Namelessness is the 
beginning of the heaven and the earth; the Name is the mother of the ten 
thousand of things. Thus, consistently in the status of having no desires, (the 
moral agent) could contemplate the profundity of the dao; consistently in the 
status of having desires, (the moral agent) could contemplate the boundaries 
of the dao. These two things, coming out altogether but with different names, 
that is called dark and profundity. More and more profundity, that is the gate of 
the profundities.259 (translated by James Legge) 
 
258 Chapter 1 以觀其妙 
259 道可道，非常道。名可名，非常名。無名天地之始；有名萬物之母。故常無欲，以
觀其妙；常有欲，以觀其徼。此兩者，同出而異名，同謂之玄。玄之又玄，衆妙之門。 
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In chapter 1 the Laozi highlights the dichotomy of having desires (有欲 youyu) 
or having no desires (無欲 wuyu), which links to moral agents possessing two 
kinds of motivation and the related contemplation of the different perspectives 
of the dao. That is to say, being situated in one of the two moral psychologies 
of having desires (有欲 youyu) or having no desires (無欲 wuyu), moral agents 
have different perceptions and deliberations of the dao at either the ideal level 
(for moral agents without desires) or the human society level (for moral agents 
with desires).260 The contemplation of the different perspectives of the dao 
indicates which Weltanschauung moral agents behold, and as I have argued 
in the previous chapter there are three kinds of Weltanschauung demonstrated 
in the Laozi, the ideal, the ideal-like and human reality. What exactly does 
desire connote? For the Laozi, is it possible to have desire in the situation of 
having no desires? 
For centuries the Laozi has puzzled readers due to the contradiction that the 
moral agent should ‘always/consistent 常 chang’ have desires yet have no 
desires. The commentator Wang Bi 王弼 (226-249 AD) uses this contradictory 
concept to strengthen his argument in terms of the significance of the Non-
being (無 Wu).261 In the commentary of ‘profundity’, Wang Bi tends to elucidate 
 
260 For the distinction of the dao, to see chapter 2.  
261 He claims that: “ 故常無欲，以觀其妙；妙者，微之極也。萬物始於微而後成，始於
無而後生。故常無欲空虛，可以觀其始物之妙。常有欲，以觀其徼。徼，歸終也。凡
有之為利，必以無為用。欲之所本，適道而後濟。故常有欲，可以觀其終物之徼
也。”“‘Profundity’ means the ultimate of minuteness. The ten thousand entities begin in the 
minute and then only become complete, they begin in Non-being, and then only come to life. 
Therefore, while they are permanently without desires and their concerns are being emptied, 
it is possible, ‘by means of this to perceive the subtlety out of which’ it initiates entities. 
‘boundary’ means the final point to which entities return/relate back. Generally speaking, for 
entities to be beneficial, they have to get their usefulness from Non-being; that on which desires 
are based will only be satisfied as a consequence of adapting to the way. That is why, ‘while 
they are constantly with desires,’ it is possible ‘by means of this to perceive the limiting’ in 
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the connection between having no desires (無欲) and the Non-being (無 Wu) 
by means of elaborating that the status of having desires is the condition to 
see “the ten thousand entities begin in the minute and then only become 
complete, they begin in Non-being, and then only come to life”.262 However, 
Wang Bi has basically paraphrased the text of the Laozi, and rendered this 
interpretation of “profundity”. He does not clarify what kind of status “having no 
desires” should be or what kind of desires should be banished and eliminated. 
Nonetheless, Wang Bi notes that Non-being (無 wu) is more fundamental and 
radical than Being (有 you). Being (有 you) is beneficial to the moral agent, 
while the attainment of the benefit is based on the usefulness of Non-being (
無 wu). Having desires (有欲) is the same in that it cannot function when the 
moral agent is Non-being (無 wu), otherwise, there will not be final ends for 
these desires.263 I agree with Wang Bi that having desires 有欲 makes the 
moral agent acknowledge the boundaries between heaven and earth and the 
consequences and final end of objects and events. However, to a certain 
degree Wang Bi obfuscates the discussion of human desires because he does 
not clearly specify the kinds of desires the moral agent possesses or define 
the procedure to acknowledge the boundaries between heaven and earth. 
Through contextualising chapters 36, 37, 46, and 61 and conceptualising 
human desires, Virág264 asserts that not all desires are negative in the Laozi, 
and there is a sort of connotation of desire in the Laozi that entails higher order 
that generates the “cosmic order”. Having been sympathetic to Virág’s 
assertion, I intend to show that human desires, the main institution in the Laozi 
to generate motivation for the moral agent to act, should be confronted by 
 
which it finalises entities.” (Wagner, R. (2000). A Chinese Reading of the Daodejing (SUNY series in 
Chinese philosophy and culture). Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, p.122) 
262 Ibid. 
263 Wagner, R. (2000). A Chinese Reading of the Daodejing (SUNY series in Chinese philosophy and 
culture). Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, p.122 
264 Virág, C. (2017). The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy. Oxford University Press, p. 
75. 
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delimiting the emotional desires and fulfilling the bodily desires in order to 
achieve the status of guayu – the ideal like level.  
First, there seems to be consensus that in the Laozi human desires hinder 
moral agents understanding and attaining of the dao.265 It is true that we can 
find that desires connoting a willingness to attain something and its 
corresponding emotions are often responsible for wars or chaos in the 
Laozi.266 I must note that while there is no direct indication of human desires 
inciting wars or chaos, there are depictions of images to illustrate it happening. 
Chapter 46 denotes an image of war horses that were born on the battleground 
to indicate a ruler’s desire to conquer other states, which can only occur 
through the outbreak of wars and chaos.267 However, chapter 1 denotes that 
the moral agent always possesses desires as a condition to contemplate the 
boundaries of the dao. Graham 268  notes that the Laozi dismisses the 
dichotomy of desire and no desire by means of mentioning that people are 
constantly having desires and having no desires, which is because, for 
Graham, mentioning desire and desireless and name and nameless are 
unnecessary to possess the dao.269 However, I disagree that the Laozi intends 
to dismiss the dichotomy of having desires and having no desires, but rather 
think that having desires and having no desires reflects the status of moral 
agents in different situations, which allows the Laozi to use the term ‘constant 
常 chang’ to modify both. Indeed, it seems puzzling that on the one hand, the 
 
265 Virág, C. (2017), p. 75; Moeller G, (2006), p.91. 
266 Moeller G, (2006), p.91.  
267 天下有道，卻走馬以糞。天下無道，戎馬生於郊。When the Dao prevails in the 
world, they send back their swift horses to (draw) the dung- carts. When the Dao is 
disregarded in the world, the war-horses breed in the border lands. (translated by James 
Legge) 
268 Graham, A.C., 1999. Disputers of the Tao : philosophical argument in ancient China, Chicago, IL: 
Open Court, p. 220. 
269 Virág, C. (2017), p. 80. Virág clearly notes and disputes Graham’s point on the 
indifference of desire in this chapter.   
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Laozi treats having desires as a kind of condition to contemplate some aspects 
of the dao; but on the other hand, advocates that desires are negative, and 
demands the moral agent to banish them. This makes me question and 
examine why desires are important to the Laozi. The necessity of  the 
divergence of human desires in the Laozi offers accounts for distinguishing 
and eliminating the emotional desires that pertain to the heart, in which the 
heart/mind is affected by emotional desires through sense organs (those 
desires in Plato are categorised as the spirited desire and rational desire which 
are the ones that motivate moral agents to pursue fame, wealth, intellect, 
knowledge, virtue and so on), 270  and desires for things that exceed the 
minimum required for living but provide pleasure.271 For moral agents, I will 
further argue that having few desires (寡欲 guayu) or no desires above the 
minimum required to live(不过欲 buguoyu) is the best situation the moral agent 
can achieve in human society.  
Second, the Laozi juxtaposes the opposite conducts that is respectively 
connected with the body and heart of the moral agent. That is to say, emptying 
the heart but fulfilling the body of the ruled is the principle guidance of the sage. 
As chapter 3 reveals, emotional desires disturb the heart, so the objective of 
the sage is to empty the hearts of the masses (民 min) but fulfil their bodies.272 
One way of emptying emotional desires from their hearts is to prevent them 
from seeing desirable objects, as chapter 3 notes, “do not see what can be 
desired by them (the ruled), the heart would not be disturbed.”273 The ruled in 
 
270 Graham, A.C., 1999, p. 220. I am not suggesting that these objects are or should pursued 
in accordance with the sequence in Plato. 
271 In this Laozi, bodily desires pertains to human body, which relates to terms such as belly 腹 
fu, sinew 筋 jin bones 骨 gu; whereas emotional desires pertains to mind, which relates to terms 
such as heart 心 xin, eyes 目 mu. 
272 chapter 3 是以聖人之治，虛其心，實其腹，弱其志，強其骨。That is the rule of the sage, 
to empty their hearts, (but) to fulfil their belly, to weaken their aspiration, (but) to strengthen their bones (body). 
(translated by James Legge) 
273 不見可欲，使心不亂。 
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human society have natural bodily desires to eat and drink, as well as other 
desires. Filling the bellies of the ruled is enough to ensure their required 
demands have been fulfilled. This envisages that the ruled people in the small 
state the Laozi outlined in chapter 80 should think (their) food sweet; (their) 
clothes beautiful; (their) dwelling places comfortable, and their costume 
joyful.274 The Laozi does not claim that ruled people have special goods in their 
lives, but with empty minds and hearts, which do not desire more than their 
minimum needs, they treat their possessions as the best. No passage in the 
Laozi articulates the dichotomy of rigid demand of needs or desires and non-
rigid ones, whereas Plato distinguishes them in the Republic (the Republic 
Book VIII 559a-d). However, we can find the implicit implication that the rigid 
demands for the Laozi are those in chapter 3 where the bellies should be 
fulfilled for the maintenance of life; whereas, non-rigid demands are those 
beyond the minimum needs for the sake of sensual pleasure. Once the ruled 
long for something for the sake of sensual pleasure, they chase those 
pleasures, leading to the heart being disturbed again. In this manner of 
speaking, needs beyond the minimum required to live should be eliminated.  
As Virág argues “first, they represent desire for unnatural things—things that 
are created (zuo 作) by the “sharp” tools and ingenuity of civilised life. Second, 
insofar as such sensual desires are not inherent to the natural human being, 
but are aroused by external things, they signal our vulnerability and passivity 
to things beyond our control…and third, these sensual desires differ from more 
natural forms of desire insofar as they can never be satisfied; they endlessly 
reproduce themselves, leading one to constantly yearn for new sources of 
pleasure and delight.”275 
I fully agree with Virág that unlike bodily desires, sensual desires can never be 
satisfied, because they are not inherent to us.276 She argues that sensual 
 
274 chapter 80 甘其食，美其服，安其居，樂其俗。 
275 Virág, C. (2017). The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy. Oxford University Press, p. 
85 
276 Ibid, 86-93 
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desires are not innate to humans, but are provoked by external objects, which 
indicates the vulnerability and passivity to things beyond moral agents’ control. 
Furthermore, sensual desires endlessly reproduce themselves creating a 
longing for more and more after each sensual desire is satisfied, because in 
her argument, she believes that civilisation creates things and concepts in 
human society such as socially constructed good and moral values such as 
filiality 孝 xiao and so on. According to Virág’s explanation, “aware of fulfilment 
知足 zhizu”277, stated as the “sagely awareness” means the higher level or 
forms of knowing, can satisfy the natural desires, yet sensual desires cannot 
be satisfied because the spawning of sensual desires is fuelled by civilisation 
and its products.278  
However, I disagree with Virág’s interpretation on the point of ‘awareness of 
fulfilment 知足 zhizu’, because I assert that the way to minimise bodily desires 
should be through awareness of fulfilment (知足 zhizu), since emotional desire 
should be completely eliminated, and only for bodily desires, is there a 
standard of minimum intrinsic demands. That is to say, only if moral agents are 
unaware of fulfilment (不知足 buzhizu), are desires for needs beyond their 
minimum demands aroused. The awareness of fulfilment (知足 zhizu) requires 
the moral agent’s self-reflection on knowing the amount and kind of what they 
need. On the other hand, emptying emotional desires from the heart is the 
condition for the moral agent to act wuwei, because emotional desires for the 
Laozi are the trigger of the motivation that drives moral agents to act in ways 
that generate the chaos of moral agents and society. Nevertheless, we can 
 
277 For the discussion of the awareness of fulfilment 知足 zhizu, to see Moeller’s book the 
philosophy of Daodejing, chapter 6, p. 94, he argues that for the contentment the Laozi does not 
differentiate among desires belonging to bodily, emotional or even states. I argue against that 
there is desires of states in the Laozi, because desires of the states should belong to the emotional 
desires of rulers. The states do not have autonomy to conquer other states, rather rulers intend 
to conquer other countries. 
278 Virág, C. (2017). The Emotions in Early Chinese Philosophy. Oxford University Press, p. 
86. 
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find few supportive ideas for the condition of emptying the heart in the Laozi 
that do not disturb the moral agent’s heart by the perceptions of desirable 
objects, apart from the aforementioned passage.    
I shall now move on to discussing how zhizu can lead moral agents to the 
status of guayu that is the ideal-like state in human society. The Laozi indicates 
that the best moral psychological situation for moral agents is to be in a state 
of having no desires (無欲 wuyu). In chapter 37,279 the passage does not 
merely reveal the consequence of being in a state of having no desires, but 
also reveals the tension between the motivation of the creation and non-
motivation, viz. the desire to act and having no desires. In this chapter, it is 
envisaged that the world possesses the traits of self-transformation (自化 
zihua), self-implementation (自正 zizheng), and self-settling (自定 ziding) to be 
associated with the dao at the ideal level. We can see that in the Laozi all these 
‘self’ features are under the same condition that is associated with the dao at 
the ideal level having the traits of wuwei and wuyu. Actions performed in the 
status of wuyu is not triggered by the motivation that is provoked by desires, 
but rather by the given situation that indicates all performed actions are self-
motivated and spontaneous, rather than interfering actions. Thus, the world 
regulated by the dao at the ideal level is ideal, and the performed actions are 
self-motivated because of the moral agent being in the status of wuyu. 
On the other hand, constantly 常  chang having desires youyu is also 
emphasised in chapter 1 of the Laozi, and attention on it has been drawn on 
the connection with the contemplation of the dao. As aforementioned, we 
 
279 Chapter 37 道常無為而無不為。侯王若能守之，萬物將自化。化而欲作，吾將鎮之
以無名之樸。無名之樸，夫亦將無欲。不欲以靜，天下將自定。The Dao in its regular 
course does nothing (for the sake of doing it), and so there is nothing which it does not do. If princes and kings 
were able to maintain it, all things would of themselves be transformed by them. If this transformation became 
to me an object of desire, I would express the desire by the nameless simplicity. Simplicity without a name is free 
from all external aim. With no desire, at rest and still, all things go right as of their will. (translated by James 
Legge) 
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cannot find anything explicitly in the Laozi that offers the procedure of transiting 
from the status of youyu to that of wuyu, nor does it offer elucidation of 
coexisted contradiction. On the contrary, the syntactical instances of coexisted 
contradiction scatters throughout the text, such as “its largest square doth yet 
no corner show; A vessel great, it is the slowest made; Loud is its sound, but 
never word it said; A semblance great, the shadow of a shade”.280  Such 
passages can be treated as the manifestation of the dao by means of the 
reversals. As Liu Xiaogan notes, ‘this method’ is the application of the value of 
ziran and wuwei, which employs the desireless motivation to the regulation of 
human society.281 Moral agents need to satisfy their natural physical bodily 
desires and also those emotional desires that are aroused by their encounters 
with the external world, and thus it seems impossible for them to reach, and 
stay in, the state of the ideal moral psychological situation. However, the Laozi 
provides an intermediate state for moral agents and this is the state of having 
few desires guayu or buguoyu as the best situation that the moral agent can 
achieve in real human society. For this situation, moral agents have to retain 
bodily desires to sustain their lives, yet emotional desires can be emptied xu 
from the heart. Nevertheless, it is fundamental for moral agents to be aware of 
fulfilment 知足 zhizu, because if they keep eating, drinking or fulfilling other 
bodily desires beyond basic needs, it would cause chaos. Similarly, the Laozi 
suggests that the outbreak of wars at the level of the states are caused by 
desires of rulers intending to conquer or take over other states (chapter 46), 
and the occurrence of robbery at individual level is caused by desires of moral 
agents who long for luxury goods (chapter 3). In the Laozi, desires initially 
trigger the moral agents to act to obtain what they want; and, according to the 
philosophy of the Laozi, the action driven by desires would normally have 
negative consequences, such as the outbreak of wars or the occurrence of 
robbery. Thus, the Laozi indicates that the optimal situation for moral agents 
 
280 Chapter 41 大方無隅；大器晚成；大音希聲；大象無形 
281 Liu Xiaogan, 2015 Laozi ninadai xinkao ji sixiang xinquan, sanminshuju, Taiwan, P. 162 
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would be in the state of having no desires 無欲 wuyu.282 In chapter 46, the 
Laozi depicts the gradual reinforcement of the adverse situations that arise 
from emotional desires and not being aware of being fulfilled 知足 zhizu as: 
“the sin cannot be greater than having something to desire, The misfortune 
cannot be greater than being not self-fulfilled; the fault cannot be greater than 
desiring to obtain. 罪莫大於可欲；禍莫大於不知足。咎莫憯於欲得.”283 The 
term “can be desired 可欲” appears in chapter 3 and in chapter 46 “不見可欲 
do not see what can be desired.” We can see that for those desires held by 
the heart, the mistake is to start desiring and so it is best to have no desires at 
all. Thus, when the Laozi says in chapter 1 that “常有欲 there are always 
desires” it indicates that the basic bodily desires are consistent and will always 
be with moral agents. That is to say, it is impossible for moral agents to have 
no desires in real human society, of which the Laozi is consciously aware. 
Thus, once moral agents empty themselves of emotional desires and are 
aware of fulfilment 知足 zhizu, they will attain the status of 寡欲 guayu, which 
indicates that bodily desires of moral agents are retained, but emotional 
desires are emptied from the heart.  
I shall now draw a short conclusion of my arguments regarding this aspect of 
the Laozi. I have shown that desires are categorised into bodily and emotional 
desires, in which bodily desires pertain to the body and emotional desires 
pertain to the heart. The Laozi argues that desires are necessary for the moral 
 
282 LaFargue, M. (1992). The tao of the Tao te ching : A translation and commentary (SUNY series in 
Chinese philosophy and culture). Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, p.45. And 
Ames, R.T. & Hall, D.L., (2004). Daodejing : "making this life significant" : a philosophical 
translation First trade paperback., New York: Ballantine Books, 149. 
283 Chapter 46 天下有道，卻走馬以糞。天下無道，戎馬生於郊。禍莫大於不知足；咎
莫大於欲得。故知足之足，常足矣。The human world conceives the dao, the horses are 
distributed in order to work in the field. The human world does not conceive the dao, the war-
horses are born in the border lands. The misfortune cannot be greater than being not self- 
fulfilled; the fault cannot be greater than desiring to obtain. Thus, the fulfilment of knowing 
the fulfilment, that is consistently fulfilled. 
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motivations of the moral agent to act in real human society, because firstly, the 
Laozi believes that moral agents in real human society consistently have 
desires, and secondly, even in the ideal-like situation moral agents will have to 
retain bodily desires and attain the capability of being aware of fulfilment 知足 
zhizu. Yet, in the ideal situation, moral agents act wuwei which is conducted 
by the judgment of the given situation in the state of having no desires. In the 
following section, I will start analysing the notion of desires as the motivators 
for moral agents in Plato. 
3.5 Moral Motivation in Plato 
Plato discusses many aspects of the issue of moral motivation, including why 
moral agents should act morally, how to make the action moral to the moral 
agent, and why the knowledge of morality is motivating.284 In this section, I 
focus primarily on the tripartite soul and the relations between the tripartite soul 
and desires. In the Republic, Plato discusses that moral knowledge is sufficient 
to motivate the moral agent to act morally. This discussion concerns whether 
it is belief or desire that motivates the moral agent to act, or a combination of 
the two. According to Socratic intellectualism, knowledge should govern the 
moral agent’s decisions of conduct. Early Platonic dialogues indicate that not 
only should moral agents act in a predicable way, but if any two moral agents 
have the same belief, then they would act identically. For Platonic Socrates, 
knowledge is sufficient to motivate moral agents to act, he denies any 
dispositions, emotions and desires to motivate the agent to act. In this part, I 
focus on how each of the different parts of the soul motivate the moral agent 
to act. I will also attempt to show how Plato answers the question of moral 
motivation in which beliefs or desires motivate the moral agent to act and I will 
demonstrate how human desires act as a motivation for moral agents to act. 
But whether it is belief or desire that triggers the moral motivation is more 
difficult to elucidate. This is because in the Republic Book 4, Plato presents 
that the rational part of the human soul will makes judgements of what is the 
 
284 Vasiliou, I., 2016. Moral motivation : a history, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 15. 
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best for the whole soul, but the other parts of the human soul will overcome 
the rational soul and make judgements (Republic 441e). That is to say, desires 
that belong to each part of the human soul will motivate moral agents to act 
differently. I suggest that Plato indicates that actions are right if they are 
performed by moral agents who harmonise their tripartite souls, i.e. gathering 
and putting in good order the reason, spirited and appetitive parts of the soul. 
Plato notes that “What do you think about knowledge? … Most people think 
this way about it, that it is not a powerful thing, neither a leader nor a ruler… 
while knowledge is often present in a man, what rules him is not knowledge 
but rather anything else – sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes 
pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of his knowledge as being utterly 
dragged around by all these other things as if it were a slave. Now does the 
matter seem like to you, or does it seem to you that knowledge is a fine thing 
capable of ruling a person, and if someone were to know what is good and 
bad, then he would not be forced by anything to act otherwise than knowledge 
dictates, and intelligence would be sufficient to save a person?” (Protagoras 
352 b8-c8) Within this passage, Plato does not say that all people would be 
controlled by their emotions but rather used ‘most people’. The main point of 
this passage in the Protagoras is to argue that if a moral agent had the 
knowledge of what good is, they would not act contrary to what they know. 
Moral agents would perform the action that results in the better outcome rather 
than the one resulting in the worse outcome. For example, a moral agent with 
knowledge of the drawbacks of smoking cigarettes would be aware that not 
smoking is far better for his or her health and would commit to not smoking. 
Most scholars believe that Socrates thinks that having knowledge of the good 
is sufficient for people to be good and virtuous, and furthermore to act 
consistently virtuously. On the basis of this understanding of Socratic 
Intellectualism, it is clear that Socrates denies the situation of akrasia, the 
weakness of will.285 However, Plato presents the division of the human soul 
that allows the moral agent to be affected by a weakness of will. The affection 
 
285 Vasiliou, I., 2016, p. 20. 
 The Moral Agent in the Laozi and Plato 
Chapter 3  139 
of the weakness of will for moral agents generates conflict within the moral 
motivations, which appears in the Republic Books 4, 8, and 9 and also the 
Phaedrus (Phaedrus 246a) regarding the conflicts of the tripartite soul and the 
great speech on the charioteer which represents the tripartite soul.286 
To this point it is clear that Socratic Intellectualism, firstly advocates that 
actions or moral actions are led by the knowledge of moral agents, and 
secondly it denies the weakness of will by advocating that moral agents will 
always be rational and commit to the better course of action. However, as I 
mentioned above, Plato allows for conflicts among different parts of the human 
soul, thus, it is clear that there is a mismatch between the early dialogues on 
the theory of motivation — Socratic Intellectualism — and the later dialogues 
— the relationship between the motivation and the tripartite soul. Rachana 
Kamtekar suggests firstly that the middle and later dialogues deny that non-
rational parts of the soul motivate moral agents to act in isolation from 
reasoning; and secondly, in the early dialogues, Socrates also recognises the 
non-rational parts of the soul, but that they motivate moral agents indirectly.287 
She further argues that “all these motivations are ours, even when acting on 
them undermines our pursuit of our own good”.288 It is therefore necessary to 
look at the theory of the tripartite soul and the moral psychology as well as 
actions motivated by each part of the tripartite soul.  
3.6 The Tripartite Soul as the Motivator of Actions in 
the Republic 
According to Plato the soul is made up of three parts, the rational soul, the 
non-rational soul and the appetitive soul: the rational part of the soul is 
attached to knowledge and truth as well as regulating the life of  the moral 
agent in respect of the whole soul and the rational soul itself, (Republic 442c); 
the non-rational part of the soul consists of the spirited part of the soul 
 
286 Ibid. Vasiliou presents similar argument in his book. 
287 Kamtekar, R. (2018). Plato's moral psychology : Intellectualism, the divided soul, and the desire for 
good (First ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.2. 
288 Ibid, p.131. 
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associated with anger, which in some situations is also associated with the 
rational part of the soul; the appetitive soul is responsible for natural and sexual 
desires, as described in the Republic Book 4 (Republic 436b-441c).289 Plato 
suggests that these three kinds of desires are quite different from one another 
and trigger different actions. I suggest that Plato is saying two things; first, 
desires are necessary motivations for moral agents to act, although there 
would be a conflict between different kinds of desires; and second, each part 
of the soul can motivate moral agents to perform voluntary actions. 
 
Let’s try to determine in that way whether these parts are the same or different. 
… it is obvious that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites 
in the same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if 
we ever find this happening in the soul, we will know that we aren’t dealing with 
one thing but many. 
Plato believes that the parts of the soul are distinct by virtue of the fact that the 
same thing cannot do different things at the same time (Republic 436b, cff. 
439b). Whilst it is plausible that the human soul consists of different parts, it is 
necessary to have a closer look at the rational part that is in charge of thinking 
and reasoning and which performs the role of controlling the agent to act. Plato 
declares that in the battle between bidding and forbidding of drinking, 
forbidding triumphs bidding and thus the forbidding is in charge. The passage 
reveals two aspects: in one aspect, the non-rational part has the possibility and 
capability to motivate the agent to act, and in the other aspect, the appetitive 
part of the soul is implicitly deemed the less influential part.  
 
289 There are many literatures regarding this point, such as: Irwin, T. (1995). Plato's ethics. 
New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press. Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). An introduction to 
Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lorenz, H. (2006). The brute within : Appetitive 
desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford philosophical monographs). 
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Based on an assumption that one thing cannot do different things at the same 
time, Plato implies which actions are driven by different parts of the soul 
(Republic 436b8).290  Based on this passage and 439c,291 it is credible to draw 
the conclusion that there are two parts of the soul attempting to motivate moral 
agents to act in different ways, i.e. either drinking or not drinking while being 
thirsty. 292  Nevertheless, it is impossible to draw the conclusion from this 
passage that the rational part of soul is always able to suppress the non-
rational part of the soul,293 unless Plato himself implicitly sets up an argument 
that the rational part of the soul is hierarchically higher than non-rational parts 
of the soul. Furthermore, it is a matter of fact, according to Plato, that the 
appetitive part of the human soul would motivate moral agents to drink while 
having appetitive desires, whereas the rational part of soul would forbid 
drinking for other reasons. However, based on the passage 439c, it is 
impossible to judge whether drinking or non-drinking is the right decision to 
make. Plato further argues that the rational part of the human soul cares for 
the interest of the whole soul, but the other two parts only take care of their 
own aspect, thus the rational part of the human soul should rule (Republic 
 
290 Irwin, T. (1995). Plato's ethics. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 204. 
291 The Republic 439d notes that “Hence it isn’t unreasonable for us to claim that they are two 
and different from one another. We will call the part of the soul with which it calculates the 
rational part and the part with which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other 
appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and pleasures.” 
292 Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Annas thinks that Plato here meets two grave drawbacks. “Firstly, the parts it produces do not 
seem to be the same as the parts that Plato’s account of the individual actually needs, and 
which he makes use of throughout the book. Secondly, there is something odd about the 
argument’s status, for it establishes the distinctness of the parts on the basis of a necessary truth, 
whereas elsewhere (581b-c) he argues from experience that the distinctness of the parts can be 
seen in the different kinds of lives people lead.” (p. 125) 
293 In the Republic 441e, Plato notes that the rational part of human soul take cares of the 
interest of the whole soul, and foresight for the whole soul as well. 
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441e).294 Up to now, I have demonstrated that based on the Republic Book IV 
436-440, Plato argues that the rational and appetitive parts of human soul 
possess their own desires that can motivate moral agents differently at the 
same time.  
John Cooper argues that the case of there being two contrary desires is 
incomplete and unclear, because Plato does not explicitly declare that to which 
the rational part of human soul goes against, i.e. if the reason goes against the 
object that the appetitive desires long for or goes against the appetitive desires 
as a whole. Although Cooper finally concludes that the function of the rational 
part of human soul in this passage is to rule and care for the interest of the 
whole soul rather than just pursue knowledge of the truth, he also argues that 
avoiding doing something, which can be expressed as ‘the reason restrains 
moral agents from doing such and such’, does not mean that the moral agent 
is motivated by the reason to prevent them from doing such and such. For 
example, he describes a thirsty person who longs to drink, yet also knows that 
the only available water will cause illness. The thirsty person therefore chooses 
not to drink to avoid becoming ill. Cooper believes that, in this case, the 
choosing not to drink is driven by a desire not to be ill rather than a contrary 
desire not to drink, leading him to argue that these two desires are physical, 
rather than the contrary desires that are derived from different parts of the 
human soul, i.e. the rational and appetitive.295 
I agree with Cooper that the rational part of the human soul functions to rule 
and care for the interests of the whole soul and that it has two functions in the 
Republic. Firstly, at 581b, the rational part is the part that loves wisdom and 
 
294 Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). An introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.126. 
The rational part of human soul is expressed to have two functions: 1. At the Republic 581b, 
the rational part is the part that loves wisdom and loves learning. The rational part of human 
soul pursues the knowledge of the truth and attain pleasures to do this. 2. at 441e, the rational 
part of human soul rule the whole soul, since it knows what is the best for the soul as the whole. 
295 Cooper, J.M., 1984. Plato's Theory of Human Motivation. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1(1), 
pp.3–21, p.6-8 
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loves learning. The rational part of the human soul pursues the knowledge of 
truth and attains pleasures in so doing. Secondly, at 441e, the rational part 
rules the whole soul, since it knows what is best for the soul as a whole. 
However, I disagree that in the case of drinking contaminated water those two 
desires are both derived from physical desires, i.e. the feeling of thirst and the 
aversion to being ill from drinking contaminated water. The aversion to being 
ill is based on the judgement made from the process of reasoning that the only 
available water is contaminated. The moral agent either has seen the water 
being contaminated or has examined the water and found it to be 
contaminated. Furthermore, not only does reasoning make the judgement that 
the water is contaminated, but also evaluates and knows that this water will 
cause illness if consumed. Based on the process of reasoning, the moral agent 
should not drink this water despite being thirsty unless the act of not drinking 
will result in a worse outcome than drinking – illness from contaminated water 
is better than death through lack of water. Thus, the desire to drink is a physical 
desire and the decision not to drink is a judgement.  
In this scenario the judgement is made by the rational part of human soul and 
the physical desire is made by the appetitive part of human soul, in terms of 
the tripartite human soul, Plato also presents the spirited part of the human 
soul in alliance with either the rational part or the appetitive part of human soul. 
The spirited part of the human soul is complex in the Republic Book 4, 8 and 
9, in the passage 441a, and appears to be closer to the meaning of the word 
‘to thumoeiudes’, which means anger, leading to having a strong tendency to 
be aggressive and violent. Thus, Plato said that this part of the soul can also 
be found in children and animals (Republic 441 a-b, cff. 375 a-b). 296 
Nevertheless, in passage 581 a-b, the spirited part of the human soul is ‘wholly 
 
296 Cooper, J.M., 1984, Cooper has a detailed analysis of the connotation of ‘to thumoeiudes’ in 
his paper, he argues that the love of honour and fame for the spirited soul is derived from the 
connotation of ‘anger’. And also Annas mentions the translation of ‘spirited’ is from ‘to 
thumoeiudes’. Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). 
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dedicated to the pursuit of control, victory and high repute,’ (the Republic 581 
a10) which people can feel proud of. The Republic 436b 
Republic 440a8-b1 
Besides, don’t we often notice in other cases that when appetitive forces 
someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets 
angry with that in him that is doing the forcing, so that of the two factions that 
are fighting a civil war, so to speak, spirited allies itself with reason?  
Plato presents an example of Leontius and a corpse, which elucidates how the 
spirited part of the soul assists the rational part of the soul against the 
appetitive part of the soul (Republic 440a8-b1), and how there is a conflict 
between different parts of the soul (Republic 439e). Leontius was motivated 
by the appetitive part of his soul to look at a corpse, while the rational part of 
his soul motivated him to do the opposite. In the passage Plato reveals the 
conflict between the spirited and the appetitive parts of the soul, since the 
spirited part of the soul will always ally with the rational part of the soul 
(Republic 440e2-4). Through this anecdote, Plato demonstrates that when 
moral agents are motivated by the appetitive part of human soul, the spirited 
part of the human soul allying with the rational part would be provoked and get 
angry toward themselves.  
It is reasonable to question whether Plato’s anecdote of Leontius does 
demonstrate a connection between the spirited part and the rational part of the 
human soul. It appears that the anecdote reveals that Leontius possesses two 
contrary desires, one to look at the corpse, and one to avoid looking at the 
corpse. However, are they contrary desires on the same level or two layers of 
desire? The first layer is the aversion to looking at the corpse, and the second 
layer is the desire to look at corpse,297 because the spirited soul, being different 
 
297 Lorenz, H. (2006). The brute within : Appetitive desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 
philosophical monographs), pp. 16-7. He has pointed out this interpretation as well in his book, 
I am sympatric to his argument. 
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from the appetitive soul, can make a contrary judgement against the appetitive 
soul and its desires (Republic 440a3). At first glance, the spirited part of the 
human soul seems to align itself with the rational part, because the rational 
part of the soul tells Leontius that it is shameful to look at the dead body. Whilst 
Plato states that the rational part of the human soul concerns the interest of 
the whole soul, his Leontius anecdote entails and implies that the spirited part 
of soul has the capabilities of independently judging the value of actions. 
Leontius’ anger is triggered by the spirited part of his soul as a result of 
persisting in pursuing the fulfilment of his appetitive desires and because of 
the conflict between his rational desire and appetitive desire. Hendrik Lorenz 
argues that there are two kinds of desires, namely first-order desires and 
second-order desires. First order desires are those conflicting desires moral 
agents would possess in a given situation such as Leontius possessing the 
desire of looking or not looking at the corpse. The second order desires are 
the aversion to the first-order desires, namely, in the anecdotal anger aroused 
from Leontius towards himself as a result of looking at the corpse. He argues 
that the second-order desires are value-based motivations that involve the 
reason to judge if the action motivated by the first-order desires are moral. He 
further arrives at the conclusion that the second order desires are higher and 
more sensitive and responsive to the first order desires, and the spirited part 
of the soul is also contained or involved in the second order desires.298 I agree 
with him that the spirited part of the human soul contains an independent 
motivation to trigger moral agents to act upon it. However it is puzzling why he 
seems to place the spirited part of the human soul higher than the rational part 
of the human soul because the first-order desires include decisions made by 
the rational part of the human soul, i.e. the contrary desires – desiring to look 
at the corpse is the appetitive desire and repulsion at looking at the corpse is 
made by the rational part of the human soul. It seems to me that Lorenz places 
the contrary desires in the first order desires because he treats these two 
contrary desires on the same level.  In the anecdote, according to Lorenz, the 
 
298 Ibid, pp. 16-7. 
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anger comes later and involves value-based judgment, the second order 
desires are higher than the first order desires. Thus, the spirited part of the 
human soul is higher than the rational part of the human soul. The action of 
Leontius swearing at himself is motivated by the spirited soul, even though 
Leontius feels and agrees with the judgement of the reasoning that it is 
shameful to look at the corpse. This clearly shows that the spirited part of the 
human soul could, on its own, motivate moral agents to perform actions 
accordingly. It is a kind of moral motivation that can be educated in accordance 
with Plato (Republic 549e- 550c). The moral agent was lured by both the 
nourishment of teaching for the rational part of the human soul and that of the 
spirited and appetitive parts of human soul. The moral agent is exposed to 
these two tensions of forces, which makes them settle in the middle to be 
victory-loving and becomes a proud and honour-loving person. This kind of 
education makes the moral agent care more about how their own ‘ideal’ image 
appears to others. If the actions performed when they are under the control of 
the spirited part of the human soul downgrades or does not match up to their 
‘ideal’ self-image, then due to a desire to preserve their honour their anger 
would be aroused to go against what she or he has done.299 
Furthermore, the three parts of the human soul, i.e. appetitive, spirited and 
rational soul, can all be motivators of action for moral agents. The rational part 
of the human soul is in charge of reasoning; the spirited part is in charge of 
honour-loving and victory-loving; and the appetitive part is in charge of natural 
desires. They are different from and have the capacity of conflicting with each 
other in some situations. Plato declares at the Republic441e, the rational part 
of the human soul rules the whole soul, since it knows what is best for the soul 
as a whole. To take the example of Leontius, the decision made by the rational 
soul, despite taking the considerations of the spirited soul into account, not to 
go against the desire of looking at the corpse for the sake of the interest of the 
 
299 Annas, J., & Plato. (1981). Annas uses the term “the self-image” to describe this kind of 
situation. It means similarly that the moral agent does not reckon that this kind of action should 
not be done by him, because this does not fit his understanding of himself. (p. 128) 
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whole soul, whereas the anger expressed is based on the spirited soul and 
only considers the honour of the moral agent, rather than the interest of the 
whole soul. Given this premise, the conclusion can reasonably be drawn that 
actions motivated by the rational part of the human soul prevail over actions 
by the spirited soul and the appetitive soul.  
We find that in the Republic 436a, 441e, 549b4, 580d, 581b Plato claims that 
the rational part of the soul is wise, and exercises foresight on behalf of the 
whole soul. The rational soul according to Plato ‘loves wisdom and loves 
learning’. It is in charge of two things, one is to learn where the truth lies, and 
the other is to search for the truth and find pleasure from learning (Republic 
581b). The functions of the rational soul are presumed by Plato as the premise 
of his argument that the life of a person who has been shaped and led by the 
rational soul is better than the one that is led by other parts of the soul. 
Nevertheless, there is no elaboration of the reason why the rational part of the 
human soul functions and cares for the interest of the whole soul. Depending 
on this open question, we cannot assert that a life led by the rational soul is 
better than one led by other parts of the human soul. Since this question is 
closely related to the life of the moral agent and the function of the rational part 
of the human soul, it is necessary and helpful to recall and to have a look at 
the Timaeus on the final moral ends of the moral agent – what kind of life 
should be the best for the moral agent live – and also what is the relationship 
between the rational part of the human soul and the procedure of attaining the 
final moral ends.300 In this part, I will mainly focus on the development of the 
tripartite soul as the motivators for moral agents to perform actions, and how 
and why the rational part of the human soul has been established as the best 
and the greatest moral source for motivations. 
Timaeus 88b states that “Given that human beings have two sets of natural 
desires — desires of the body for food and desires for the most divine part of 
 
300  Johansen, T.K., 2004. Plato's Natural Philosophy: A Study of the Timaeus-Critias, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 151. 
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us for wisdom — the motions of the stronger part will predominate and amplify 
their own interest. They render the functions of the soul dull, stupid and 
forgetful, thereby bringing on the gravest disease of all: ignorance.”301 It can 
be seen that in this passage Plato claims that there are two kinds of natural 
desires, i.e. bodily desires and rational desires for the knowledge of the truth, 
and both kinds of desires are for the well-being of the moral agent, the bodily 
desires are for the body, and the rational desires are for the soul. Plato 
distinguishes two other categories of desires, which are necessary desires and 
unnecessary desires. Desires are necessary if they are helpful for the health 
and well-being of the moral agent, whereas they are unnecessary if they go 
beyond this and seek things which are harmful to “both the body and to the 
reason and moderation of the soul” (the Republic 559d-e).302. Those desires 
that cannot be dismissed or restrained, or whose satisfaction is good for us are 
necessary desires (558 d8). The rational part is the part that loves wisdom and 
loves learning and pursues knowledge of the truth and attains pleasures in so 
doing (581b).  For Plato, these two kinds of desires or motivations for the same 
reason need to be fulfilled, because the implication of the juxtaposition of these 
two desires indicates each part of the human soul being deficient in something, 
i.e. desires of appetitive is deficient in food and drink, being the same with the 
desires in wisdom. The bodily desires should be fulfilled for the energy of the 
function for the rational soul (Timaeus 43b).  
The process by which the cosmic soul is created displays interaction between 
the motions of the cosmic soul and cognition. That is to say, in the process of 
the creation of the cosmic soul, (Timaeus 37c-d), on the one hand, it reveals 
the process of the creation of the cosmic soul, and on the other hand, 
establishes how intelligence works in accordance with the operation of the 
particular parts of the cosmic soul relating to the procedure of thinking and 
 
301  Cooper, J., & Hutchinson, D. (1997). Complete works. Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett 
Publishing. 
302 This is in a similar fashion to the Laozi on the bodily desires that are also separated into the 
basic needs (necessary desires) and the exceeded needs (unnecessary desires). 
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cognition. Every rational soul is created in the same manner and quality 
(Timaeus 41e),303 and each is made with the same ratios of materials but yet 
less pure materials in the same fashion (Timaeus 41d4-7). This indicates that 
the rational (immortal) soul of the human being is supposed to work in the 
same manner as the cosmic soul including the motions and the circles of the 
Same and the Difference (Timaeus 35b-37c). However, once the rational soul 
is embedded into the human body, then the rational soul does not merely come 
across a single motion, but rather seven motions, Plato explains it with the text: 
Timaeus 43a-d 
“They proceeded to fuse them together with copious rivets so small as to be 
invisible, thereby making each body a unit made up of all the components. And 
they went on to invest this body — into and out of which things were to flow — 
with the orbits of the immortal soul. These orbits, now bound within a mighty 
river, neither mastered that river nor were mastered by it, but tossed it violently 
and were violently tossed by it. Consequently the living thing as a whole did 
indeed move, but it would proceed in a disorderly, random and irrational way 
that involved all six of the motions. It would go forwards and backwards, then 
back and forth to the right and the left, and upwards and downwards, 
wandering every which way in these six directions. For mighty as the 
nourishment-bearing billow was in its ebb and flow, mightier still was the 
turbulence produced by the disturbances caused by the things that struck 
against the living things. Such disturbances would occur when the body 
encountered and collided with external fire (i.e. fire other than the body’s own) 
Or for the matter with a hard lump of earth or with the flow of gliding waters, or 
when it was caught up by a surge of air-driven winds, the motions produced 
 
303 41b … and to the extent that it is fitting for them to possess something that shares our name 
of ‘immortal’, something described as divine and ruling within those of them who always 
consent to follow after justice and after you, I shall begin by sowing that seed, and then had it 
over to you. The rest of the task is yours. Weave what is mortal to what is immortal, fashion 
and beget living things. Giver them food, cause them to grow, and when they perish, receive 
them back again. (translation from Cooper, J., & Hutchinson, D. [1997].) 
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by all these encounters would then be conducted through the body to the soul, 
and strike against it.”304 
As I argued in the last chapter, the totality of the human soul is the rational soul 
bonded with the non-rational soul and embedded in the human body. The 
rational soul becomes affected because this immortal part of the soul is joined 
with the human body by “many rivets” unlike the cosmos and the cosmic soul 
which is a dynamic construction produced by the two working together 
(Timaeus 34b8-c2). The rational soul cannot really function when it first gets 
into the human body because of the affections from different angles and 
motions. The motion of the circle of the Same and the Difference are affected, 
one stops and the other is deflected, causing the rational soul to not operate 
in the infancy of a human life. This explains the issue Plato left open in the 
Republic, where at birth the spirited soul is in charge of the human body, and 
as Plato claims that “in small children, one can see that they are full of spirit 
right from birth, while as far as rational calculation is concerned, some never 
seem to get a share of it, while the majority do so quite late” (Republic 441 a8-
b1). The human body nourishes the rational soul and enables it return to the 
original orbits (Timaeus 44b2-5) “if such a person also gets proper nurture to 
supplement his education, he’ll turn out perfectly whole and healthy, and will 
have escaped the most grievous of illnesses” (Timaeus 44b8-c2). 
In the Republic, as I argued above, Plato does not justify that the decision 
made by the motivation of the rational soul is always better or more moral than 
the other parts of the soul. However, in the Timaeus, he does offer reasons 
why the motivations from the rational soul are better and more moral than from 
other parts of the soul and argues it would be best for the moral agent to follow 
the motivation of the rational soul rather than the spirited or the appetitive soul. 
The immortal soul or the rational soul is situated in the head, because the 
shape of the head resembles the shape of the cosmos (Timaeus 44e-45b). 
The rest of the mortal soul has been placed in the human body. There are two 
 
304 Translation from Cooper, J., & Hutchinson, D. [1997]. 
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parts of the soul, the one called the spirited soul is placed in the trunk near to 
the head and submits to the rational soul (Timaeus 69d5); the other, called the 
appetitive soul is placed in “between the midriff and the boundary toward the 
navel” (Timaeus 70e1-2), and is in charge of natural desires, such as 
nourishment for the human body.  
Ideally, the best motivation of the moral agent is to follow the decision made 
by the rational soul because, according to Plato in the Republic, the rational 
soul is in charge of calculation, weighing and measuring out the rest of the 
parts of the soul (Republic 441c). The embodied soul as a whole may 
experience and be in either good or bad status through the interaction of the 
body and the embodied soul. According to Timaeus 86b, “The foregoing 
described how diseases of the body happen to come about. The diseases of 
the soul that result from a bodily condition come about in the following way. It 
must be granted, surely, that mindlessness is the disease of the soul, and of 
mindlessness there are two kinds. One is madness, and the other is ignorance. 
And so, if a man suffers from a condition that brings on either one or the other, 
that condition must be declared a disease.” We can see that the overwhelming 
input for the desires or the motivation of the bodily appetitive desires will put 
the embodied soul in a state of disease. The intake of food, drink and sexual 
enjoyment will pass through the body and reach the embodied soul (Philebus 
35 c-e). It needs balanced and harmonious decisions for the motivation, rather 
than fulfil the desires of the spirited and appetitive souls. “All that is good is 
beautiful, and what is beautiful is not ill-proportioned” (Timaeus 87c7). This 
passage indicates that on the one hand, the motivation of the embodied soul 
as a whole should be well calculated and fulfilled, and the only part of the soul 
that has the capability of the calculation is the rational soul. On the other hand, 
it matches up the harmony of the rational soul in terms of the process of the 
creation. Aristotle interprets the process of the creation of the cosmic 
soul/rational soul as: “the soul having been composed from elements and 
divided according to harmonious numbers, he bent the straight soul into a 
circle so that the soul would both have cognate perception of harmony and 
move the universe in symphonic motions” (De Anima i.3 406b28–31). Because 
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the rational soul is created in harmonious fashion, through the motions of the 
circle of the Same and the Difference, the calculation is drawn out as the best 
decision for the moral agent to do. Thus, this shows that the rational soul 
reasons and manages the best motivation for the moral agent.  
A comparison of the Laozi and Plato in respect of moral motivation clearly 
shows that both draw attention to the connection between desires and 
motivation for action by moral agents. Both argue that desires are necessary 
for the motivations of moral agents to act and both think that a right action 
should be performed by moral agents who are in the appropriate state. For the 
Laozi the moral agent should be in the state of wuyu having no desires, 
whereas for Plato the moral agent should act based on motivation that is 
derived from the rational part of the human soul. However, Plato and the Laozi 
differ in their thinking on the notions of desires. In the basic level of comparison 
between the Laozi and Plato, both argue that the appetitive desires are natural 
and innate to moral agents. For both, although explained differently, there is a 
basic need to fulfil the appetitive desires which are necessary for the moral 
agent to live. However, the exceeding needs for the appetitive desires are 
considered emotional desires for the Laozi but as unnecessary desires for 
Plato that desist the moral agent from pursuing wisdom and the truth. Plato 
suggests in the Republic 439a that appetitive desires include the objects and 
the quality of the object, because moral agents not only pursue the need to 
fulfil appetitive desires, but also feel attraction and repulsion (Republic 437c, 
cff. 589e). Plato and the Laozi have similar views on appetitive desires, but 
Plato elaborates it in more detail than the Laozi in respect of the relationship 
between appetitive desires and motivation for the right action. Moreover, both 
agree that moral agents can be shaped (the Laozi) and educated (in Plato) so 
as to regulate the desires that motivate them to act. However, they differ in the 
best life for the moral agent. The best life for the moral agent in Plato is to let 
the rational soul rule the whole human body and soul, whereas the best life for 
the moral agent in the Laozi would be to have no desires that trigger the moral 
agent internally, but that instead action is triggered by the whole context of the 
situation within which the moral agent is situated. For Plato, letting the rational 
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part of the soul rule the life of human beings is the final moral end that leads 
human life to become as godlike as possible, whereas for the Laozi the final 
moral end is acting wuwei and being in the state of having no desires and to 
live in accordance with the dao. 
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In this thesis I have found, interpreted, evaluated and compared the notion of 
moral agent and its related concepts including the formation of moral agent, 
the final moral end, and moral motivations in the Laozi and Plato. I have 
furthermore shed some light on how these findings could contribute to the 
same issue in contemporary moral theories.  
In the introduction I defined the notion of the moral agent in the Laozi and Plato 
as an autonomous person or entity which can deliberate and make a decision; 
they are also accountable for their actions and the consequences of their 
actions. And I have shown that we can find the notion of the moral agent has 
two levels; the empirical level and the universal level. The empirical level of 
the moral agent mainly refers to individuals; whereas the universal level refers 
to the ideal role model in both the Laozi and Plato; the sage in the Laozi and 
the philosopher king in Plato. I identified that contemporary moral theories also 
consider the moral agent, but I have shown that both consequentialism and 
deontology consider the moral agent at the empirical level, creating an issue 
in each: 1. consequentialists, despite having the nature of  happiness as their 
moral motivation, are moral egoists whose main concern is happiness in the 
sense of pleasure and who may to some extent neglect or further abandon 
some intrinsic good such as virtues for the sake of maximised happiness; 2. 
deontologists have developed answers to the question why moral agents are 
willing to be principled, or to fulfil their duties. I have demonstrated that in both 
the Laozi and Plato a link can be found between the final moral ends and their 
moral motivations which can contribute to a resolution of these issues in 
consequentialism and deontology.  
In the first chapter I demonstrated that both the Laozi and Plato have 
distinguished and ranked different kinds of goodness. Both advocate that the 
highest goodness should be the intrinsic good and its best consequences 
because they consider that a properly formed moral agent will simultaneously 
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possess the intrinsic good and achieve the best consequences. After this, I 
focused on the ideal moral agent, which was the sage in the Laozi and the 
philosopher king in Plato as well as the process of the formation of those two 
ideal moral agents.  
In the second chapter I explored the final moral ends in both the Laozi and 
Plato. I found that both the Laozi and Plato believe that the moral agent should 
be assimilated to the higher authorities, i.e. for the Laozi the moral agent 
should live in accordance with the dao, whereas for Plato the moral agent 
should order the rational parts of the embodied human soul through observing 
the heavenly bodies and learning mathematics. In more detailed analysis of 
the Laozi, I have argued that there are three layers of the Weltanschauung that 
have been demonstrated, which have a close relation to three layers of the 
conceptions of the dao. On the other hand, in my analysis of Plato, I have 
mainly explored and examined the Timaeus in respect of the creation of the 
cosmic soul and the rational and mortal parts of the human soul so as to 
scrutinise the issue of the final moral ends in Plato as “to become like gods as 
much as possible”. I have found that for Plato “to become like gods as much 
as possible” means to get the rational part of the human soul assimilated to 
the cosmic soul. 
In the third chapter I considered the issue of moral motivation in the Laozi and 
Plato which has a close relation to their final moral ends, because the final 
moral ends lead to, and answers, the question of why the moral agent wants 
to be principled or wants to do something right or good. I found that both the 
Laozi and Plato think that desires are necessary for the moral motivation of the 
moral agent to act. In the Laozi, emotional and bodily desires will trigger 
different kinds of motivations for the moral agent to act. However, while the 
Laozi supports bodily desires being fulfilled, it espouses that emotional desires 
that pertain to the heart shouold be dismissed; whereas in Plato, I argued that 
three parts of the embodied human soul can be the motivators of the moral 
agent to act, nevertheless Plato merely reckons that the motivation can be 
moral only in the situation that the rational part of the soul rules the whole 
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human soul due to the merely rational soul’s consideration that is for the benefit 
of the whole human soul.  
Finally, I identified that the Laozi and Plato have the same attitudes towards 
bodily desires and emotional/rational desires. Both think that bodily desires are 
natural and innate desires for moral agents. For Plato, some bodily desires are 
necessary to be satisfied and also that is necessary for the moral agent to 
function their rational part of the human soul in order to reach the final moral 
ends. Similarly in the Laozi, innate bodily desires can be fulfilled in order to 
achieve the ideal state. Neither Plato nor the Laozi treats bodily desires in a 
negative way but rather shows how to deal with those bodily desires so as to 
achieve the status of being morally good. Both argue that moral agents can be 
shaped (the Laozi) and educated (in Plato) and regulated in a certain way so 
as to control their desires that would motivate them to act in different ways.  
In conclusion, by exploring the notion of the moral agent in both the Laozi and 
Plato, I believe I have demonstrated the notion of the moral agent and its 
related aspects, the formation of the moral agent, the final moral ends and 
moral motivations by means of comparative analysis and that this comparison 
demonstrates their relevance to contemporary discussions on 
consequentialism and deontology. I hope in future this research will inform and 
enrich the discussion on the topic of the moral agent.  
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